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ABSTRACT 
 
In one hundred days between April 6 and July 15, 1994, the Rwandan genocide took 
away the lives of approximately 800,000 Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus. The United 
Nations estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 individuals were raped or sexually 
assaulted during the genocide, and rape was used as a tool of war with a clear genocidal intent to 
destroy the enemy. Both men and women subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual torture, sexual 
slavery, sexual mutilation, and various other types of abuse and humiliation. As the genocide 
ended with the victory of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Rwanda was 
confronted with a multitude of challenges, including holding perpetrators accountable, helping 
survivors reconcile with the past, and moving the country towards reconstruction. As an attempt 
to reckon with this painful past and the emerging challenges at present, Rwanda and the 
international community turned to transitional justice and hoped to deliver justice and 
reconciliation. Internationally, the United Nations Security Council established International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to investigate and prosecute high-level perpetrators, and various 
countries held trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction to try perpetrators who fled 
Rwanda after the genocide. Domestically, Rwanda sought justice and reconciliation in the 
national courts, the local gacaca courts, and various reparation programs.  
At the most preliminary level, this thesis provides a systematic comparative analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses of international and domestic transitional justice mechanisms in 
bringing comprehensive justice – both retributive and restorative – to victims of rape and sexual 
violence during the genocide. This thesis argues that no mechanisms were perfect; each 
mechanism had different strengths and weaknesses. Internationally, the ICTR and universal 
jurisdiction trials in other states were particularly successful in creating jurisprudential norms of 
  iii 
prosecuting rape and sexual violence as serious crimes under international law. Domestically, the 
national courts and gacaca functioned as concurrent justice mechanisms, and were together able 
to uncover some truth about the genocide and prosecuted approximately 9,000 individuals for 
rape or sexual torture. Additionally, assistance programs, especially in terms of housing and 
healthcare, were delivered to some sexual violence survivors. Despite these achievements, both 
international and domestic transitional justice faced several shortcomings in bringing 
comprehensive justice for victims of rape and sexual violence. Compared to the estimated 
250,000 to 500,000 rape cases during the genocide, retributive justice delivery in all levels was 
inadequate. Additionally, all mechanisms were not very successful at investigating and 
prosecuting sexual violence against male and Hutu victims. No mechanism was successful at 
uncovering truth about and prosecuting crimes committed by the RPF, and this appearance of 
“victor’s justice” was detrimental to national reconciliation between the two ethnic groups in 
Rwanda. Moreover, the operation of reparation programs within Rwanda also marginalized a 
large number of survivors of rape and sexual violence.  
Because of these shortcomings, this thesis argues that to many Rwandan victims of 
sexual crimes, truth, justice, and reconciliation were impossible. The thesis points out that 
different survivors had different conceptions of justice and reconciliation, and that social stigmas 
surrounding sexual crimes were a constant independent variable that inhibited the justice 
process. The thesis ends with a summary of research findings and provides recommendations for 
future research and future transitional justice projects. 
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1. THE AFTERMATH 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At some point, a FAR soldier picked me out of the group and took me to a nearby 
bush. This soldier raped me. After he was done with me, he took me to a house 
and told the owners of the house to keep me safe so that he could rape me every 
time he came. He told them if anything happened to me he would kill them. Over 
five days, I was raped five times a day.1 
 
At 8:30 pm on April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana 
and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down during its descent approach into 
Kigali International Airport, killing everyone on board. What immediately followed was the start 
of one of the fastest and most horrific genocidal conflicts the world has witnessed since the 
Holocaust. President Habyarimana’s death provided Hutu extremists with complete control of 
the government, the military, and security services, effectively setting in motion the genocide of 
Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus. In 100 days between April 6 and July 15, 1994, the 
genocide resulted in the deaths of approximately 800,000 people at the rate of 333 1/3 deaths per 
hour and 5½ deaths per minute.2  Hutu extremists employed various genocidal strategies, 
including using state-sponsored and privately owned media outlets, to propel violence against 
Tutsi “cockroaches.”3 The principals of the genocide were able to mobilize a large population to 
participate in widespread killing to an unprecedented degree. To many, death, however, did not 
come quickly. The level of brutality exceeded imagination; victims were tortured both physically 
and psychologically before death, and subjected to the most painful and humiliating treatments 
                                                
1 Testimony by Marie Louise Niyobuhungiro in Anne-Marie De Brouwer and Sandra Ka Hon Chu, The Men Who 
Killed Me: Rwanda Survivors of Sexual Violence (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), 32 
2 Michael N. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2002), 1 
3 Gerald Gahima, Transitional Justice in Rwanda: Accountability for Atrocity (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 
44 
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possible. Some were buried alive; some were mutilated and left to bleed to death, while others 
were forced to kill their children, spouses, or friends before being killed themselves.4  
Twenty-two years have passed, and the Rwandan genocide is still regarded as one of the 
most horrific mass atrocities in recent history. However, many forget that one of its most brutal 
aspects was the widespread use of rape and sexual assaults as genocidal tools. In the years 
leading up to the genocide, Tutsi women were especially targeted by genocidal propaganda. In 
December 1990, the Hutu paper Kangura, meaning "Wake up," published its "Ten 
Commandments of the Hutu" with special references to Tutsi women:  
1. Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the 
interests of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any 
Hutu who: 
§ Marries a Tutsi woman; 
§ Befriends a Tutsi woman; 
§ Employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or concubine. 
2. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and 
conscientious in their role as woman, wife, and mother of the family. Are 
they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? 
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons 
back to reason. 5 
 
Through these Commandments, Kangura created the conditions that made sexual attacks of 
Tutsi women a foreseeable part of the genocide.6 Tutsi women were also accused of using their 
sexuality to enslave Hutu men for the promotion of Tutsi hegemony.7 Moreover, the depiction of 
Tutsi women through the propaganda contributed to the attitudes toward them – “that they were 
objects to be dominated, humiliated, dehumanized, and destroyed.”8 United Nations officials 
                                                
4 Ibid 45 
5 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic, 2002), 338-339 
6 Usta Kaitesi, Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence: The Legacy of the ICTR, Rwanda's Ordinary Courts and 
Gacaca Courts (Cambridge, Antwerp, and Portland, OR: Intersentia, 2014), 71 
7 Ibid 7 
8 Alex Obote-Odora, "Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR Contribution," New England Journal 
of International and Comparative Law I. 12 (2005): 140 
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estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 people were raped during the 100 days of conflict.9 
Rape was often committed in public spaces such as schools and roadblocks, in view of husbands, 
children, and relatives. With neither children nor the elderly spared, Rwandan women were 
subjected to rape, gang rape, sexual torture, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation, the cutting open of 
wombs and removing of fetuses, and other types of abuses and humiliation.10 As social and 
political weapons, rape and sexual assaults functioned to fulfill genocidal visions by leading to 
physical death, community breakdown, and the dilution of the next generation.11 It is crucial to 
note that Tutsi men and boys, as well as Hutu women who were married to Tutsi men and/or 
deemed sympathizers of the Tutsi, also suffered from sexual violence, albeit to a much lesser 
extent.12 It is this combination of frequency, pervasiveness, and brutality with a clear genocidal 
vision that made rape an actual tool of genocide itself.  
The long-term impact of gender-based violence, however, did not stop when the genocide 
ended, as Rwandan women were left in extremely dire socioeconomic conditions. Many rape 
survivors were infected with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and either died or are 
dying of HIV/AIDS.13 Since many traditional male breadwinners of the family were either killed 
or imprisoned, women became heads of the households and bore the burden of not only 
supporting themselves and their children, but also of providing food for their imprisoned 
relatives.14 An estimated 5,000 babies were born as a result of rape during the genocide, and 
innocently served as a painful reminder of the traumatic events their mothers experienced.15 In 
                                                
9 De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu 16 
10 Gahima 45, Kaitesi 76 
11 James E. Waller, “Rape as a Tool of “Othering” in Genocide,” in Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide, eds. Carol 
Rittner and John K. Roth (Paragon House, 2012), 85 
12 Kaitesi 5 
13 Gahima 45 
14 Human Rights Watch, Struggling to Survive: Barriers to Justice for Rape Victims in Rwanda (New York, 2004), 
10 
15 Gahima 45 
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addition, many women faced humiliation, loss of respect and dignity, and extreme stigmatization 
by community members once it was known that they were raped. The list of traumatic effects of 
rape and gender-based violence goes on, and the ultimate question remains: Could there ever be 
justice for Rwandan victims of rape and sexual violence, and what would such justice look like? 
This question of justice arose within the multitude of challenges facing post-genocide 
Rwanda. The military victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) brought the end of the 
genocide, leaving the country with a damaged social fabric, economy, and capacity to deliver 
essential public services. Torn apart by the death of almost one million Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus, with thousands remaining as refugees and internally displaced people, Rwanda was 
confronted with the difficult dilemma of how to deliver justice for survivors and hold 
perpetrators accountable while simultaneously moving the country towards reconstruction and 
reconciliation. These issues of immediate urgency emerged at a crucial moment in history when 
the international community was also concerned with ending the culture of impunity for gross 
human rights violations – not just in Rwanda, but also across the globe.16 For instance, in 
Europe, atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia resulted in the establishment of the ad 
hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in August 1993, a few 
months prior to the start of the Rwandan genocide. The creation of an international tribunal 
mandated by the United Nations was the culmination of the international community’s efforts to 
date to bring accountability for gross human rights violations in international politics, especially 
in the aftermath of war. The irony, however, lay in the fact that the same community, 
exemplified by the United Nations and its Security Council, did almost nothing to either prevent 
or stop the genocide in Rwanda despite having early and sufficient evidence that such a genocide 
                                                
16 Ibid xxxvii. 
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took place.17 To confront the various demands for justice and reconciliation, Rwanda and the 
international community turned to an emerging field of praxis and study: transitional justice.18 
Transitional justice is not a specific type of justice, but rather “an approach to achieving 
justice” for countries in the wake of conflict and/or state repression.19 It refers to a set of judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms utilized by states to reckon with the legacy of gross human rights 
violations. These mechanisms include, but are not limited to, criminal prosecution, truth 
commissions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms.20 Through these various methods, 
states aim to accomplish various goals, including: holding perpetrators accountable for gross 
human rights violations, providing opportunities for healing for victims, uncovering truth and 
testimony to create an official historical record and a “collective memory,” eliminating impunity 
to cultivate a culture of respect for human rights, promoting reconciliation across social 
divisions, and recommending ways to deter future repetitions of gross human rights violations.21  
Within the universe of transitional justice for Rwanda, various mechanisms were 
implemented. Within the confine of this thesis, the following mechanisms are selected as the 
main objects of investigation. In terms of criminal prosecution, four mechanisms were 
implemented. In the international sphere, the United Nations mandated and created the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to investigate and prosecute masterminds of 
the genocide responsible for gross human rights violations. In addition, many countries to which 
genocide planners had fled, including Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United 
States, implemented trials to prosecute genocide crimes based on the principle of universal 
                                                
17 For more information, see Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to A Genocide 
18 Gahima xxxvii 
19 International Center for Transitional Justice. Web. https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice 
20 Ibid 
21 Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: 
Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 3 
  6 
jurisdiction.22 Within Rwanda, the state made various attempts to prosecute every participant of 
the genocide in its domestic courts. These attempts proved to be unworkable, as the justice 
system was so overwhelmed by the genocide caseload that some serious crimes, such as rape, 
were not being investigated and prosecuted.23 Rwanda then turned to a traditional form of justice 
by modifying and reinstalling the gacaca courts, a form of communal and local justice whose 
name means “justice on the grass” in Kinyarwanda. Gacaca in its traditional form was as a 
system of communal justice in which prisoners were brought before lay judges, who were often 
elected from the village populations and trained briefly in a system of dispensing justice.24 While 
the traditional form of gacaca was purely restorative, the modification and reinstallation of the 
gacaca system after the genocide contained both retributive and restorative elements. In addition, 
the thesis also investigates the effectiveness of domestic reparation programs in delivering 
economic justice and facilitating reconciliation for victims of rape and sexual assault.   
This thesis argues that both local and international transitional justice mechanisms for 
post-genocide Rwanda were imperfect; each possessed different strengths and weaknesses in 
bringing both retributive and restorative justice to victims of rape and sexual violence. Some 
measure of justice was delivered; some truth was uncovered; and some reparation was paid to 
victims. Internationally, the ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction were 
able to prosecute a handful of high-level perpetrators. The ICTR was particularly successful in 
creating jurisprudential norms on prosecuting rape and sexual violence under international law. 
Domestically, the national courts and gacaca operated as concurrent justice mechanisms, and 
were also able to prosecute approximately 9,000 perpetrators of sexual violence. The Rwandan 
                                                
22 Gahima 192 
23 Ibid 66 
24 Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass 
Atrocity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2004), 12 
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government also paid more attention to reparations and developing new laws that attempted to 
improve women’s sociopolitical and economic status. Both domestic and international 
mechanisms were able to contribute to some aspects of reconciliation for victims of rape and 
sexual violence.  
Despite these achievements, all mechanisms faced several shortcomings. Compared to 
the estimated figure of between 250,000 and 500,000 cases of rape and sexual violence during 
the genocide, retributive justice delivery was inadequate. In addition, all mechanisms were 
insufficient in bringing justice to male and Hutu victims of rape and sexual violence, and no 
mechanisms were able to uncover truth and prosecute crimes committed by the RPF. Ethnic 
tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi dominated Rwanda and underpinned the genocide, and 
this appearance of “victor’s justice” constituted a major impediment to national reconciliation. 
International mechanisms focused predominantly on retributive justice, and paid inadequate 
attention to reparations and reconciliation. While reconciliation was one of the ICTR’s objectives 
listed in its mandate, the Tribunal’s foreign location in Arusha and its lack of public outreach 
effort significantly undermined its contribution to reconciliation. Within Rwanda, the national 
courts system was devastated after the genocide and overburdened by the large number of 
detained genocide suspects. It was not until gacaca was implemented as a concurrent justice 
mechanism that national mechanisms were able to bring more perpetrators to justice. Gacaca 
was a local justice mechanism situated within each community, and this proximity proved to be a 
double-edge sword: it was able to facilitate justice for some victims, but simultaneously 
maximized the fears of social stigmas and reprisals for many others. Additionally, while gacaca 
was implemented to facilitate the pursuit of both truth and justice, it decidedly focused on justice 
at the expense of truth, despite the fact that not much justice was actually served. Finally, the 
  8 
operation of reparation programs also marginalized a large number of survivors of rape and 
sexual violence. The thesis concludes that social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual 
violence were an independent variable that inhibited the justice process. Survivors of sexual 
crimes had different conceptions of justice and reconciliation, and to many, a full measure of 
justice was unfortunately impossible.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Justice is most effective when it works in tandem with other processes of national 
reconstruction and reflects the crucial needs of those most affected by violence.25 To victims of 
rape and sexual violence in Rwanda, these “crucial needs” included the pursuit of justice, the 
uncovering of truth about what happened during the past, and reparations, especially in terms of 
housing and access to healthcare. Justice for Rwandan victims of rape and gender-based 
violence, in order to be comprehensive and effective, must therefore be both retributive and 
restorative. Retributive justice requires criminal prosecution and “punishment of the guilty.”26 In 
a society that values the close-knit spirit of families and communities like Rwanda, however, 
victims of rape are usually stigmatized and ostracized by their own community, preventing them 
from coming forward about their traumatic experiences in court. In addition, the public nature of 
judicial processes often constitutes an inhospitable environment for victims of gender-based 
violence. It is how different transitional justice mechanisms attempted to resolve this tension 
between the public nature of criminal prosecution and the personal nature of rape and sexual 
assault that this thesis seeks to analyze.  
Since Rwandan women were left in extremely dire socioeconomic conditions after the 
genocide, justice solely in terms of criminal prosecution does not suffice. Restorative justice is 
                                                
25 Ibid 11 
26 Jennifer J. Llewellyn, “Restorative Justice in Transitions and Beyond,” in Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and 
Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies, ed. Tristan Anne Borer (University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 90  
  9 
therefore a crucial element of investigation in this thesis. Restorative justice seeks to recognize 
and address the harms to all of the relationships involved during the conflict, including, but not 
limited to, the relationship between “the victim and wrongdoer, between the victim and 
wrongdoer and their respective and various communities, and between the different communities 
involved.”27 Restorative justice is thus often described as justice for victims or sometimes as 
restoration of the moral order, which may be achieved through other means than prosecution and 
punishment.28 While different scholars disagree on a single definition of restorative justice, the 
consensus remains that its focus should be less on crime and more on compensating for the harm 
done to the victim and the society, especially through reparation programs.29  
In the context of restorative justice, feminist transitional justice scholars30 have pointed 
out that while it is well known that war is gendered, less recognized is that peace is gendered as 
well.31 The preoccupation of transitional justice with violations of public political and civil rights 
has the tendency to marginalize the various harms experienced by women, especially violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights, because they are usually deemed private and non-
political.32 This preoccupation thus usually results in the exclusion of women and omission of 
gendered harms from transitional justice procedures.33 As a result, this thesis looks at the 
peacetime status of Rwandan victims of rape and gendered-based violence holistically. Through 
the lens of restorative transitional justice, the delivery of second-generation human rights usually 
                                                
27 Ibid 91 
28 Ibid 87 
29 Hugo van de Merwe, “Delivering Justice during Transition: Research Challenges,” in Assessing the Impact of 
Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research, eds. van der Merwe et al. (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2009), 119 
30 For more information, see Fionnuala Ní Aolain, Dina Haynes Francesca, and Naomi Cahn R. On the Frontlines: 
Gender, War, and the Post-Conflict Process (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011)  
31 Tristan Anne Borer, "Gendered War and Gendered Peace: Truth Commissions and Postconflict Gender Violence: 
Lessons from South Africa," Violence Against Women 15.10 (2009): 1170 
32 Catherine O’Rourke. Gender Politics in Transitional Justice (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 6; Borer, 
“Gendered War and Gendered Peace,” 1172 
33 O’Rourke 7 
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translates into reparations programs and the process of reconciliation and re-integration of 
victims into their communities.  
The concept of “reconciliation” deserves particular attention. While reconciliation is 
often described as a desirable and crucial step towards a sustainable peace, there is no widely 
agreed-upon definition for reconciliation. Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein argue that 
reconciliation can be defined as the development of a mutual conciliatory accommodation 
between different persons or groups engaging in war and political violence.34 Tristan Borer 
offers an approach to defining reconciliation by dividing it into two overarching subcategories: 
individual reconciliation (IR) and national unity reconciliation (NUR).35 While IR is usually 
associated with healing, apology, and forgiveness, NUR is usually described in terms of 
tolerance, peaceful coexistence, the rule of law, human rights culture, and democracy. Borer 
argues that while the IR and NUR models of reconciliation are qualitatively different and serve 
different functions, both are necessary for sustainable peace.36 In addition, Pablo de Greiff offers 
a comprehensive conception of reconciliation:  
Reconciliation, minimally, is the condition under which citizens can trust one 
another as citizens again (or anew). That means that they are sufficiently 
committed to the norms and values that motivate their ruling institutions, 
sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also on the 
basis of those norms and values, and sufficiently secure about their fellow 
citizens’ commitment to abide by and uphold these basic norms and values.37 
 
Reconciliation is therefore a complex and nuanced process that must be developed 
incrementally. Situating the concept of reconciliation in the context of Rwanda, the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda defines reconciliation by dividing it into six 
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different yet overlapping variables: 1) understanding the past, present and envisioning the future 
of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social 
cohesion.38 Because of the Commission’s legitimacy and cultural understanding of Rwandan 
society, and the report’s extensive research and survey methodology, this thesis seeks to use this 
nuanced definition of reconciliation through a gender sensitive lens.  
First, reconciliation requires acknowledging of the past and educating future generations 
of the genocide, which must include recognition of the widespread use of rape and sexual 
assaults during the genocide. Second, the sense of citizenship and national identity must be 
shared by victims of rape and sexual assaults, which can be partly constructed by the gradual 
changes in local communities’ perceptions of the victims. Third, the citizens’ confidence in 
governmental institutions and the political culture can only be developed through the 
government’s specific attention to victims of rape and sexual assault, which can be demonstrated 
through reparation programs. Fourth, security and justice can be developed from both retributive 
and restorative justice for victims, which this thesis seeks to analyze. Finally, social cohesion 
must mean the reintegration of victims of rape and sexual assaults in their communities. This 
reintegration can only be developed incrementally through the construction of an equal gender 
relation between men and women, and the elimination of the social stigma and ostracism facing 
victims of rape and sexual assaults. These different elements of reconciliation, especially social 
cohesion, will take a long time to be implemented and are difficult to quantify. Since all 
transitional justice mechanisms for Rwanda have just recently ended, this thesis attempts to 
evaluate these mechanisms’ immediate impacts on victims of rape and sexual assault. The long-
term process of reconciliation must be facilitated by future policies, and this thesis seeks to 
provide some recommendations for these future projects.   
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The notion of “justice” investigated in this thesis is therefore both retributive and 
restorative. In assessing the strengths and weakness of different transitional justice mechanisms, 
the thesis seeks to analyze various elements of comprehensive justice. These elements include: 1) 
accountability for perpetrators of rape and gender-based violence, 2) economic justice for victim 
through reparations program, 3) reconciliation for and reintegration of survivors of rape and 
gender-based violence into their communities, and 4) post-transitional justice national and 
international legal developments concerning survivors of rape and sexual violence. 
Research Questions 
Drawing on scholarship on gender-based violence and transitional justice as a theoretical 
framework, the thesis employs national (domestic courts, the gacaca system, and reparation 
programs) and international (the ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction) 
engagement in Rwanda’s transitional justice in a comparative case study. This thesis contributes 
to the growing field of transitional justice by focusing on the following research questions:  
1) Given the personal nature of rape and gender-based violence, and the social stigma 
surrounding victims of such crimes, what were the strengths and weaknesses of local and 
international transitional justice mechanisms in delivering the aforementioned elements 
of restorative and retributive justice for victims of rape and gender-based violence? 
2) Did the objectives of local and international transitional justice mechanisms, in some 
cases, work against each other? If so, how did these discrepancies affect the outcomes of 
transitional justice for victims of rape and gender-based violence? 
3) To what extent did different transitional justice mechanisms pay attention to violations of 
both first-generation (civil and political) rights and second-generation (economic, social, 
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and cultural) rights? How did this attention, or lack thereof, affect these mechanisms’ 
ability to deliver comprehensive justice for women?  
The scope of this thesis is summarized in this diagram: 
 International Domestic/Local 
Retributive Justice 
(accountability and 
setting legal 
precedents) 
A 
- The ICTR  
- Trials based on the 
principle of universal 
jurisdiction 
B 
- National criminal 
court system 
- The Gacaca system 
Restorative Justice 
(reparations and 
reconciliation) 
C D 
- The Gacaca system 
- Domestic reparation 
programs 
 
Hypotheses 
The following are the thesis’s principal hypotheses: 
In terms of retributive justice 
A: The physical distance of the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, the language barrier between 
the victims and the Tribunal, and the public nature of an international tribunal would create an 
inhospitable environment for victims to come forwards. Third-party trials based on the principle 
of universal jurisdiction would face the same challenges.  
The ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, however, had the 
potential to push for more development in international law concerning victims of rape and 
gender-based violence, and women’s rights in general. The findings of the ICTR had the 
potential to influence the construction of the Rome Statue and future cases at the International 
Criminal Court.  
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B: Given the damaged state capacity after the genocide and the widespread participation 
of civilians as génocidaires, the domestic criminal system was unlikely to have brought justice to 
victims of rape and sexual violence in Rwandan.  
The local gacaca system, in contrast, had the potential to be more effective at 
investigating and trying cases of rape and gender-based violence. Because of gacaca’s public 
nature and the stigmatization of their respective communities, victims would face the same 
challenges of testifying about their experiences in international courts. However, gacaca was a 
traditional system situated within the local community and had significant cultural legitimacy. 
This communal environment and legitimacy could potentially create a less hostile environment 
for victims to come forward.  
In terms of restorative justice 
C: The ICTR would show several weaknesses in delivering economic justice and 
facilitating reconciliation for victims of rape and gender-based violence. Given its preoccupation 
with prosecuting the masterminds of the genocide, the ICTR would show a tendency towards 
prosecuting violations of first-generation and bodily-integrity human rights, while neglecting the 
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights.  
D: While the modification of the gacaca courts included retributive elements, its 
communal environment and restorative elements still remained. The gacaca system was likely to 
be effective in facilitating reconciliation for victims of rape and sexual assaults. In addition, local 
nongovernmental organizations would have a better chance of working with the gacaca system 
than with the ICTR in pushing for more economic justice and reparation programs to facilitate 
reconciliation. 
Case Selection and Contribution to the Literature 
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Transitional justice is emerging as one of the most exciting and complex interdisciplinary 
fields of social science. Many political scientists and legal scholars, such as Ruti Teitel, Neil 
Kritz, A. James McAdams, and William Schabas, have published extensively on the topic.39 
There is also a substantial amount of scholarship in the field on transitional justice on Rwanda, 
with scholars Timothy Longman, Mark Drumbl, and Phil Clark emerging as some of the most 
prolific.40 Similarly, given the widespread use of rape and sexual assault in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia, many feminist scholars such as Cynthia Enloe, James Waller, and Janie 
Leatherman have written extensively on this horrendous tool of war and its prominence in armed 
conflicts. 41  The integration of transitional justice and feminist scholarship on gendered 
dimensions of war is, however, less developed. There is not as much literature on the 
effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms in addressing the legacy of sexual violence and 
improving the conditions of victims of rape after conflicts. Even less literature has been written 
on transitional justice and gender-based violence in Rwanda itself. The thesis addresses this gap 
in the literature by providing a comprehensive and comparative study of transitional justice in 
post-genocide Rwanda through a gender-sensitive lens.  
Rwanda’s engagement in transitional justice provides an interesting case study because 
its combination of both a national legal response and an international judicial intervention is 
without many precedents. In assessing the successes of transitional justice in providing 
accountability for gender-based crimes, this thesis engages in a comparative analysis of the 
international and local sets of mechanisms along the various dimensions of justice mentioned 
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above. While criminal prosecution aimed at holding perpetrators accountable and ending the 
culture of impunity, there existed fundamental differences in their targets for prosecution. 
Internationally, the ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction focused on 
investigating and prosecuting the crimes committed by the masterminds and planners of 
genocide, many of whom used promises of rape and sexual assault against Tutsi women as a 
strategy for recruitment.42 Domestically, Rwanda’s national criminal system and gacaca courts 
focused their efforts on trying génocidaires at lower levels who engaged in direct killing and 
raping of Rwandan women. The outcomes of these different trials have left and will leave 
distinctive marks on the development of national and international laws with regards to victims 
of rape and sexual assault. The strengths and weaknesses of the local and the international 
mechanisms are one of the main motivations behind this thesis. 
Sources 
Primary and secondary literature serves as the main resources for this research. Primary 
research includes reports produced by the four main judicial procedures (the ICTR, trials based 
on the principle of universal jurisdiction, Rwanda’s domestic court, and the gacaca court), 
legislative documents pertaining to the rights of victims of rape and sexual assaults, and 
international treaty reports by the Rwandan government. Academic and legal scholarship (such 
as journal articles and books), reports produced by local, regional, and international NGOs (such 
as the International Center for Transitional Justice, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty 
International), and reports produced by the United Nations in its investigation of human rights 
violations in Rwanda serve as secondary sources. It is crucial to note that in investigating the 
situation of Rwandan women during and after the genocide, victims’ testimonies provide crucial 
and invaluable insights. Since my financial resources, lack of training in interviewing victims of 
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rape and sexual assault, and the possibilities of secondary traumatization for victims prevent me 
from conducting this type of interview myself, I actively look for these testimonies provided in 
secondary sources.  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The general question that emerged after the genocide, and still remains of crucial 
importance in intellectual and scholarly debates today, is what social, economic, and political 
factors inspired the genocide? At the most preliminary level, this section aims to provide a brief 
history of Rwanda leading up to the genocide, and how the ever-changing notions of ethnicity 
have affected Rwandan society. 
The Rwandan genocide has been historically categorized as an ethnic conflict, since its 
clear genocidal vision was to annihilate the Tutsi population in the country. The argument that 
“tribalism” and ancient tribal hatred drove the Rwandan genocide is, however, misleading. First, 
using “tribe” as a category in describing Rwanda’s ethnic category is technically false.43 By the 
mid-18th century, Rwanda was a centralized state, inhabited by the agriculturalist Hutu majority, 
the cattle-herding Tutsi minority, and the Twa, who accounted for only 1% of the population.44 
The integration of these different groups was extensive. Prior to European colonization, Hutus 
and Tutsis spoke the same language (Kinyarwanda), belonged to the same clans, honored the 
same gods, and had the same cultural practices. Many lived in the same regions and mostly in the 
same neighborhoods, and interethnic marriage was common. These communities were ruled by 
an absolute monarchy, as the all-powerful king maintained power through a hierarchy of 
competing chiefs, the majority of whom were Tutsi.45 This monopolization of power within the 
Tutsi, however, did not result in systematic or continuous violence among communities, thus 
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dispensing with the notion of “ancient tribal hatred.” Benjamin Valentino argues that during this 
pre-colonial period, Tutsi and Hutu seemed to have considered themselves more akin to castes or 
classes than to ethnic groups,46 while Scott Strauss adds that people could even “become” Tutsi 
by acquiring enough cattle.47  
The concept of race and ethnicity, however, changed drastically when German and 
Belgian colonial powers arrived in 1894 and 1919 respectively. While European rule did not 
invent the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” this colonial intervention nevertheless racialized these 
ethnic categories, rendering them exclusive and immutable.48 Impressed by a complex judicial 
system, European explorers and missionaries believed they had found in the Rwandan Tutsi a 
superior race of “natural born leaders,” while simultaneously considering the Hutu an inferior 
race.49 Involving “modern scientific” methods such as the measurement of nose and skull sizes, 
colonial anthropologists described Hutus as short, stocky, dark-skinned, and wide-nosed, while 
presenting Tutsis as tall, elegant, light-skinned, and thin-nosed. 50 Most importantly, in the 1930s, 
Belgian colonial officers instituted a rigid system of ethnic classification and introduced identity 
cards that labeled Rwandans according to their ethnicity, which was a crucial facilitator in the 
identification and widespread killing of Tutsis during the genocide. This systematic race thinking 
thus became the basis for power allocation in the colonial system, reinforcing Tutsi dominance. 
European colonial rules rendered “race” the central determinant of power, and turned “race” into 
a symbol of oppression that largely discriminated against the Hutu.51 Rwandans seemed to have 
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adopted these conceptions of race as well, further cementing the bi-polar differentiation between 
Hutus and Tutsis, and fueling hatred and division within the society.52  
Major changes in the Belgian colonial administration occurred after World War II. Under 
pressure from the newly established United Nations and the continental movement for 
independence in Africa, Belgium started the process of decolonization and relinquished its 
formal political power by introducing reforms to increase Hutu political representation.53 Some 
Catholic missionaries took this opportunity to address the oppression of Hutu masses and created 
a new Hutu political class. Through a series of legislation, the colonial government and the 
Church used their influence to implement a transfer of power from the Tutsi aristocracy to Hutu 
elites.54 The emergence of a new Hutu political class constituted the core of the 1959 “Hutu 
Revolution,” which installed a new Hutu president and Hutu-dominated government and purged 
Tutsis from positions of authority.55 The 1960 – 1961 legislative elections led to a large-scale 
victory of Parmehutu, a radical Hutu and anti-Tutsi party. Widespread violence against the Tutsi 
occurred, killing hundreds of Tutsis and forcing many to flee the country. Between 1961 and 
1963, many Tutsi refugees in Burundi and Uganda attempted to return to the country by 
launching small guerrilla attacks. While this attempt was stopped easily, the anti-Tutsi mentality 
led to organized massacres of innocent Tutsi civilians, leading to the deaths of up to 30,000 
Tutsis and resulting in more than 100,000 Tutsis forcibly fleeing the country.56 The 1959 Hutu 
Revolution thus marked the crucial transformation of ethnic identities in Rwanda. Racialized 
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ethnicities both overshadowed the organization of the country and became Rwanda’s central 
political idiom.57  
The newly established Hutu government in 1960s Rwanda was, however, neither 
democratic nor averse to repression. The post-independence Rwandan government was 
confronted with a dual mandate: 1) defining and solidifying the state as an institution with 
authority, and 2) strengthening the control of state power held by the new Hutu elites.58 The state 
controlled all aspects of lives, from education, health care, rural development, to the promotion 
of cultural and social values. Through this absolute and comprehensive control of state power, 
the elites were able to fulfill the second part of their mandate through violent means in both the 
first Republic (1962-1973) under Grégoire Kayibanda and the second Republic (1973-1994) 
under General Juvénal Habyarimana. The Kayibanda regime implemented widespread 
persecution of most former Tutsi power-holders and all Tutsi politicians, and a few opposition 
Hutu politicians. The second Republic was an equally autocratic military dictatorship that killed 
many powerful figures from the first Republic and violently cracked down on opposition and 
dissidents.59 
Despite their autocratic nature, both regimes were very successful in legitimizing 
themselves in front of both domestic and international forces by employing an ethnic, “social 
revolution” argument and a “development” argument. The “social revolution” ideology argued 
that Rwanda belonged to the Hutus, its original inhabitants who were subjugated for centuries by 
both the Tutsi and European colonizers. Referencing discrimination against Hutus under the 
colonial period, this argument constructed the government as the legitimate representative of the 
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majority Hutu and as Hutus’ sole defense against Tutsis’ attempt to enslave the country again.60 
This argument was intricately linked to the second one, which argued that the state’s sole 
objective was to facilitate economic development for the underdeveloped Hutu masses. Such 
ideology thus legitimized the state’s interference in all aspects of social life, and diverted 
attention from crucial political and social problems within the country.61 These two arguments 
together reiterated a dehumanizing notion of Tutsi evilness and helped foster an ethnic-based 
intra-Hutu and anti-Tutsi societal division. It is crucial to note that even during this period, 
political rhetoric sustained by these two ideologies already contained genocidal languages. 
Prejudice, discrimination, and racism against the Tutsi became institutionalized; violence and 
human rights abuses against the Tutsi were glorified as acts of heroism protected by almost 
complete impunity.62  
By the end of the 1980s, the Habyarimana government faced pressure from several 
fronts. Obligated to undergo structural adjustment programs, Rwanda faced a decline in food 
production per capita, a collapse in international coffee prices, and a major fall in farm cash 
incomes.63 Habyarimana’s domestic political crackdown backfired, which resulted in an increase 
in internal opposition to the single-party system. In addition, with the fall of communism in 
Europe, Western donors no longer accepted single-party dictatorships, and Rwanda was no 
exception. Under pressure from France, President Habyarimana formally ended the exclusive 
rule of his party, allowing for a vigorous Hutu opposition to rise and to challenge his presidency. 
The largest opposition party was the Mouvement Démocratique Republicain (MDR).64  
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In October 1990, Tutsi refugees under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
attacked Rwanda from southern Uganda, setting in motion a civil war between the Hutu-
dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated rebellion. The Rwandan army, with the 
assistance of foreign troops, managed to turn back on RPF invasion. The civil war did not end, 
however, as the RPF shifted to low-level guerrilla warfare and cross-borders raids from Uganda 
into Rwanda.65 By early 1992, it became clear that the Rwanda government lacked the capacity 
to defeat the RPF. In April 1992, President Habyarimana formed a coalition government with the 
political opposition and started peace negotiations with RPF rebels. The agendas during these 
peace talks included negotiations of a ceasefire, repatriation of Tutsi refugees, and a 
comprehensive political agreement for power sharing with the RPF. 66  Peace negotiations 
culminated in the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993, and the United Nations 
deployed a peacekeeping force, led by General Romeo Dallaire of Canada, to Rwanda. By nearly 
all accounts, the Arusha Accords were a triumph for the RPF.67 The Accords created a viable 
threat to the monopolization of political and economic powers held by Hutu elites. Hutu 
extremists also saw the civil war in early 1990s as a Tutsi-caused threat to Hutu political and 
economic predominance in general. They also believed that the Tutsi posed a threat to the 
physical safety of all Hutus in Rwanda.68 In addition, Prunier argues that when the political 
landscape looked as if the Tutsi were gaining extensive power through the Arusha Accords, 
“such a desperate threat called for desperate remedies.”69  
In the 1990-1993 period, the Hutu elites triggered a series of informal and irregular 
measures that laid the groundwork for the genocide in 1994. First, the hardliners linked the 
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Tutsi-dominated RPF to the Tutsi population living in Rwanda, calling them rebel “accomplices” 
and subsequently arrested as many as 13,000 civilians, mostly Tutsi.70 Second, the Rwandan 
army expanded dramatically and launched a civilian defense program to train civilian authorities 
in firearms use. This training mandate therefore incorporated civilians into the war, setting the 
stage for civilian participation in the genocide. Third, extremist politician and military officials 
started funding and organizing Hutu militia groups, including the Interahamwe (“those who 
stand or fight together) and Impuzamugambi (“those with a single purpose”). These groups 
terrorized domestic political opponents, the RPF guerrillas, and Tutsi civilian “accomplices.”71 
The training program for the Interahamwe also included instructions to create “death lists” of 
Tutsis, which would allow militiamen to exterminate Tutsi civilians.72  
Fourth, Habyarimana’s party, the Mouvement Républicain National Pour la Démocratie 
et le Développement (MRND) and its supporters funded and distributed racist propaganda 
against the Tutsi. Among the most notorious platforms was the radio station Radio Télévision 
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), which broadcasted messages perpetuating fear-mongering 
about the ruthlessness of the RPF, ethnic nationalism, and ethnic stereotyping. In addition, the 
aforementioned “Hutu Ten Commandments” published by the extremist Kangura also instructed 
Hutus to break ties with Tutsis and to protect the gains of the Hutu Revolution.73 The final 
development was the creation of a political alliance known as “Hutu Power.” The assassination 
of the elected Hutu President Ndadaye in Burundi by Tutsi military officers reverberated in the 
Rwandan political sphere. Hardliners took this opportunity to claim that Tutsis would never 
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share power and only sought domination of Hutus.74 The solidification of Hutu power indicated 
radicalization among nationalist and ethnic lines, as Hutu elite openly embraced exclusivist 
nationalism that framed Tutsis as a common enemy. In addition, various developments – the 
militia training and the “death lists,” among others – also suggested that by early 1994, Hutu 
extremists had already undergone extreme radicalization and showed genocidal tendency 
towards Tutsis.75 During this period, the government was allegedly responsible for at least 16 
major episodes of massacres against the Tutsi population.76 
Several factors affected the final decisions to launch a systematic genocide. First, the 
extremists’ efforts to deal with the Tutsi threat had failed, as the Arusha Accords provided the 
RPF with extensive political power. Second, the Hutu extremists showed a tendency to view the 
Hutu-Tutsi conflict in quasi-racial terms, assuming that all Tutsis were enemies and that 
cooperation between the two ethnicities was therefore impossible.77 These hardliners argued that 
virtually all Tutsis were supporters of the RPF. Finally, the desire of Hutu extremists to not 
repeat the “mistake of 1959” appeared to have been one of the most crucial factors in facilitating 
the decision for genocide.78 Prunier argues that the extremists thought of the genocide as a matter 
of survival, for the “mistake of 1959” had allowed for children of many refugees to come back 
and threaten Hutu hegemony.79 This cold logic was shown most clearly in Colonel Bagosara’s 
speech at a party two days before the genocide began, in which he claimed that, “the only 
plausible solution for Rwanda would be the elimination of the Tutsi.” President Habyarimana 
himself also lost a significant amount of support and trust due to his failure to protect Hutu 
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power from the RPF invasion. Many scholars speculated that the Hutu extremists were 
responsible for shooting down the airplane carrying Habyarimana on April 6, 1994.80 What 
immediately followed was one of the most horrific chapters of human history. It was within this 
historical context that gross human rights violations and gender-based violence occurred. This 
thesis seeks to analyze how international, national, and local transitional justice mechanisms 
attempted to address this gendered legacy.  
CHAPTER OVERVIEWS 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. This first chapter introduces the thesis and its 
research design, and provides a brief historical background to the social and political tension 
leading up to the genocide. The second chapter is a review of literature in the field. It first 
provides a theoretical framework for understanding rape and sexual assaults as a tool of genocide 
and a weapon in armed conflicts. It then offers an overview of the major concepts, definitions, 
and debates within the field of transitional justice. The chapter ends with the issues surrounding 
gender justice within the context of transitional justice, and situates the thesis within the 
literature.  
The third and fourth chapters are detailed cases study of international and local 
transitional justice mechanisms in post-genocide Rwanda. The third chapter focuses on the 
establishment of the ICTR and the creation of trials based on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction in other states. It evaluates the strengths and weaknesses, as well as successes and 
failures, of international mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice for victims of rape and 
sexual violence. The chapter focuses specifically on the ICTR, and analyzes how its 
shortcomings and achievements could serve as precedents for future tribunals, especially the 
ICC, in prosecuting sexual crimes under international law.  
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The fourth chapter begins with a quick overview of Rwanda’s attempt to prosecute 
participants of the genocide in its national criminal court system, which proved to be insufficient 
and ineffective. It then focuses primarily on the modification and reinstallation of the gacaca 
courts, and evaluates its success in delivering gender-sensitive justice. The chapter shows that 
the modern gacaca was a significant departure from its traditional version that was popular to 
Rwandan society, which resulted in various tensions and incompatible goals within the modern 
gacaca system. The extent to which gacaca was successful in bringing comprehensive justice to 
victims of sexual violence depended on how the victims defined justice and reconciliation. In 
addition, the chapter also evaluates whether reparation programs within Rwanda were able to 
provide assistance to survivors of sexual violence.  
The last chapter is a comparative analysis of domestic and international transitional 
justice mechanisms with regards to their effectiveness in providing accountability for the legacy 
of rape and sexual violence during the genocide. It summarizes the thesis’s research findings and 
provides recommendations for future research and transitional justice projects. 
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2. GENDERED WAR, GENDERED PEACE 
 
GENDER, ARMED CONFLICTS, AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
The past, as William Faulkner contends, is not even past. History lives on in Rwanda. As 
President Paul Kagame said, “Every Rwandan is either a genocide survivor or a perpetrator, or the 
friend or relative of a survivor or perpetrator.”81 The question of, and to some extent, the tension 
between, justice and reconciliation emerged almost immediately as the country attempted to reckon 
with its painful past. Within the multitude of challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda, the 
question of how to bring justice and reconciliation to victims of rape and sexual assault was one of 
the hardest to answer. This was a crucial national matter, because how the country reckoned with 
its past could and would set precedents for new political and social norms that dictated the 
emerging post-genocide regime. For survivors of gender-based violence, these norms would also 
impact their reconciliation and reintegration into their communities.  
As Juan E. Méndez, a prominent authority on legal transitional justice, argues, the hardest 
question is, “how to pursue the objectives of justice and reconciliation without falling into 
tokenism and a false morality that only thinly disguises the perpetuation of impunity.”82 In order to 
fully understand how Rwandan victims of rape and sexual assaults were impacted by these 
“objectives of justice and reconciliation,” it is necessary to understand the overarching issues 
facing women in both armed conflicts and transitional justice. This chapter is a review of the 
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literature and provides a brief overview of the gendered impacts of both armed conflicts and 
transitional justice on women and situating the thesis in the literature.  
GENDER AND ARMED CONFLICTS 
Militarized Hyper-Masculinity and Sexual Violence 
Hyper-masculinity dominates war and military training, which is a process of socializing 
soldiers into an extreme kind of masculinity that capitalizes on young men’s sexual insecurities 
and identities.83 This gender dimension of war and militarism is guided by the gender ideology 
that men are the protector, women are the protected, and war is men’s chosen province in which 
they can prove their masculinity.84 This protector/protected dichotomy imposes profound political 
consequences on women, as they are often associated with being victims, weak, and passive.85 
More importantly, such dichotomy also renders women extremely vulnerable to sexual violence 
committed by enemy’s men.86 This resort to sexual violence is a direct way of getting at the 
enemy by highlighting their failure to protect their women, thus emasculating and humiliating the 
enemy. The use of sexual violence and all forms of gender-based violence against women 
therefore becomes a symbolic tool of assaulting men’s pride and national honor.87  
Sexual violence takes various forms in armed conflicts, and the use of sexual violence as a 
tool of war has become an epidemic commonality. Janie Leatherman categorizes and 
conceptualizes sexual violence in armed conflicts as a runaway norm that crosses four different 
thresholds of violence: type of violence, target, agency, and loss of neutrality and safe space.88 
Leatherman defines runaway norms as “a special class of norms that produce social harms and 
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public bads,” and argues that these norms legitimize and incentivize different conflict processes 
that result in gross violations of human dignity.89 In genocides especially, Leatherman argues that 
rape and other forms of gender-based violence, such as genital mutilation and other means of 
degradation directed against sexual organs or the female body, point to the gendered nature of 
genocide, or “gendercide.”90 Within the multitude of sexual violence in armed conflicts, rape is the 
most commonly used form of violence against women.91  
Despite this commonality, scholars often situate rape and sexual violence in armed 
conflicts differently. Primordial approaches to gender and sexuality suggests that since men are 
aggressors against women, they employ rape and sexual violence to pursue and maintain 
dominance over women.92 Instrumentalist feminists, on the other hand, contend that rape and 
sexual violence is used as a means to achieve a specific end, such as the use of rape as a genocidal 
tool in Rwanda. Furthermore, a social constructivist approach highlights that understanding rape 
and sexual assault in armed conflicts requires a careful analysis of the overarching socio-cultural 
framework in which gender, sexuality, and ethnic power intersect.93 For example, Catherine 
MacKinnon argues that in the case of the former Yugoslavia, sexual violence and rape must be 
understood as part of a larger strategy of violence against women and their ethno-religious 
community.94  
Rape and Sexual Violence as A Tool of Genocide 
The instrumentalist approach to understanding rape and sexual violence points to a crucial 
aspect of violence in Rwanda: the use of rape as a genocidal tool. Scholars, however, are divided 
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on whether rape should be recognized as a tool of genocide.95 On one hand, scholars such as 
Catherine MacKinnon contend that rape, as in the case of Bosnian Muslim women raped by Serbs 
during the Yugoslav wars, was genocidal because it tended to destroy the victim and her Bosnian 
community.96 Scholars in this line of thought emphasize intersectionality; they believe that the 
intersection of gender and ethnicity is a factor that can aggravate the victims’ situation.97 On the 
other hand, Rhonda Copelon and her supporters argue that rape occurs against women not because 
of the social or ethnic group to which they belong, but because they are women.98 This rather 
essentialist approach to understanding rape in armed conflicts promotes the notion of womanhood 
as a homogenous victim group.99 This thesis aligns with MacKinnon’s line of argument and 
believes that in the case of Rwanda, the use of rape and sexual assault was genocidal. While the 
majority of victims of sexual violence are women, men and boys too can be sexually attacked. 
While men have been portrayed primarily as perpetrators, women can also assume this role to 
commit and facilitate sexual violence.100  
James Waller argues that during genocidal conflicts, rape often serves a macro-level 
purpose and is central to regime policy and directive.101 Waller writes that as a “political and social 
tool or weapon, rape can fulfill visions of genocide and ethnic cleansing by leading to physical 
death, community breakdown (including disruption of traditional gender roles), and the “dilution” 
of the next generation (including the intentional transmission of sexual diseases).”102 Leatherman 
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adds that rape is also a tool of branding, for rape creates “a lasting physical and psychological 
scar,” “invokes and re-invokes the horror of the original violation,” and “preserves and 
communicates the power of the perpetrators over family members and others in the community.”103 
In other words, the use of rape in genocidal conflicts is not result of “a few bad apples,” but rather 
represents a systemic method of violence employed with clear political motivation. As Catherine 
MacKinnon argues: 
This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also rape unto death, 
rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. It is 
rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never 
want to go back. It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape 
as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, 
to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide. 104 
 
The gender ideology that men are the protector and women are the protected is central to 
understanding rape as a tool of genocide. According to patriarchal principles, women are the male 
enemy’s property and should be used as an instrument to defeat the enemy. Raping a woman in 
armed conflict is thus a political act against her husband, father, and brother, and thus becomes a 
way to blame the enemy’s men, ethnicity, and country for failing to protect their women.105 As 
Susan Brownmiller argues, “a simple rule of thumb in war is that the winning side is the side that 
does the raping.”106 However, women also become the victims of the losing side, for raping 
women of the winning side is an act of retaliation and revenge. In a “never-ending cycle of 
revenge,”107 women find themselves raped because of the “manifestation of the heroic fighting 
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men engaged in good fight.”108 Rape, however, is not a tool only reserved for emasculating and 
humiliating the enemy. Women also face the prospect of being raped both by soldiers from their 
own countries and by peacekeepers – men who are supposed to be their protectors.109   
The Rwandan genocide exemplified the use of rape as a tool of war and genocide. Chiseche 
Salome Mibenge writes that two gendered and interwoven themes underpinned the construction of 
sexual violence as a weapon of war in Rwanda: 
First, extremists used sexual violence to reclaim the lost ground of patriarchy and 
reassert a male dominance over Rwandan women. Second, sexual violence was 
supposed to perpetuate Hutu dominance and destroy all threats to racial purity and 
unity.110  
 
Tutsi women were raped both because of their ethnicity and their gender, and their bodies became 
the figurative and literal sites of combats.111 Following the notion of a “never-ending cycle of 
revenge,” Tutsi soldiers of the RPF also raped Hutu women in revenge for Tutsi women raped by 
Hutu men. Moreover, Tutsi girls and women were also obliged to “offer themselves” to RPF 
soldiers to avoid being regarded as sympathizers of the Hutu government.112 In both sides of the 
conflict, women were raped to pay for what men from other side had done. Rape was also used as a 
tool of torture, as perpetrators employed amputation and mutilation of victims’ breast, vaginas, and 
buttocks, or features deemed to be Tutsi such as small noses or long fingers.113 Rape was also used 
as a weapon of genocide to kill and spread HIV/AIDS by perpetrators who often knew they carried 
the disease. This strategy proved to be horrendously successful, as 15 years after the genocide, an 
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estimated 70% of rape survivors were HIV-positive.114 Furthermore, the traditional roles of women 
as mothers and child-bearers were also politicized and used for ethnic cleansing. Both Tutsis and 
Hutus used women as “reproductive vessels,” and raped them to make them bear the children of 
the rapists’ ethnic identity.115 Rwandan women were raped because it was widely recognized that 
victims of rape were never acceptable to the patriarchal community and to herself, and rape could 
destroy a woman’s chance of marriage. Survivors of rape almost always live with physical and 
emotional trauma while simultaneously being treated by their family and community as “damaged 
goods, living symbols of the nation’s humiliation and bearers of ‘enemy children.’”116  
The warrior culture and its socialization of soldiers into a militarized hyper-masculinity 
have long lasting impacts even when armed conflicts have officially ended. In the United States, 
combat trauma and the stress of redeployment set the stage for homicide and domestic violence, 
and researchers have argued that those diagnosed with PTSD are “significantly more likely to 
perpetuate violence towards their partners.”117 In Bosnia, domestic violence also increased after the 
conflict. In a militarized, hyper-masculinized environment, men turned the abstract hatred of other 
nationalities into the concrete hatred of close relatives likes wives and children.118Jacquie True also 
argues that despite the official disarmament, domestic violence will escalate in post-conflict 
societies due to the “heightened militarization of the society and the celebration of armed 
masculinity.”119 Soldiers can also prey upon women for sexual advantage with impunity when the 
normal fabric of law enforcement and justice are disabled by wars. This impunity results from the 
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reality that immediate post-war violence against women is never prioritized during the process of 
national reconstruction, and is almost always considered an issue to be put off until later.120 As a 
result, while the signing of a formal peace agreement can end armed conflicts; rape, sexual assault, 
forced pregnancy, prostitution, and trafficking continue to haunt women’s lives.121 It is therefore 
widely acknowledged that domestic and sexual violence tends to increase in almost all post-
conflict societies across the world.  
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The term “transitional justice” itself is relatively new. Initially dominated by legal scholars, 
the field of transitional justice at its early stage was predominantly occupied with the questions of 
accountability in democratic transitions.122 As Ruti Teitel defines, the conception of justice in 
political transitions is characterized by “legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes.”123 The field, however, emerged out of its legal focus and became more 
interdisciplinary, as scholars of anthropology, psychology, political science, and sociology 
contribute significantly to the literature. The focus beyond legal justice then included non-legal 
concepts, including truth telling, reparations, healing, and forgiveness. Consequently, mechanisms 
of transitional justice became more diverse and included truth commission, reparation programs, 
institutional reforms, and memory projects, among many others. While there is no single and 
unanimously accepted definition of transitional justice, many of its elements remain universal. The 
International Center for Transitional Justice, the most well-known and respected research 
institution in the field, defines transitional justice as: 
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Transitional justice is not a ‘special’ kind of justice, but an approach to achieving 
justice in times of transition from conflict and/or state repression. By trying to 
achieve accountability and redressing victims, transitional justice provides 
recognition of the rights of victims, promotes civic trust and strengthens the 
democratic rule of law. 124 
 
In addition, one of the most holistic definitions of transitional justice came from the former United 
Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 2004 report, in which he defines transitional justice as: 
The notion of “transitional justice” discussed in the present report comprises the full 
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, 
serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at 
all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, 
vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof. 125 
 
This complex understanding points to two crucial and universal aspects of transitional justice. 
First, it is widely accepted and understood that states cannot bury their past wrongdoings and 
human rights violations. The pursuit of retrospective justice is a crucial task of democratization, for 
it sets the fundamental characters of a new social and political order based on the rule of law and 
respect for human dignity.126  Second, through transitional justice, the road to democracy and the 
rule of law must be constructed by a holistic and “full range” of mechanisms. This holistic 
approach, which must include both retributive and restorative justice, sometimes clashes with the 
tendency of governments to believe that different measures can be traded off against one 
another.127  
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The origin of transitional justice can be traced back to the post-World War II period.128 
This period was the heyday of international justice; the world witnessed a critical turning point 
from prior domestic responses to international responses.129 In an effort to deal with the atrocities 
committed by Nazi Germany and Japan, the international community created two international 
tribunals: the 1945 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Trials) and the 1946 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials). These trials hold historic 
significance by expanding the application of international law to individuals instead of to only 
states, and by stressing and prioritizing international law over domestic law.130 The creation and 
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials showcased that the principles of individual and 
group human rights were of international concern, and that international judicial intervention in 
bringing accountability for human rights violations could overrule the concept of national 
sovereignty.131 Since the concept of national sovereignty had been the guiding principle of 
international relations since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, this weakening of judicial sovereignty 
was a stepping-stone to the creation of the ICTR and the judicial intervention of the international 
community decades later. 
The post-World War II period also marked the creation of the United Nations (UN), its 
human rights charter, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The creation of both the UN and 
the ICJ represented a landmark attempt to fight against impunity for gross human rights violations. 
Almost immediately afterwards, delegates passed the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, creating the 
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core structure of the international human rights regime.132 The next few decades saw the adoption 
of various treaties concerning civil and political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, 
torture, and discrimination. In addition, the world also witnessed the growth of regional human 
rights courts in Africa, Europe, and Latin America, and the creation of influential human rights 
organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.133 This international 
commitment to individual human rights also informed domestic and comparative law, as 
exemplified by the emergence of a wave of related constitutionalism.134 As the Cold War dictated 
the bipolarization of the international order, this growing human rights regime came to a halt in the 
1950s. Despite its short-lived length, this immediate post-War period, in which state and individual 
wrongdoings were criminalized and a universal rights scheme was established, forms the basis of 
modern human rights law.135  
Modern transitional justice took shape in the 1980s, as a body of literature concerning 
transitional justice emerged when a number of African (Uganda, Zimbabwe) and Latin American 
(Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Uruguay) countries transitioned from dictatorships and 
authoritarian governments towards democracy.136 In addition, the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union also marked the beginning of democratization in Eastern Europe and 
South Africa.137 Following this global movement towards democratization, a new phase of 
transitional justice commenced and moved beyond retributive justice and criminal prosecution. 
The rule of law was adhered to through trials by nation-states to legitimize the successor regime 
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and advance nation building.138 However, instead of solely focusing on holding the predecessor 
regime accountable, transitional justice also turned towards questioning how to heal a society after 
a painful past and to include various rule of law values, such as peace and reconciliation between 
former enemies. This shift away from legal justice reflected a change in the understanding of 
transitional justice, which was linked with more complex conditions of nation building.139 With a 
clear need for both justice and reconciliation, scholars and practitioners questioned what type of 
mechanism was most appropriate. The debate soon revolved around the question of trials versus 
non-trial approaches, with those arguing for prosecution pitted against those in favor of amnesty.140  
In the context of transition, this debate took place when families of victims of former 
regimes and other survivors started increasing their demands for information about atrocities and 
human rights violations committed in the past.141 Uncovering the truth about human rights 
violations was considered of crucial importance to democratization, and truth telling was the 
central focus of transitional justice studies. As Luc Huyse argues, “dealing with the past is an 
inescapable task for new democratic regimes.”142 Many then turned to truth commissions, the most 
commonly used and prominent non-trial transitional justice mechanism. Transitional justice 
through truth commissions became a vehicle for victims to reconcile and recover from past harms, 
and a form of dialogue between victims and their perpetrators.143 Reconciliation thus became both 
a national and a personal matter: while society as a whole struggled to confront its past, individuals 
simultaneously attempted to rebuild and restore their social and political identity. While 
questionable and often debated, it is often suggested that truth commissions, by uncovering the 
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truth and giving victims a chance to speak, offer victims an opportunity for healing or “cathartic” 
experiences.144 In addition, Pablo De Greiff argues that truth-telling mechanisms can facilitate the 
establishment or the entrenchment of the rule of law by promoting civic trust. 145  Truth 
commissions have continued to be adapted, and the most well-known and extensively studied 
institution is the 1995-2002 Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.  
This forward-looking focus on national and individual reconciliation underlined modern 
transitional justice. In tandem with the backward-looking mechanism of criminal prosecution, 
transitional justice during this time also included apologies, reparations, memoirs and other ways 
of settling account in regards to past wrongdoings and human rights violations.146 In addition, this 
phase of transitional justice also witnessed a change in relevant political actors from those with 
legal and political authority to those with moral authority in the society, such as churches, NGOs, 
and human rights groups.147 Furthermore, this phase of transitional justice reflected a struggle 
between local and global decisions, increasing the complexity and interconnectedness of 
transitional justice, globalization, and sovereignty. The crucial question was whether and to what 
extent the response to human rights violations should remain under the control of the state where 
the harm occurred.148  
This tension was extremely visible in both the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The violent 
acts in the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides were witnessed by the entire world. Eager to redeem 
itself, the United Nations established the ICTY and ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectively. In the 
context of increasing globalization, the intersection of the principles of jurisdiction and sovereignty 
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has and will raise profound questions.149 However, it is now widely accepted that there exists a 
duty, whether on national or international level, to implement both restorative and retributive  
measures to uncover truths and prosecute crimes of genocide, crime against humanity, war crimes, 
and torture.150 This duty is a crucial tenet of transitional justice, which has become significantly 
interdisciplinary by the end of the twentieth century.  
Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Objectives 
As aforementioned, as the field of transitional justice emerged and expanded out of its 
legal-focused inception, a variety of mechanisms have been employed. While the insistence on 
confronting the past in countries in transition has become almost universal, the range of options 
remains vast and depends on the social, cultural, and political context of each country.151   
One of the most common institutions of transitional justice is criminal prosecution. 
Varying from domestic and local trials to international tribunals, criminal prosecution is a 
retributive mechanism aimed at investigating the crimes committed during conflicts, holding 
perpetrators accountable, and punishing them for their abuse.152 As Martha Minow argues, trials 
“transfer the individuals’ desires for revenge to the state or official bodies,” and respond to the 
demand for accountability, acknowledgment of past harm, and punishment.153 Many countries, 
such as Peru, Venezuela, and Egypt have used their respective domestic criminal systems to 
prosecute perpetrators, while in many other instances, such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, 
the international community intervened judicially by opening ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY 
                                                
149 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 88 
150 See Diane F. Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime." The Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (1991): 2537-615. 
151 Van Der Merwe et. al, Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice, 2 
152 Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt, "Transitional Justice: Prospects for Postwar Peace and Human Rights," in What Do 
We Know about Civil Wars? ed. Thomas David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2016), 181. Also see Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
153 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 26 
  41 
and ICTR, or through the International Criminal Court.154 In countries where post-conflict societies 
either lack the political will or capacity to prosecute perpetrators, hybrid courts, which include both 
international and domestic actors and use international legal standards, have been implemented for 
the pursuit of justice, such as in Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and Cambodia. Criminal and 
retributive justice is usually the first and most prominent demand, yet also one of the most difficult. 
Countries emerging out of a sustained period of conflict usually have a devastated judicial system, 
in which judges may be politically compromised, corrupt, timid, and/or lack expertise and 
resources.155 In addition, victims often play a limited role in this retributive justice process, and 
reconciliation is usually not the goal of criminal trials.156  
Within the repertoire of non-judicial approaches to transitional justice, truth commissions 
are the most common. Truth commissions are temporary, non-judicial bodies that are authorized by 
the state to investigate a pattern of events in a sustained period of time, to engage directly with the 
affected population, and to gather information about their experiences.157 While the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is the most well known and extensively studied, 44 other 
truth commissions have been set up in various countries, such as Argentina, Sri Lanka, Chile, Peru, 
and El Salvador, among many others.158 Truth commissions are established to gather truth and 
construct an official historical record of human rights abuses to help victims find closure and signal 
an official commitment to prevent the reoccurrence of atrocities.159 Psychological research points 
to the notion that truth telling itself is important, as survivors can be helped by sharing their story 
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to sympathetic listeners and by situating their stories within the larger social context.160 In addition, 
just as individuals need “closure,” a traumatized society can also benefit from a public airing 
leading to closure, setting the stage for former enemies to live together and creating a framework 
for non-recurrence of violence and human rights violations.161 Other non-retributive transitional 
justice mechanisms include reparations and memory projects. Reparations can be both material 
(through financial payments and social services) and/or symbolic (through public acknowledgment 
or apology). Reparations can also occur in tandem with institutional reforms to prevent recurrence 
of abusive practices and to revise the laws that facilitated such practices in the first place.162 
Memory projects, such as monuments, annual prayer ceremonies, or mass graves, create official 
records, preserve memories of people and events, and serve as public acknowledgment of past 
wrongdoings to restore the dignity of victims.163  
Furthermore, many transitional justice mechanisms include both retributive and non-
retributive elements. Some countries employ lustration, which identifies and removes politicians 
from former regime from public office.164 This method has been criticized for lacking due-process 
guarantees and for relying on false intelligence from the prior regime, and has been rare outside of 
Eastern Europe.165 Similar to lustration, some states also employ vetting or purging to remove 
those with a record of human rights abuse from security forces and other public positions.166 In 
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addition, many countries also grant amnesties to perpetrators in exchange for truth and mark a 
turning point from the conflict-ridden past to a new and more peaceful present.167   
The universe of transitional justice is therefore very diverse, and its mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive. The establishment of different transitional justice mechanisms points to a wide 
range of goals. Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman provide a brief 
summary of what has been often accepted as the overall objectives of transitional justice: 
• restoring dignity to victims and promoting psychological healing; ending 
violence and human rights abuses and preventing them in the future; 
• creating a “collective memory” or a common history for a new future not 
determined by the past; 
• forging the basis for a democratic political order that respects and protects 
human rights 
• identifying the architects of the past violence and excluding, shaming, and 
diminishing perpetrators for their offences; 
• legitimating and promoting the stability of the new regime; 
• promoting reconciliation across social divisions; 
• educating the population about the past; and 
• recommending ways to deter future violations and atrocities. 168 
 
Drawing upon these objectives of transitional justice, Pablo de Greiff concludes that all 
measures of transitional justice share two mediate goals (providing recognition to victims and 
fostering civic trust) and two final goals (contributing to reconciliation and to democratization).169 
In times of political transition, transitional justice aims to grant victims “moral standing as 
individual human beings” and “to provide victims a sense of recognition not only as victims but as 
(equal) right-bearers and, ultimately, citizens.170 Trust, on the other hand, involves an expectation 
of shared commitments to norms and values. This type of civil trust is a “disposition that can 
develop among citizens who are strangers to one another and who are members of the same 
community only in the sense in which they are fellow members of the same political 
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community.” 171  To victims and survivors of violence, civil trust can be attained by an 
institutionalized effort to confront the past as a good-faith effort to come clean, to understand and 
acknowledge long-term patterns of socialization, and to initiate a new political project around 
shared norms and values.172  
In connecting short- and long-term goals of transitional justice, De Greiff argues that 
recognition and civic trust are both preconditions and consequences of justice and reconciliation. 
Reconciliation, as defined earlier, refers to a state of social relations characterized by civic and 
norm-based trust.173 It is crucial to note that this civic trust refers to both trust among individuals 
and trust between individuals and political institutions. Making institutions trustworthy, especially 
to survivors of violence, requires an institutional transformation for which transitional justice 
mechanisms can set the stage but not produce.174 In a similar light, while the end goal of 
transitional justice is democracy, transitional justice mechanisms by themselves cannot produce 
democracy. Transitional justice can, however, contribute to democratization through its 
commitment to and the (re)establishment of the rule of law. De Greiff argues that different 
mechanisms, such as criminal prosecution and truth commissions, all represent to a promise of the 
rule of law.175 The rule of law can be promoted as a range of traditional liberal civil rights that 
victims of violence are recognized to have as citizens, and as social norms and principles that form 
the basis of civic trust as enshrined in laws.176 These rights and norms must translate into the rights 
to political participation.177  
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These short- and long-term goals of transitional justice are particularly important in the 
case of Rwanda, where Tutsis and Hutus lived in integrated communities and interethnic marriages 
were common before the genocide. On the individual level, victims of rape and sexual assaults had 
to confront the possibility of reintegrating into their communities where their perpetrators lived. 
Transitional justice mechanisms, in order to facilitate reconciliation, must acknowledge and 
legitimize the victims’ experiences, develop extensive trust between the victims and the 
perpetrators, and restore broken community ties. In addition, in most communities where victims 
of rape and sexual assaults were usually stigmatized and ostracized by their families and relatives, 
building trust between the victims and their respective community was crucial for victims to live 
peacefully and start of the process of healing. On the national level, civic trust must be restored 
between Hutus and Tutsis in order for norms of equality and reciprocity to emerge and be 
incorporated in the rule of law. Given the history of oppression of the Tutsi by the Hutu-dominated 
autocratic governments, these norms of equality must translate into equal rights of political 
participation and equal political representation in the government. In addition, an official historical 
narrative that recognizes the experiences of the Tutsi during the genocide, especially those 
experienced by victims of rape and sexual assault, must be developed through transitional justice 
mechanisms to facilitate the process of healing for victims.  
Retributive and Restorative Justice 
One of the most prominent debates in the field on the appropriate mechanisms to achieve 
the various goals of transitional justice is that between retributive and restorative justice. Both 
retributive and restorative theories of justice acknowledge that a balance has been disrupted by past 
wrongdoings. Their shared goal is therefore the restoration of such balance through reciprocity. 
Consequently, both theories believe that there must be a proportional relationship between the act 
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and the response: the victims deserve something for their sufferings and the perpetrators owe 
something for their offense.178 Despite this commonality, retributive and restorative justices are 
different in their understandings of justice, their objectives, and their corresponding measures to 
achieve those goals.  
Retributive justice, in its simplest form, is understood as, “punishment of the perpetrator by 
the state, through a process of judging guilt and imposing penalties commensurate with the nature 
of the crime.”179 Martha Minow writes that retribution motivates punishment out of fairness and 
reflects the beliefs that wrongdoers deserve blame and punishment proportionate to the harm they 
inflicted. 180  Moreover, this retributive dimension of justice advocates for punishment not 
necessarily with hope of deterrence or other future effects, but as a way of denouncing previous 
wrongs and wrongdoers. In the bigger societal context, states use retributive justice to correct the 
wrongdoers’ message that victims were less worthy or valuable, and reassert the victim’s value by 
publicly punishing the wrongdoers.181 In the context of national reconstruction, retributive justice 
is necessary for states since they need to adhere to international legal standards,182 and states can 
do so by reaffirming the norms that grant equal rights to all.183 Regarding the relationship between 
retributive justice and transitional justice, David Crocker argues that transitional justice “refers 
exclusively to penal justice and even to retributive interpretations of trials and punishment.”184 
Seen in this light, justice in transitional contexts must be retributive and thus requires prosecution 
and punishment of wrongdoers.  
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While scholars generally agree on the conception of retributive justice, transitional justice 
scholars, however, often approach restorative justice differently. Gerry Johnstone defines 
restorative justice as revolving around the idea that crime is “a violation of a person by another 
person (rather than a violation of legal rules)” and that “efforts should be made to improve the 
relationship between the offender and victim and to reintegrate the offender into the law-abiding 
community.”185 Hugo van der Merwe argues that different definitions of restorative justice all 
agree that the focus should be less on the crime but more on restoring or compensating for the 
harm done to the victims and the society at large.186 Furthermore, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Dina 
Haynes and Naomi Cahn define restorative justice as, “characterized by apologies and other forms 
of direct victim confrontation with perpetrators, allowing victims and perpetrators to share a (safe) 
space, allowing the perpetrators to acknowledge the “wrong” committed and the victims to 
articulate the hurt or damage done to them as a result.”187   
Despite their differences, these various definitions of restorative justice all share one major 
common trait: the focus on and the contextualization of the relationship between the victim and the 
perpetrator in the bigger context of their community and of transitional justice. Drawing upon this 
common trait, Jennifer Llewellyn offers one of the most holistic and comprehensive conceptions of 
restorative justice. She proposes that it is “relationship centered” and “fundamentally concerned 
with restoring relationships harmed by wrongdoing to ones in which all parties enjoy and accord 
one another equal dignity, respect, and concern.”188 Underpinning this theory of restorative justice, 
Llewellyn argues, is the conviction that all human beings are constituted in and through 
relationships, and the nature of these relationships, especially those of violence and oppression, are 
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crucial to the beings of those involved.189 Restorative justice thus aims to restore and reconstruct 
relationships to their ideal version, and views crimes primarily as harms to relationship and those 
involved.190 She argues that while criminal justice is preoccupied with the idea that the state is the 
principal party harmed by crime, restorative justice views harms and wrongdoings through the lens 
of the victims, and assesses their impacts on the victims’ web of relationships.191 Because of its 
focus on human and social relationship, restorative justice relies heavily on social context and thus 
must be tailored to the specific needs of each society, and society therefore plays a crucial role in 
the creation and solution of social conflicts.192   
There are fundamental differences in the roles of retributive and restorative justice in the 
bigger context of transitional justice, and these differences depend on the conception of transitional 
justice itself. On the one hand, transitional justice, as “justice to the extent possible,” refers to the 
extent to which justice can be achieved in a transitional context. This conception of transitional 
justice is underwritten by the belief that “full” or “normal” justice is inherently retributive, and that 
“full” justice may not be achieved in times of transition.193 Restorative justice seen in this account 
is partial justice and is used in the absence of prosecution; restoration of the moral order is 
therefore only one of the various goals served by justice.194 On the other hand, many contend that 
political transitions have different demands and requirements for justice, and restorative justice in 
this transitional context is the proper form of justice.195 In this account, transitional justice is and 
must be restorative, and such process must focus on restoring the dignity of victims and the moral 
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order. Martha Minow, for example, argues that truth commissions, as one of the essential 
institutions of restorative justice, are not an alternative to criminal prosecutions but a mechanism 
better suited to achieve the various goals of transitional justice.196   
Both of these approaches to transitional justice, despite their differences, share a common 
assumption that justice in normal times is retributive justice, and once political transition is over, 
this normal demand of justice will emerge again.197 This assumption limits the influence of 
restorative justice to transitional time, while its objectives, such as the restoration of social 
relationships and the moral order, are often time-consuming. Retributive justice, in contrast, is 
done when prosecution and punishment end. Llewellyn contends that different from retributive 
justice, restorative justice is a process rather than a state of justice; it is a means to an end rather 
than the end goal itself.198 A society’s decision to employ different institutions of restorative and 
retributive justice will leave different impacts on victims of past harm. The focus of analysis and 
political debates surrounding transitional justice has been, however, preoccupied with prosecutorial 
rather than reparative objectives, and therefore with the question of how to punish perpetrators 
rather than with how to help heal victims.199 Ruth Rubio-Marin argues that this tendency of 
transitional justice to be preoccupied with perpetrators often results in a double marginalization: 
the neglect of victims in transitional and post-conflict context, and within that, the marginalization 
of women.200 This chapter now turns to an analysis of the role of women, or lack thereof, in 
transitional justice and how different institutions of both retributive and restorative justice attempt 
to resolve the legacy of rape and gender-based violence. 
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GENDER AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
“Adding Women” in International Law  
Since the very inception of the field, women have largely been neglected in the process of 
transitional justice. Rape and sexual violence used as tools of war, however, is not a recent 
phenomenon. Systemic use violence against women in conflict has been documented at least since 
the rape of Chinese girls and women in Nanjing in the 1930s, the exploitation of Korean and 
Chinese comfort women by Japanese soldiers in the 1940s and 1950s, abuses against Vietnamese 
women by American soldiers in the Vietnam War, and the many other accounts of rape and sexual 
assaults in conflicts in, but not limited to, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Darfur, Iraq, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.201 The earliest institutions of transitional justice, 
the post-World War II tribunals, did not pay adequate attention to the needs and experiences of 
women, and rape and sexual violence were largely considered spoils of war rather than systemic 
tools of conflict.202 The very early stage of international human rights and humanitarian laws did 
not prioritize a gender-sensitive framework and thus excluded the various experiences and needs of 
women from the dominant practice of law at the time.203  
As the concept of human rights started getting recognized and mainstreamed in the realm 
of international politics, incremental changes in international human rights and humanitarian law 
also occurred, including recognizing women as political actors in traditionally male-dominated 
domains. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1951 Genocide 
Convention, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1984 
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment or 
                                                
201 Tazreena Sajjad, “Rape on Trial: Promises of International Jurisprudence, Perils of Retributive Justice, and the 
Realities of Impunity,” in Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide, eds. Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (St. Paul, MN: 
Paragon House, 2012), 65 
202 Alam 36 
203 Ibid 
  51 
Punishment (CAT), and the 2000 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons altogether denounce all forms of torture, slavery, and degrading treatment as 
violations of bodily-integrity rights.204 Most of these legal standards, especially the 1948 UDHR 
and the 1951 Genocide Convention, however, lack a gendered perspective and reveal “a misguided 
and misinformed attempt to be gender neutral, as was the common tendency in international 
human rights.”205 It was not until the creation and adoption of the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 1993 United Nations 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and the 1994 Inter-American 
Convention on Violence that international laws started paying attention to the specific experiences 
of women during conflict, especially in terms of sexual violence. Within the framework of 
international humanitarian law, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions specifically 
references rape and other forms of sexual mistreatment, and states that, “women shall be especially 
protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any 
form of indecent assault.” Rape is thus recognized as a crime of honor and as a human rights 
violation. In addition, rape and sexual assault are considered “inhumane treatment” under Article 
147 and therefore constitute “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions.206 
Gender-based violence against women in armed conflicts gained specific attention in the 
1990s. During this time, literature on transitional justice was dominated by the work of human 
rights lawyers who argued that international human rights standards should be applicable to and 
enforced during these political transitions.207 The 1990s also witnessed the rise of feminist scholars 
who critiqued international human rights law and demanded the protection and promotion of 
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women’s rights with specific attention to violence against women.208 As the concept of human 
rights in international politics once again gained worldwide attention in the 1990s after the end of 
the Cold War, interpretations of international laws also acknowledged that women experienced the 
same physical harms as men in the context of political violence.209 However, feminist interventions 
into international law specifically pointed to the different types of harms women experience in the 
context of political violence, referencing rape and sexual assault as a general category of political 
violence and using the widespread sexual violence in the Balkan and Rwandan conflicts as 
examples.210 Following these conflicts, additional application and interpretation of the Geneva 
Conventions was further highlighted in the findings of both the ICTY and the ICTR, and later in 
the creation of the ICC through the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute. The Rome Statue was a 
landmark creation of a legal and normative foundation for transitional justice, especially in regards 
to prosecuting sexual violence. The ICC categorizes “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” 
as crimes against humanity,211 and defines rape as: 
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, 
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a 
sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any 
other part of the body. 
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as 
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of 
giving genuine consent. 212 
 
This definition of rape prioritizes evidence of coercion over evidence of non-consent, recognizes 
that the question of consent does not apply to everyone subjected to sexual violence, including 
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children, the elderly, and the disabled, and focuses on the intention of perpetrators through the 
show of coercion or threats of coercion.213 In addition, reforms were also introduced in the 
investigation of war crimes to improve the recognition of gender-based human rights violations 
and enhance prosecutors’ access to expertise in the prosecution of gender-based crimes.214 In 
addition, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 
2000 delivered a formal international political and legal recognition that both political violence and 
its resolution are gendered, for gender is a determining factor in how individuals experience 
political violence.215  
Gendered Shortcomings of Transitional Justice 
Despite these various developments in international law that focus on the recognition of 
women as political actors and their experiences during armed conflicts, women have largely been 
marginalized from both retributive and restorative transitional justice process. Christine Bell and 
Catherine O’Rourke argue that one major feminist critique points to the “from” (male-defined 
political violence) and “to” (liberal democratic frameworks) framework of transitional justice 
discourse.216 First, the gendered nature of the public/private dichotomy reveals that since women 
spend most of their lives in the private realm, a wide range of harms experienced by women, 
especially gendered-based violence, is usually deemed private and thus does not fall into the 
purview of state’s intervention.217 In addition, the predominantly Western liberal democratic 
frameworks of transitional justice and human rights heavily prioritize civil and political rights over 
economic, social, and cultural rights, and hence perpetuate the prioritization of public over private. 
                                                
213 Alam 48 
214 Christine Bell and Catherine O'Rourke, "Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory 
Essay," International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 1 (2007): 27 
215 O’Rourke 4 
216 Bell and O’Rourke 23 
217 O’Rourke 20 
  54 
In this account, transitional justice processes orchestrated by the state are more concerned with an 
individual’s relationship with the government as dictated by civil and political rights.218 This major 
focus on public, first-generation human rights therefore allows states to neglect both the ongoing 
sexual violence happening in the private sphere during post-conflict national reconstruction.  
In addition, this overwhelming prioritization of first-generation human rights translates into 
major neglect of second-generation human rights, which is crucial for women especially in the 
post-war economies. Post-conflict political economy is often gendered; since men are often either 
killed or imprisoned after conflict, women usually assume the role of heads of households and are 
responsible for family survival. These changing gender dynamics are usually neglected during the 
process of national reconstruction, for states often quickly prioritize state survival and defense and 
thus often either postpone or abandon gender transformation policies. 219  The presence of 
international actors, primarily UN Peacekeeping forces, also intensifies this gendered nature of 
post-conflict economies. First, since the purpose of peacekeeping missions is primarily to 
reestablish law and order, little attention is paid to securing social and economic livelihoods for 
women (and men) after conflict. A lack of focus on delivering economic, social, and cultural rights 
usually forces women and girls into dire socioeconomic conditions and into risky income-
generation activities, such as sex work, to feed their family and gain protection from men with 
more resources.220 In addition, an international militarized presence often leads to the expansions 
of sex industries employing women as sex workers or sex slaves, or to widespread, systemic rape 
conducted by peacekeepers, as in the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central 
African Republic.221 In addition, since transitional justice mechanisms are often products of peace 
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negotiations, and because negotiations processes themselves are gendered with negotiators being 
mostly men, the conceptualization of how accountability, justice, and human rights should be 
approached is overwhelmingly gendered.222 This tendency of applying gender-neutral approaches 
to post-conflict reconstructions process therefore directly influences both restorative and retributive 
transitional justice procedures.  
a) Gendered Retributive Justice 
There exist major shortcomings in investigating and prosecuting rape and sexual violence 
in retributive justice mechanisms (i.e. criminal prosecution). First, in order for rape and sexual 
violence to be tried as a jus cogens crime,223 those actions must be found to have occurred in a 
systematic, organized pattern.224 In addition, given the personal nature of rape and sexual assaults, 
survivors of these crimes are often reluctant or afraid to testify in courts. In many cases, the burden 
of proving rape and sexual violence falls on the victims, intensifying their reluctance to share these 
experiences. Furthermore, the general shortage of women’s representation in transitional justice 
mechanisms, in this case the courtrooms, also creates a lack of female perspective and a reliance on 
the application of a gender-neutral defense standard.225 This nature of traditional defense lawyering 
often creates an inhospitable and under-supportive environment for victims of these crimes, and 
even when the environment is supportive, not all women believe there are benefits of disclosing 
traumatic experiences of rape.226 In addition, the public and adversarial environment of the 
courtroom also increases the risk of secondary traumatization for the victims, as trials may become 
predominantly concerned with female accountability rather than male responsibility. Furthermore, 
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testimonies of rape and sexual assault, under the potential of repetitive cross-examination, may 
turn these traumatic experiences into voyeuristic and pornographic devices, resulting in further 
traumatic re-victimization.227  
In many trials, especially international tribunals, the Western tendency to focus on civil and 
political rights also overshadows the possibility of investigating and prosecuting violations of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. Even when sexual and reproductive violence is addressed, 
which is already undermined by the various factors mentioned above, accountability processes 
often fail to assess the various aspects of harm experienced by women. Violations of 
socioeconomic rights like deliberate starvation, blockade, and destruction of food and water are 
often neglected in wartime prosecutions that are heavily preoccupied with prosecuting violations of 
bodily-integrity rights.228 In addition, serious long-term impacts of rape and gender based violence, 
such as STDs, vaginal and reproductive tract problems, and sterility, if acknowledged, are usually 
considered secondary harms.229 This disproportionate attention to physical harms and violations of 
bodily-integrity rights not only has a direct effect on victims’ lives, but also poses a threat to the 
long-term economic, social, and cultural sustainability of peace, which is the primary goal of post-
conflict reconstruction.230 Despite various progressive developments in international law, they 
have often fallen short in terms of enforcement. These shortcomings help explain why the 
international conviction rates for gender-based violence are low, and the conviction rates in 
national courts are almost non-existent.231  
b) Gendered Restorative Justice 
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It is generally accepted that criminal accountability for rape and sexual assaults, which is 
already incomplete in most cases, cannot by itself facilitate reconciliation for victims. Restorative 
justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions, in contrast, can be utilized to compensate for 
retributive justice’s shortcomings. While truth commissions do not fall under the scope of this 
research, many other scholars have written extensively on the gendered aspects of truth 
commissions. 232  Within the repertoire of restorative justice mechanisms, this thesis looks 
specifically at reparation programs and the process of reconciliation. There is a growing consensus 
in international law that the state is obligated to provide compensations for victims of gross human 
rights violations committed by the governments. 233 Such obligation, if not fulfilled, carries over to 
the successor government. In terms of international standards, the UN Human Rights Commission 
and its Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights had discussed since 
1989 and finally approved in 2005 “The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law.”234 While these principles refer to restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition as forms of reparations, they do not 
define what constitutes either “gross violations of international human rights law” or “serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”235  
For women, especially victims of rape and sexual assaults, the existence and effectiveness 
of reparation programs can contribute significantly to the process of reintegration and 
reconciliation. For example, the tendency to cast women as secondary victims, which is as living 
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survivors of those killed by political violence, makes women the prime beneficiaries of 
reparations.236 In addition, since retributive justice’s overwhelming tendency to neglect second-
generation human rights, reparation programs can help improve women’s dire socioeconomic 
conditions. Rubio-Marin notes the general trend of women’s preference of basic social services, 
such as medical and psychological rehabilitation, education for children, and housing-related 
assistance, to meet their family’s needs as the ideal form of reparation over restitution of lost 
property or monetary compensation.237 In addition, for victims of rape and sexual violence and 
those living with HIV/AIDS, medical and psychological services as reparations might play a 
crucial role in their psychological rehabilitation process.238 While the material needs of victims are 
overwhelming and criminal accountability by itself appears to be shallow justice, reparation 
programs, especially in the forms of material recompense and social services, can be significantly 
valuable to victims of rape and sexual assaults, at least in the short term.239 
 Neil Kritz argues that compensation and reparation can also contribute to the long-term 
process of national reconciliation by serving at least three functions: (1) it aids the victims to 
manage the material aspect of their loss; (2) it constitutes an official acknowledgment of their pain 
by the nation. Both of these facilitate the societal reintegration of people who have long been made 
to suffer in silence; and (3) it may deter the state from future abuses, by imposing a financial cost 
to such misdeeds. 240  In addition, while retributive justice focuses on holding perpetrators 
accountable, Reparations, in contrast, may be “the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the 
state” to remedy the harms the victims have suffered.241 Similarly, Rubio-Marin argues that 
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reparations can become measures to promote both interpersonal trust and trust in the institutions of 
the new state and in its legitimacy, thus contributing to the creation of a more sustainable 
democratic state.242 Colleen Duggan and Adila M. Abusharaf also argue that reparation programs 
can contribute to the long-term process of women’s reconciliation by: 1) putting the women-
citizen/State relationship on a more just and equitable footing, 2) creating a more supportive 
environment for victims to claim reparations, 3) establishing a societal conviction that victims of 
sexual violence must not be silenced and guaranteeing accountability for the crimes perpetrated 
against them, and 4) taking advantage of the transitional context to redefine the social norms that 
have fostered sexual violence, and forging an essential connection between the enforcement of the 
right to reparation and the establishment of public policies to prevent sexual violence in the 
future.243   
Despite these various long-term and short-term advantages of reparation programs, 
government in political transitions often encounter various challenges that prevent victims of 
sexual violence from receiving the full benefits of reparations. In the case of Sierra Leone, the 
transitional government faced competing demands to finance retributive justice mechanisms 
(tribunals) and restorative justice mechanism (national reparation programs), and the resources 
allocated for remedying gender crimes were often curtailed.244 In addition, the various social and 
cultural taboos surrounding rape and sexual assaults that prevent victims from testifying in courts 
also discourage women from registering for reparations.245 The case of Sudan also highlights the 
fact that allocating resources for sexual violence reparations also means a state-sponsored 
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acknowledgment of these crimes, and, while necessary for reconciliation, is often tantamount to 
admitting to the dishonoring of an entire society.246 Balancing the demands for both national and 
individual reconciliation, while creating a hospitable environment for victims to receive the 
benefits of reparations, proves to be a major challenge for many societies. In addition, while it is 
recognized that victims of these crimes should receive full restitution, intangible assets that were 
loss as a result of these crimes – such as purity, social standing, and marriageability – can never be 
returned.247 Compensating materially for these assets is complicated and depends heavily on the 
social and cultural context of each society.  
The social and cultural context of each society, furthermore, also impacts the individual 
and national process of reconciliation extensively. Donna Pankhurst writes that while there is 
considerable international and national debate about how reconciliation may be achieved, there is 
“virtually no discussion about ‘gender reconciliation,’” and that women are often expected to 
identify themselves with the gender-neutral concepts of reconciliation and peace-building 
interventions.248 As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis examines reconciliation by dividing it into 
six different subcomponents: 1) understanding the past, present and envisioning the future of 
Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social 
cohesion. Several challenges to criminal prosecutions and reparations programs in bringing justice 
for victims of rape and sexual assaults have been demonstrated throughout this chapter. These 
challenges in turn create significant obstacles to victims’ pursuit of justice and reconciliation 
process. The citizenship and political culture components of reconciliation can be developed with 
peace negotiations and designing transitional justice mechanisms. These processes, as 
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aforementioned, also often fail to include women in the decision-making process. Other factors of 
reconciliation, including acknowledging the past, security, and social cohesion, rely on the 
recognition of women as equal members of society, and the destruction of pre-existing conditions 
that allow rape and sexual assault to happen in the first place. The challenge, in other words, is to 
deconstruct unequal gender relations.249 Gender relations and ideologies stem from the deeply held 
traditions in which patriarchal societies regard women as property, and that their values reside only 
in women’s productive and reproductive labor.250  
Deconstructing these traditions, and eliminating the culture of stigma and ostracism that 
discriminates victims of rape and sexual assault, while necessary for reconciliation, are 
overwhelming tasks that transitional justice mechanisms often lack the capacity and time to 
implement. In addition, improving gender relations between men and women can partly come from 
improving women’s political representation in a democracy, which transitional justice can help 
build but cannot produce. Reconciliation for victims within their communities must occur at the 
grassroots level, where victims face the daunting tasks of living with the perpetrators who have 
raped them. This process of reconciliation requires a fundamental change in which sexual violence 
is perceived.251 Yet this fundamental change requires a political will to accept women’s values as 
equal members that post-conflict communities often do not possess. Reconciliation for victims of 
rape and sexual assault thus requires a fundamental reconstruction of societal relations, in which 
women themselves are unfortunately often underrepresented. Reconciliation is therefore the most 
daunting task facing transitional justice mechanisms, which this thesis seeks to analyze.  
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In conclusion, both retributive and restorative justice for victims of rape and sexual assaults 
face the various contextual challenges that societies need to address through transitional justice 
mechanisms, while simultaneously encountering distinctive challenges because of the inherently 
personal nature of these crimes. This chapter is, at the most basic level, a review of the literature in 
the field, analyzing the gendered aspect of both armed conflicts and transitional justice. Rwanda, 
with both its local and international transitional justice mechanisms, attempted to resolve this 
complicated and multifaceted legacy of rape and sexual assaults. The next two chapters provide a 
comparative analysis of the strengths and weakness of these local and international mechanisms in 
reckoning with this painful legacy. While scholars have written extensively on the strengths and 
weaknesses of each transitional justice mechanism in post-genocide Rwanda, few have looked at 
these mechanisms from a comparative perspective. Even fewer scholars have analyzed this 
comparison from a gender-sensitive perspective with a focus on survivors of sexual violence. This 
thesis thus fills the gap in the literature by providing an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
domestic and international attempts to bring both retributive and restorative justice to victims of 
rape and sexual assaults through a comprehensive and in-depth case study.  
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3. LOCAL CRIMES, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA & TRIALS BASED 
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
 
 
With Akayesu, Pillay made history again. “Rape had always been regarded as one 
of the spoils of war,” she said in a statement after the verdict. “Now it is a war 
crime, no longer a trophy.”252  
 
 
On May 31, 1994, the then-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, presented a report on the situation in Rwanda to the Secretary Council, in which he states: 
The magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda might be 
unimaginable but for its having transpired. On the basis of evidence that has 
emerged, there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have 
been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging to a particular 
ethnic group.253 
 
The Rwandan genocide therefore happened against the backdrop of willful ignorance of the 
international community, which was aware of genocide yet refused to intervene. During the 
genocide, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, however, did appoint Ivoirian law 
professor René Degni-Segui as the Special Rapporteur on the situation in Rwanda. The Special 
Rapporteur’s reports showed clear evidence of genocide and crimes against humanity, and 
recommended either the establishment of an international ad hoc tribunal or the enlargement of 
the jurisdiction of the ICTY to bring those responsible for the massacres of the genocide to 
justice.254 These recommendations were made in the context that the ICTY, an ad hoc tribunal, 
was created a year earlier. Given the severe crimes investigated by the ICTY, the reports on 
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serious violations of international humanitarian law and the commission of crimes against 
humanity in Rwanda, and the lack of international efforts to stop the genocide, an international 
judicial institution, similar to the ICTY, was deemed to be of crucial importance. On December 
18, 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 955, establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  
Between the end of the genocide in July 1994 and the establishment of the ICTR, 
millions of Rwandans fled the country to Europe, North America, and various African countries. 
Many of those fleeing were responsible for organizing and participating in the genocide. 
Rwanda, however, did not have extradition treaties with many states to obtain custody of 
suspects living in foreign countries. Many governments also refused to return these suspects, 
concerned about a judiciary in shambles in Rwanda and its questionable capacity to provide fair 
trials to suspects who might be returned to the country. Given the widespread acceptance of the 
fact that a genocide happened in Rwanda, and an international pressure to prosecute those 
responsible for the crimes committed during the conflict, twelve countries to which these 
perpetrators had fled organized trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.  
This chapter analyzes and evaluates the extent to which the ICTR and trials based on the 
principle of universal jurisdiction were successful in bringing comprehensive justice to victims 
of rape and sexual violence during the genocide. The chapter first provides a brief background of 
the ICTR, including its mandate and objectives, and summarizes its record in prosecuting rape 
and sexual violence. It then provides a brief introduction to the legal framework for the creation 
of universal jurisdiction trials in other states, and summarizes their records. The chapter 
continues with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these two mechanisms in bringing 
both retributive and restorative justice to victims of rape and sexual assaults.  
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Both mechanisms were able to bring some high-level perpetrators of rape and sexual 
violence to justice, and thus partially fulfilled their retributive justice mandate. Through both the 
testimonies of victims and the convictions of perpetrators, a partial historical record about rape 
and sexual violence during the genocide also emerged. This historical record contributed to a 
collective memory about what happened during the genocide, and confirmed that rapes and 
sexual violence were not only opportunistic attacks but also systemic elements of the genocide. 
Moreover, the ICTR was particularly successful at establishing an international jurisprudence for 
prosecuting rape and sexual violence under international law. Despite these successes, the ICTR 
also faced several institutional challenges as an international justice mechanism trying local 
crimes, and thus failed to bring comprehensive justice to many other victims. The Tribunal was 
inconsistent in defining rape and sexual violence, and different prosecutors demonstrated 
different levels of willingness to prosecute these crimes. Various cases moved through trials 
without sexual violence charges despite substantial evidence, creating a sense of frustration for 
many victims who had the courage to testify. In addition, the environment at the Tribunal was 
sometimes hostile to survivors of sexual crimes. Finally, the ICTR’s record also reflects an 
incomplete picture of sexual crimes during the genocide, and the Tribunal paid insufficient 
attention to restorative justice.  
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR) 
On September 28, 1994, upon Special Rapporteur Degni-Segui’s recommendation, 
Rwanda formally sent a request to the President of the UNSC to establish an ad hoc tribunal. On 
December 8, 1994, the UNSC passed Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania 
with a sub-office in Kigali, Rwanda: 
for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
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Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994255 
 
This location was set to avoid the appearance of “victor’s justice” by the new Tutsi-dominated 
Rwandan government.256 However, locating the ICTR in Tanzania, despite good intentions, 
caused a significant physical and psychological distance between the Tribunal and Rwandan 
society.  
Despite its formal request less than three months earlier, the Rwandan delegation to the 
UN cast the sole vote against the creation of the ICTR, with an abstention by China. Several 
reasons explain this opposition. Gerald Gahima, who served as the principal liaison between the 
Rwandan government and the ICTR, argues that the newly established government showcased a 
clear desire to assert its national ownership over the international aspect of accountability 
mechanisms, to emphasize its sovereignty in dealing with the international community during the 
reconstruction process, and to protect its military from exposure to prosecution by the proposed 
court. 257  Second, the Rwandan delegation also cited various reasons for opposing the 
establishment, including, but not limited to: 1) the prohibition of capital punishment, which 
could lead to principal genocide planners receiving prison terms from the ICTR while their 
subordinates could face death penalty if found guilty in Rwanda’s national courts, 2) the 
limitation on temporal jurisdiction to the 1994 calendar year, which excludes the period of Hutu 
planning for the genocide that can be arguably traced back until 1990, 3) poor staffing, as the 
ICTR and ICTY would share an appeal chamber and a prosecutor, 4) the nominated judges’ 
potential conflict of interests in excluding their co-nationals who might be complicit in the 
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genocide, 5) the possibility of sentences being served outside Rwanda, and 6) the refusal to 
locate the seat of the Tribunal in Rwanda itself.258  
Despite this opposition by the Rwandan government, the ICTR was nevertheless 
established with three main organs: 1) the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), which investigated 
allegations, issued indictments, and prosecuted cases in court; 2) the Registry, which performed 
administrative tasks, and 3) the Chambers. There were three Trial Chambers, and one Appeals 
Chamber that was shared with the ICTY at The Hague. The Chambers had sixteen permanent 
members, of whom seven served at the Appeals Chamber and nine as ad litem judges. Judges 
were nominated by their home state and elected by the UN General Assembly, and no two judges 
could come from the same country.259 During the first nine years of its operation, the ICTR 
shared a common Prosecutor with the ICTY, until the Security Council determined that both 
Tribunals would be more effective and efficient if each had a separate Prosecutor and appointed 
one for the ICTR in 2003. Four individuals served in this role: Richard Goldstone of South 
Africa, Louise Arbour of Canada, Carla Del Ponte of Switzerland, and Hassan B. Jallow of 
Gambia.  
The ICTR was established with a ratione materiae, or material jurisdiction, over the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.260 According to the statute of the ICTR, rape 
constitutes a crime against humanity under Article 3; rape, enforced prostitution, and any forms 
of indecent assaults are also violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
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and of Additional Protocol II. In relation to the genocide, the ICTR statute uses verbatim the 
Genocide Convention’s definition.261 With this jurisdiction, the ICTR became the world’s first 
genocide court with several objectives. 
Gerald Gahima summarizes seven main goals and expectations for the ICTR: 1) holding 
perpetrators accountable, 2) fighting impunity and promoting respects for human rights in 
Rwanda and other countries, 3) deterring future human rights violations, 4) facilitating the return 
of Rwandan refugees, 5) restoring and maintaining peace, 6) promoting reconciliation in 
Rwanda, and 7) supporting the rebuilding Rwanda’s justice system.262 The original language of 
UNSC Resolution 955 stresses two main objectives: holding perpetrators accountable and 
promoting reconciliation. The UNSC was determined that the crimes in Rwanda “constitute a 
threat to international peace and security,” and that the Tribunal would take “effective measures 
to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.”263 the Security Council also 
believed that by delivering retributive justice to the perpetrators of genocide, the Tribunal would 
“contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.”264 This mandate is different from that of the ICTY, for facilitating reconciliation was 
discussed in Security Council debates but was never included in the actual resolution that 
established the ICTY.265  
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On December 31, 2015, the ICTR formally closed its operations. In its 20-year existence, 
the ICTR indicted 93 individuals, of which 62 were sentenced, 14 were acquitted, 10 were 
referred to national jurisdictions for trials, three were fugitives and referred to the Mechanisms of 
International Criminal Tribunals (MCIT), and two died before judgment was handed down. In 
addition, two indictments were withdrawn before trial.266 The MCIT assumed responsibility for 
all of the ICTR’s tracking operations at the beginning of July 2012.267 With regards to sexual 
crimes, 52 out of the total 93 indicted were charged with rape or other crimes of sexual violence. 
Of these 52 cases, 43 cases proceeded to trials, seven were referred to Rwanda or France for trial, 
and two high-level fugitive cases have been transferred to the MCIT. 14 of the accused were 
convicted of these crimes;268 27 were acquitted; and sexual violence charges in seven cases were 
dropped as part of plea negotiations or through amendment of the indictments.269 The OTP was 
successful in prosecuting and holding perpetrators accountable for rape and sexual violence as 
constituent acts of genocide (Akayesu, Ngirumpatse, Karemera), as crimes against humanity 
(Akayesu, Nyiramasuhuko, Gacumbitsi, Bagosora…), and as a war crime (Bizimungu and 
Nyiramasuhuko).  
TRIALS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Universal jurisdiction is defined as “a legal principle allowing or requiring a state to bring 
criminal proceedings in respect of certain crimes irrespective of the location of the crime and the 
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nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”270 Based on this principle, states can hold trials for 
international crimes committed by anybody, anywhere in the world. Traditionally, two main 
ideas justified this principle. First, there are crimes that are so grave – such as genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture – that they pose significant threats to the 
international community. Second, due to the severity of these crimes, there must be no safe 
havens available for those who committed them.271 Given the human rights violations committed 
during the genocide and the international community’s commitment to hold perpetrators 
accountable, the Rwandan genocide was a legally and morally justified backdrop against which 
states could exercise universal jurisdiction.  
Twelve countries have been involved in holding perpetrators of the genocide accountable 
based on this principle, including: Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Finland, 
Denmark, Germany, Spain, Norway, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. The extent 
to which these countries exercised universal jurisdiction was, however, different and dependent 
on the political will of the country. Belgium, for example, has been one of the leading states in 
exercising universal jurisdiction for crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide. Several 
factors can explain this commitment, including the murder of Belgian peacekeepers during the 
genocide, the large number of Rwandan refugees seeking asylum in Belgium, its colonial history 
in Rwanda, and its decision to withdraw peacekeepers as the genocide escalated.272 Belgium’s 
commitment to universal jurisdiction led to successful investigation and prosecution of a 
significant number of cases, including the landmark Butare Four case.273 In contrast, while 
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France had by far the largest number of ongoing investigations related to the Rwandan genocide 
(25 genocide suspects), as of 2013, it has failed to complete any of the investigations and has yet 
to bring a Rwandan genocide case to trials.274 Gahima argues that this failure in investigating and 
prosecuting Rwandan genocide cases can be attributed mostly to the French government’s lack 
of political will.275  
While the scope of this thesis and my current available resources prevent me from 
analyzing in-depth the records of universal jurisdiction trials, it is clear from the current literature 
that trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction have not been very successful in 
prosecuting crimes of rape and sexual assaults. Perpetrators of rape have been convicted of war 
crimes (Ephrem Nkezabera in Belgium and Desiré Munyaneza in Canada) and crimes against 
humanity (Desiré Munyaneza) in only a few cases, while in practice most of these crimes were 
ignored. Given the lack of research on universal jurisdiction trials for cases related to the 
Rwandan genocide, this chapter focuses on the achievements and shortcomings of the ICTR. In 
the realm of international judicial mechanisms, the contribution of third-party trials was in the 
aspect of creating an international jurisprudence.   
ANALYSIS: MAJOR STRENGTHS AND SUCCESSES 
The Landmark Case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu 
Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former bourgmestre276 of the Taba Commune, was responsible 
for acts of genocide and violations of humanitarian law that occurred in the area under his 
control during the 100 days of the genocide. His initial indictment on February 16, 1996 included 
charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
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Conventions. None of these charges, however, included acts of rape or sexual violence.277 Eight 
days into the trial, Witness J testified and began talking about the rape of her daughter during the 
genocide without being asked by either the Judges or the Prosecutor. This narration led to more 
questions about other rapes she had witnessed, many of which were asked by the sole female 
Judge at the time – Judge Navi Pillay of South Africa. These events were confirmed many weeks 
later when Witness H took the stand and also testified about the sexual violence she had 
witnessed at the communal bureau under Akayesu’s control.278 These testimonies, those from 
five other witnesses, and various human rights reports about rape and sexual violence during the 
Rwandan genocide helped the prosecution link the evidence to the actions of the accused, which 
eventually led to an amendment that charged Akayesu with rape and sexual violence as 
genocide.  
Akayesu pleaded not guilty on the basis that he did not commission any acts of rape and 
sexual assault, and that many testimonies were fabricated against him.279 The Trial Chamber held 
that a number of Akayesu’s statements, such as “Don’t ever ask again what a Tutsi woman tastes 
like” and “You should first of all make sure that you sleep with this girl,” constituted sufficient 
evidence that while he did not personally rape anyone, Akayesu was responsible for overseeing 
and encouraging rape against Tutsi women.280 Furthermore, in contextualizing rape and sexual 
violence in the bigger picture of the genocide, the Tribunal concluded that: 
Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual 
violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group – destruction 
of the sprit, of the will to live, and of life itself.281 
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In this conclusion, the Trial Chamber established that Akayesu was responsible for not 
only facilitating rape and sexual violence, but also encouraging those crimes with the intent to 
destroy Tutsi women and the Tutsi as a population.282 The Trial Chamber also established that 
rape and sexual violence in the Taba commune, while by themselves did not constitute crimes 
against humanity, were committed as parts of the widespread and systemic attack against the 
Tutsi population with a discriminatory intent to destroy them, and thus were qualified as crimes 
against humanity.283 It is also crucial to note that rape is not included as a prohibited act in the 
1948 Genocide Convention, and that gender is also not included as a protected group.284 Given 
that there was no judicial record and legal framework of prosecuting rape and sexual assaults as 
genocide that the ICTR could follow, the fact that the Tribunal was able to reach the conclusion 
that these crimes were just as genocidal as other brutal methods of killings is remarkable. In 
addition, through this judgment, the Tribunal exemplified a heightened awareness of sexual 
crimes by recognizing that some forms of sexual violence were easier to deny than other visibly 
obvious crimes of violence.285 More importantly, the ruling also concluded that a superior who 
knew or had reasons to know that their subordinates would or had committed rape and sexual 
violence with a genocidal intent was individually liable under international criminal law.286 This 
recognition therefore created a framework for investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of 
sexual violence in the future. The Akayesu trial, in establishing that rape and sexual violence 
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were serious crimes that can be prosecuted under international law, successfully created a shift in 
paradigm of how these crimes should be perceived in the international community.287 
More importantly, in establishing rape and sexual violence as elements of genocide and 
as crimes against humanity in the Akayesu Judgment, the Trial Chamber offered definitions of 
these crimes as follows: 
The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on 
a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence which includes 
rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a 
person under circumstances which are coercive.288 
 
The Trial Chamber established that rape was a form of aggression, of which central elements 
“cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts.”289 In addition, citing 
the similarity between rape and torture, the Trial Chamber argued that rape was used for 
“intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a 
person.”290 In this account, rape was defined by the perpetrators’ purpose in context and by the 
specific sexual nature of the crime. Through this definition, the Trial Chamber moved the 
definition of rape from one of non-consent (non-consent must be established beyond reasonable 
doubt in order to hold the accused responsible) to one of coercion. Sexual violence, which 
includes rape, was defined in a similar light, which focused on the coercive nature of the attack. 
The Chamber used this definition to include acts such as forced nakedness and forced gymnastics 
while being naked as sexual violence in prosecuting Akayesu.291  
Through these definitions, the Chamber argued that while it was clear that rape itself was 
an unwelcome act, its coercive nature took the burden of proving non-consent from the 
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prosecution.292 In other words, using this definition allows judges to infer non-consent from the 
coercive background of the attack (such as genocide in the case of Rwanda) without requiring 
evidence of the perpetrator’s force, threat of force, or the victim’s resistance. This judgment also 
emphasized that coercion was often inherent in armed conflicts or when the military and militias 
were present.293 As a result, the Chamber successfully incorporated into its definition of rape the 
context of violent inequality common to the crimes it was statutorily authorized to prosecute, 
and, arguably for the first time, defined rape “in law as what it is in life.”294 This progressive 
definition of rape set a legal framework to prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence during the 
ICTR’s operation. For instance, in the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, the Appeal Chamber 
confirmed that “the Prosecution can prove non-consent beyond reasonable doubt by proving the 
existence of coercive circumstances under which meaningful consent is not possible” and that 
“the Trial Chamber is free to infer non-consent from the background circumstances, such as an 
on-going genocide campaign or the detention of the victim.”295   
By contextualizing rape and sexual assaults into the bigger genocidal campaign where 
genuine consent was not possible, the ICTR pioneered a prosecution strategy by inferring non-
consent from coercive contexts to hold perpetrators accountable. This decision caused a 
significant blow to some national courts’ unjustified emphasis on evidence of the perpetrator’s 
physical force or the victim’s resistance to prove non-consent and the perpetrator’s knowledge 
thereof.296 This progressive understanding of rape was subsequently used in ICTY and ICTR 
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judgments, such as the 1998 ICTY Celebici judgment and ICTR judgments in Musema (2000), 
Niyitegeka (2003), and Muhimana (2005).297 More importantly, this focus on coercion instead of 
non-consent is also utilized by the ICC Statute’s current definition of rape as a crime against 
humanity: 
The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as 
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of 
a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable 
of giving genuine consent.298 
 
This definition was also incorporated into legislation in the states of Illinois and California, 
which both define gender violence for civil purposes in part to include “a physical intrusion or 
physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions.”299  
The Case of Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al. 
In 2002, the New York Times published an article by Peter Landesman titled “A 
Woman’s Work,” in which he details the role of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko – the former Minister 
of Family and Women’s Affairs – in perpetrating sexual violence in Butare during the Rwandan 
genocide.300 During Landesman’s interviews with those who confessed to taking part in the 
slaughter in Butare, Nyiramasuhuko came up as the coordinator of rape. She commanded the 
Interahamwe that, “Before you kill the women, you need to rape them,” and in other cases, 
asked, “Why don’t you rape them before you kill them?” 301  Landesman argues that 
Nyiramasuhuko led the soldiers to see rape as a reward for participating in the genocide. In 
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Butare, rape was frequently accompanied by other forms of physical torture, staged as public 
performances to multiply terror and degradation, and oftentimes served as a prelude to murder.302 
Rape in Butare, as it was in many areas throughout Rwanda, was part of the genocidal campaign 
that was aimed at destroying the Tutsi.  
At the ICTR, Nyiramasuhuko was the only woman to be tried and convicted of genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Along with five other accused, including her son 
Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, she was tried in the famous Butare Trial – known for being the 
Tribunal’s longest trial having lasted for ten years. The case was successful in confirming that 
women were capable of perpetrating sexual violence and genocide, and added to the historical 
record of the Rwandan genocide that Nyiramasuhuko was among the many women who 
participated as génocidaires. In fact, she was the first and only woman to be convicted of rape as 
a crime against humanity, and was sentenced to 47 years in prison. While the Prosecutor did not 
charge Nyiramasuhuko for rape as a tool of genocide, the Trial Chamber did acknowledge in its 
trial judgment that intent behind the rape perpetrated by Nyiramasuhuko was in fact genocidal. 
303  
Other Techniques to Prosecute Rape and Sexual Violence 
Beside the prosecution strategy to use coercive background to infer non-consent, the 
ICTR also succeeded in using additional techniques to prosecute rape and sexual violence during 
the Rwandan genocide. As demonstrated earlier, one of the biggest institutional challenges that 
the ICTR faced in fulfilling its mandate was to link the accused to rape and sexual violence and 
to attach criminal culpability. The ICTR was, however, successful in prosecuting perpetrators of 
rape and sexual violence in some cases by using the concept of joint criminal enterprise (JCE). 
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Given that in various cases, perpetrators who fell under the jurisdiction of the ICTR did not 
personally commit rapes, using JCE enabled the prosecution of rape and other forms of sexual 
violence that were committed by other individuals.304 Having originally emerged from the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, a JCE requires “a plurality of co-perpetrators who act pursuant to a 
common purpose involving the commission of a crime.”305 The first category of the JCE is the 
basic form represented by cases where all co-perpetrators possess the same criminal intent and 
act pursuant to a common purpose. The second category is a “systemic” form of JCE 
characterized by the existence of an organized system of ill-treatment. The third category, the 
“extended” form of JCE, covers cases involving a common purpose to commit a crime where 
one of the perpetrators commits an act that is outside of the common purpose but is nevertheless 
a natural and foreseeable consequence of that common purpose.306   
The Prosecutor was successful in using the third category of JCE in holding Édouard 
Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse accountable for genocide and crimes against humanity for 
rape and sexual violence, on the basis that these crimes were a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the JCE whose purpose was to destroy the population.307 The Trial Chamber 
found that because both of the accused had participated in the MRND political party and because 
of Karemera’s role as Minister of the Interior of the Interim Government from May 1994, both 
individuals were aware that the widespread rapes and sexual assaults against Tutsi women 
constituted at least a possible consequence of the JCE, and that they were willing to take the risk 
of more rapes and sexual violence by continuing to participate in the JCE despite the widespread 
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occurrence of sexual crimes.308 As Linda Bianchi argues, the Prosecutor v. Karemera et al. case 
stands as a strong precedent on prosecuting leaders who were physically distant from the actual 
rapes and sexual assaults, but nevertheless had influence over these crimes, knew about their 
occurrences, and were liable for allowing sexual violence to continue.309 
Additionally, one of the biggest challenges in prosecuting rape and sexual violence in any 
legal systems is how to best approach and solicit evidence from victims/survivors. As an 
international tribunal located in a different country with judges and lawyers coming from around 
the world, accompanied by the stigma around victims of rape and sexual violence in Rwandan 
society, the ICTR inevitably faced this challenge. In some cases, the ICTR managed to solicit 
enough evidence and testimonies from other sources beside direct victims of rape and sexual 
assaults to investigate and prosecute these crimes. Given the leadership roles of the accused in 
many cases that involved rape and sexual violence, rape was often charged under a form of 
superior liability.310 This approach allowed the OTP to bring relevant and eyewitness testimonies 
about rape at particular crime scenes without necessarily having to call the victims themselves. 
This method was used in the Bagosora et al. case, where the majority of the evidence was 
solicited from witnesses, especially General Roméo Dallaire and Major Brent Beardsley, who 
were not victims themselves.311 This method proved to be successful, as Bagosora was convicted 
on the basis of evidence of sexual assaults carried out by his subordinates.312   
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In addition, the OTP was also successful in using a variety of sources to support its cases, 
including written statements and facts found in previous, relevant cases.313 In Karamera et al., 
the Prosecutor, concerning the widespread occurrences of rape and sexual violence throughout 
Rwanda, requested the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice thereof as adjudicated facts. When 
the Trial Chamber denied vital aspects of this motion, the Prosecutor appealed. In upholding the 
appeal, the Appeal Chamber found that the fact that a genocide happened in 1994 was reasonably 
indisputable common knowledge, and that rape was part of the violence in this conflict.314 
However, the Appeal Chamber reasonably deferred the matter to the Trial Chamber to determine 
if it would take judicial notice of the occurrence of rape in a named location, such as the 
widespread sexual violence in the Taba commune under Akayesu’s control, as an adjudicated 
fact. A careful use of this discretion by Trial Chamber would ensure respect for the rights of both 
the accused and of the victims, in that a Chamber may admit the occurrence of rape in a specific 
location as adjudicated facts without having to question the victims of rape and sexual 
assaults.315   
Lessons Learned from Rwanda: Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution 
of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions  
As noted earlier, the ICTR, together with the ICTY, were the first international judicial 
institutions to prosecute rape and sexual violence as international crimes. The ICTR, by its mere 
establishment, was there positioned to make important legal precedents for its successor, the 
ICC, and other future national and regional courts. Due to the low conviction rate for sexual 
crimes, especially in light of a rather successful conviction rate for other crimes within the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the OTP created a Committee for the Review of the Investigation and 
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Prosecution of Sexual Violence in June 2007.316 The Committee went through several stages of 
reviewing the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, looking into cases where allegations of sexual violence 
had been included in the indictments, and analyzing the factors that contributed to either 
convictions or acquittals of those crimes. 317 This review process resulted in the creation and 
adoption of the Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence 
Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the Office of the Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Going through several reviews and editions, the 
final version of the Manual was produced and distributed in January 2014. The Manual 
summarized the lessons learned by the OTP in the investigation and prosecution of rape and 
sexual violence, and provided an annex that included detailed statistics from the ICTR’s rape and 
sexual violence cases.318 In addition, the Manual also highlighted major findings of the ICTR – 
including that rape was used and subsequently prosecuted both as an element of genocide and a 
crime against humanity – and provided recommendations on how to best investigate and 
prosecute these crimes in an international setting.  
The production and distribution of this Manual was significant to the prosecution of 
sexual crimes in Rwanda for two main reasons. First, through its details about the ICTR’s major 
findings, the Manual contributed to the process of acknowledging the past and reaffirmed the 
recognition that rape and sexual violence were as much a part of the genocide as other brutal 
methods of killing. The fact that the OTP produced an official document that focused solely on 
rape and sexual violence contributed to the overall historical record about what happened during 
the genocide. Second, the distribution of this Manual also strengthened the ICTR’s jurisprudence 
on rape and sexual violence by offering lessons and creating a framework upon which future 
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trials can better prosecute sexual violence. For instance, the earlier version of the Manual was 
used in a 2009 conference held in Arusha for prosecutors from national jurisdictions who were 
involved with prosecuting international crimes in their home states.319 In 2014, the ICTR’s 
successor, the ICC, released its Draft Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes. This 
Paper refers specifically to the work of the ICTR and the Best Practices Manual, and 
incorporates several of the Manual’s major recommendations, such as the need to pay attention 
to specific challenges confronting the prosecution of rape and sexual violence and necessary 
measures to prevent the possible secondary or re-traumatization of the victims.320 Furthermore, 
the Best Practices Manual was also cited frequently as the major influence for the “International 
Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict, Basic 
Standards of Best Practice,” a part of the United Kingdom’s Prevention of Sexual Violence 
Initiative, by providing a legal precedential guide on the development of this Protocol.321  
ANALYSIS: MAJOR WEAKNESSES AND FAILURES 
Lack of A Comprehensive Prosecution Strategy  
A closer look at the landmark Akayesu case shows an often-overlooked fact: its initial 
indictment did not include any rape or sexual violence charges. Although numerous early reports 
highlighted the prominence of rape and sexual violence during the conflict,322 these crimes were 
never considered a central element of the prosecution strategy, which partly explained the 
Tribunal’s poor conviction rate.323 Usta Kaitesi argues that the initial failure to indict Akayesu 
for his sexual crimes could be best explained by the failure to link evidence of rape and sexual 
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violence evidenced in human rights reports to the crimes of the accused.324 In other words, while 
rape and sexual violence were widespread, genocidal, and well-known, they were not deemed 
worthy of prosecution at the beginning of the Tribunal. It was not until the courageous victims 
decided to speak about their experiences of rape, in tandem with the repeated push by the sole 
female judge at the time – Judge Navi Pillay of South Africa – that more narratives on rape and 
sexual violence were solicited and that Akayesu was convicted of sexual crimes.  
While this landmark case of the ICTR had the potential to dictate the course of the 
Tribunal in prosecuting rape and sexual violence, the initial lack of a prosecution strategy to 
investigate these crimes still nevertheless impacted the operation of the ICTR. Binaifer Nowrojee 
argues that because of this systemic lack of attention to sexual crimes that by 2004, ten years 
after the ICTR was opened, only two defendants were specially convicted for their role in sexual 
violence crimes, the third conviction was reversed on appeal, and none of the rape acquittals 
were appealed by the Prosecutor.325 In addition, Nowrojee notes that in the first ten years of the 
Tribunal, cases were moved forward without rape charges even when the Prosecutor possessed 
strong evidence. Moreover, in a significant number of cases, rape charges were added belatedly 
as amendments and as an afterthought, rather than an integral part of a prosecution strategy that 
acknowledged rape as a form of genocidal violence.326  
As Nowrojee argues, the lack of a political will to prosecute rape and sexual violence was 
demonstrated in the ways in which Tribunal approached these crimes.327 Since the ICTR was 
established as the first “genocide tribunal” in the world, its focus was holding perpetrators 
accountable for crimes such as genocide, murder, and extermination. This focus led to a 
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prosecution approach in which the OTP sought to establish whether these already targeted and 
indicted persons had also been involved in rape and sexual violence. The OTP then hoped to find 
an actual woman who had been raped by that target, which was equivalent to “looking for a 
needle in a haystack.”328 As Chiseche Salome Mibenge argues, while human rights reports on 
Rwanda have shown that it is hard to find a woman in Rwanda who was not raped, international 
judicial procedure at the ICTR reframed the challenge as “show me a woman who was raped.”329 
Despite the fact that Akayesu established rape as a tool of genocide, the prosecution strategy 
utilized by the OTP nevertheless seemed to portray sexual violence as occurrences that happened 
on a random basis rather than a part of the greater atrocity that took place in Rwanda.330  
Furthermore, this lack of attention to sexual violence prosecution resulted in poor 
investigations of these crimes throughout the operation of the Tribunal. As sexual crimes were 
not a central focus, many investigators had no prior experiences in the investigation of sexual 
violence.331 Investigators also did not receive any training on interviewing methods for rape 
victims, and many even believed that rape and sexual violence were not crimes that deserved 
specific attention.332 While it has been established that victims of rape and sexual violence often 
felt more comfortable sharing their experiences with other women, in 2003, only five of the 100 
investigators were women.333 Given the lack of financial resources for a long-running Tribunal, 
investigators often chose to collect statements in areas where they received a higher stipend, thus 
paying less attention in areas such as Kigali where there was a high level of sexual violence. 
Sexual violence investigations, as a result, were often poor in quality and not trial-ready, forcing 
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attorneys, in many cases, to travel from Arusha to Rwanda to conduct their own 
investigations.334  
Binaifer Nowrojee also argues that the OTP’s willingness to prosecute rape and sexual 
violence was not consistent over the years.335 The OTP gained some momentum in prosecuting 
rape under some Prosecutors, and lost such momentum under others. In his two-year tenure as 
the first Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone of South Africa never translated his pronounced 
commitments to punishing sexual crimes into action.336 The OTP gained more momentum during 
the tenure of Canadian Prosecutor Louise Arbour from 1996 to 1999. By the last year of her 
mandate, all new indictments contained sexual violence charges, and the OTP was poised for a 
rapid acceleration in performance and efficiency with regards to prosecuting sexual violence.337 
This momentum was, however, lost completely when Carla Del Ponte of Switzerland took 
charge of the OTP. There was a steady decline in the number of new indictments that contained 
sexual crime charges and a lack of commitment to using evidence for prosecution in cases where 
rape charges were included. Del Ponte moved several cases, such as Cyangugu, through trial 
without rape charges even when OTP possessed strong evidence.338 Mibenge argues that under 
the pressure to speed up trials, Del Ponte regarded sexual violence charges as unnecessary and 
the least relevant of the crimes being investigated, and in many cases, sacrificed them in the 
interests of expediency.339 As a result of this lack of attention, the proportion of new indictments 
including sexual violence charges dropped from 100% in 1999-2000 to 35% in 2001-2002, and 
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by her last year as Prosecutor, none of the new indictments contained rape charges.340 Prosecutor 
Hassan Jallow of Gambia replaced Del Ponte in 2003, and served at the Tribunal until its 
conclusion. In many aspects, he was the Prosecutor most committed to prosecuting rape and 
sexual assaults. Major achievements of the ICTR, such as using the JCE and creating the Best 
Practices Manual, were gained during his tenure.341 Despite these commitments shown by 
Prosecutors Arbour and Jallow, the overall inconsistency in the willingness to prosecute rape and 
sexual violence led investigators to: 
gather too little or the wrong kind of evidence, which does not prove all elements 
of the crimes; fail to keep track of the evidence over time; use inappropriate 
methodology; miss investigatory opportunities; and potentially create a disconnect 
between the charges in the indictment and what the prosecution can actually prove 
at trial, which results in the need to amend indictments to drop charges, or leads to 
acquittals.342 
 
In other words, the overall inconsistent willingness to try rape cases that underpinned the 
operation of the OTP and the significant failures during the tenure of Prosecutor Del Ponte 
ultimately undermined the record of prosecuting rape and sexual violence at the ICTR. 
Inconsistency in Defining and Prosecuting Rape as Genocide  
Despite its trailblazing legacy in offering a progressive definition of rape and in 
prosecuting rape as an element of genocide, Akayesu still stands out as an anomaly in the ICTR’s 
record of prosecuting rape and sexual violence. While Akayesu’s definition of rape has been used 
internationally in both the ICTY and the ICC, the extent to which it was utilized at the ICTR was 
rather discouraging. The only other instances that explicitly accepted the Akayesu formulation 
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were the Musema, Niyitegeka, and Muhimana cases.343 In contrast, some later cases at the ICTR, 
such as in Semanza, Kajelijeli, and Kamuhanda, seemingly reverted to a more traditional 
understanding of rape that was rejected by Akayesu, and accepted a narrower consent-based 
definition endorsed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kunarac.344 In addition, the Semanza 
ruling in 2003 also considered Akayesu definition too “broad,” and the Kunarac definition 
“narrower.”345 While Trial Chamber I in Akayesu succeeded in contextualizing rape in the bigger 
context of coercion that was genocide, other Trial Chambers unfortunately reversed to a more 
mechanical definition. MacKinnon argues that this failure was partly a result of the Tribunal’s 
unwillingness to hold the superiors responsible for rapes, and showed the common tendency to 
think of rape as individual, decontextualized, once-at-a-time attacks.346 Similarly, Alex Obote-
Odora adds that close analyses of the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence show that Trial Chambers in 
these Tribunals often seemed reluctant to abandon consent as an element of rape as it existed in 
the legislation of most national jurisdictions.347 This inconsistency in defining rape can arguably 
be attributed to the fact every Judge at the ICTR came from a different country and thus had 
different legal training and interpretation of international law. Indeed, while Akayesu is one of 
the ICTR’s most applauded achievements, a closer look at the record of the Tribunal 
nevertheless shows that this achievement was an anomaly in a Tribunal that often forgot to place 
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rape in the context of genocide, which resulted in many missed opportunities to prosecute rape 
and sexual violence as elements of genocide.  
An Inhospitable Environment for Victims of Rape and Sexual Assaults 
The literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates that victims of rape and sexual assaults 
often find it difficult to testify about their experiences in private, if not more so in a public, 
international tribunal. The record of the ICTR, however, shows this was not always the case. 
Throughout the Tribunal, various victims came forward and testified about their experiences, 
even when they were not asked to, as exemplified by the courageous witnesses in the Akayesu 
case. Unfortunately, in most of the cases, the Tribunal did not respond well to this astonishing 
courage of the victims, and faced similar criticism of international judicial mechanisms trying 
intimate crimes such as rape and sexual violence.  
Legal commentators have criticized the manner in which judges presided over sexual 
violence cases, especially for permitting the re-traumatization and humiliation of victims during 
“inept” and “insensitive” cross-examination by defense counsel.348 One incident that was heavily 
criticized by human rights groups happened during the Butare Trial in 2001. While Witness TA, 
a victim of multiple of rapes, was being cross-examined insensitively by the defense counsel, all 
three judges suddenly burst out laughing.349 Not only did the judges show a reluctance to limit 
and restrain excessive cross-examination, they also showed a disrespectful insensitivity to the 
emotionally wrenching position of the victim. In addition, Binafer Nowrojee also notes that rape 
victims were often harassed on the stand by the defense counsel for hours, days, and even 
weeks.350 This harassment was often worsened in joint trials with numerous defendants, when 
victims got asked the same questions over and over again by different defense attorneys. 
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Moreover, these questions were sometimes highly offensive. Witness TA was asked questions 
such as, “Did you touch the accused’s penis?” and “How was it introduced into your vagina?” In 
the same Butare Trial, a prosecution lawyer noted that a rape victim whom she led on the stand 
was asked 1194 questions by the defense counsel.351   
In addition, even in cases where the victims and eyewitnesses felt comfortable testifying 
about their experiences or what they witnessed, these victims oftentimes felt a cultural constraint 
and lack of sufficient words to explain what happened.352 Because of Rwandan culture, victims 
often refrained from saying directly what happened to them and opted for euphemisms, such as 
“he married me/her,” “he took her/me by force,” and “he took advantage of me/her.”353 
Moreover, post-trial interviews with victims also showed that they often could not find sufficient 
words to describe and explain the extreme trauma of rape. 354  This tension between an 
international Tribunal and the experiences of victims in a local setting, in which foreign judges 
often did not understand how the local culture could impact victims’ ability to testify, was one of 
the main institutional challenges that confronted the ICTR, and in many ways, affected the 
Tribunal’s record of prosecuting rape and sexual violence.  
In addition, one of the most horrifying aspects of testifying at the ICTR for victims was 
that their names could be leaked back into Rwanda. Pre-trial witnesses were informed by the 
OTP that their identities would be kept confidential, and they often testified behind the curtain 
using pseudonyms. However, the Tribunal rules required that the defense know the names of the 
witnesses testifying against the accused, which means that oftentimes these names got leaked 
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back to Rwanda.355 There are significant social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual 
assaults, and the fact that they were raped could destroy their chance to marry, upon which their 
survival often depended. In the case of Witness TA at the Butare Trial, her experiences at the 
Tribunal attracted significant attention and resulted in her fiancé leaving her, and she has not 
been able to marry.356 This danger placed a significant burden on the victims and witnesses who 
testified at the ICTR. Not only were they subjected to insensitive and offensive questioning 
during the trials, their ability to reconcile and reintegrate to society could also be severely 
impeded by the ICTR’s lack of protection for witnesses. While the ICTR did provide protection 
for the witnesses during trials, it argued that the burden of post-trial protection fell onto the 
government of Rwanda.357 This argument reflects the need for more coordinated efforts between 
the ICTR and the Rwandan government.  
An Incomplete Picture of Rape and Sexual Violence 
The ICTR served not only as a judicial process to bring perpetrators of the genocide to 
justice, but also as a truth-telling mechanism that documented a historical record about what 
happened during the genocide. This uncovering of truth happened not only by the convictions of 
the perpetrators, but also through the victims’ and witnesses’ articulation of their experiences and 
observations, which are now presented in the trials’ transcripts. The picture of rape and sexual 
assault during the genocide is, unfortunately, incomplete in many aspects.  
First, the rather poor conviction rate of the Tribunal, while partly contributing to the 
historical record, did not portray the full picture of who was responsible for the genocide, 
especially given the high acquittal rate. In addition, throughout the Tribunal’s operation, only 
Tutsi women appeared to be victims of rape and sexual violence, and other categories, such as 
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Hutu and male victims, were neglected. Chiseche Salome Mibenge argues that the ICTR’s 
dominant narrative of gender and violence is monolithic and overtly exclusive, for it solely 
consisted of sexual violence against Tutsi women.358 For instance, the rape and sexual assault of 
moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwingiliymana was completely erased from the legal 
findings of the Tribunal. In the Bagosora judgment, the sexual aspect of her death – a bottle was 
shoved into her vagina – did not receive any legal consideration,359 whereas in Akayesu, thrusting 
a piece of wood into the vagina of a Tutsi woman was considered rape. Mibenge charges that this 
erasure of sexual violence against the Prime Minister was made possible because her Hutu 
identity did not fit into the dominant rape narrative of the ICTR, which explicitly indicated a 
dichotomy of only Tutsi women as rape victims and Hutu men as perpetrators.360 
This dichotomy also impacted the ICTR’s consideration of sexual violence against a 
prominent Tutsi man – Assiel Kabanda. He was killed and castrated, and his head and genitals 
were subsequently hung up and displayed near his fruit shop.361 In the Niyitegeka judgment, the 
ICTR mentioned the killing, decapitation, and castration of Kabanda as crimes against 
humanity,362 yet ignored the fact that castration was not merely an amputation but an attack 
against a male sexual and reproductive organ, which was often considered a symbolic 
amputation of one’s masculinity.363 In other words, while there was sufficient evidence about 
sexual violence against a male victim, the Tribunal’s record never referred to this attack as 
having a sexual nature, thus failing to create a more comprehensive record of truth about sexual 
violence against men and boys during the genocide.  Usta Kaitesi also notes that the Tribunal’s 
                                                
358 Mibenge 62 
359 Bagosora Trial Judgment, para. 705 
360 Ibid 
361 Mibenge 80 
362 Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, May 16, 2003, para. 465 
363 Mibenge 81 
  92 
record only mentioned two situations of sexual violence against men in three cases, as two cases 
shared the same victim.364  Moreover, this neglect fits into a trend in the field of transitional 
justice, in which researchers have largely ignored the issue of sexual violence as a form of 
gender-based violence against men in armed conflict.365  
Finally, the ICTR was located in Arusha, Tanzania to avoid the appearance of “victor’s 
justice.” The UNSC reiterated on many occasions, especially during the first ten years of the 
ICTR’s mandate, the need to investigate and prosecute human rights violations that were 
committed by the RPF. 366 The Tribunal, however, failed to uncover truth about and prosecute 
these crimes, which undermined the very decision to locate it in a foreign country.  
Insufficient Attention to Restorative Justice  
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis divides restorative justice into reparations and 
reconciliation. The ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction as 
international judicial processes, however, were mechanisms of retributive justice. Both 
mechanisms had no mandate to provide reparations for victims. The ICTR did, in 2000-2001, 
launch a service program to distribute monetary, legal, and medical support to women through 
five Rwandan women’s organization; yet the program was only largely symbolic and not 
implemented widely.367 This lack of attention to reparations for victims of the genocide in 
general was a result of an institutional challenge facing the ICTR. Established as a “genocide 
tribunal,” its tasks were to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and other violations of 
international humanitarian law. This mandate therefore systemically shaped the focus of the 
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ICTR on prosecuting violations of first-generation and bodily integrity rights, while neglecting 
violations of economic, social, and cultural crimes. With regards to gender-based violence, only 
rape and other physical invasions of the women’s body were paid attention to and prosecuted as 
“sexual violence.” Crimes such as the intentional spread of HIV/AIDs and other STDs were 
never considered under the Tribunal’s mandate. This systemic lack of attention to the long-term 
impacts of sexual crimes and other forms of gender-based violence on victims led to an 
unfortunate situation: while those in the ICTR’s custody received adequate healthcare, their 
victims, especially those in needs of HIV/AIDs treatment, completely lacked basic access to 
healthcare.368  
The other aspect of restorative justice – reconciliation – was, however, included in the 
mandate of the ICTR. UNSC Resolution 955 states that the ICTR would contribute to “the 
process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” This chapter 
now analyzes the extent to which the ICTR facilitated the reconciliation of victims of rape and 
sexual assaults through six main elements laid out in the introduction: 1) understanding the past, 
present and envisioning the future of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political culture, 4) 
security, 5) justice, and 6) social cohesion. The ICTR, by its role as a judicial mechanism and as 
a truth-uncovering mechanism, had the potential to push for more understanding of the past and 
to bring perpetrators to justice. In her interviews with victims of rape and sexual violence, 
Binafer Nowrojee noted that victims were primarily interested in two aspects of the Tribunal: 
jurisprudence and justice.369 In other words, they wanted public acknowledgment of the crimes 
committed against them, and wanted information about the fate of their perpetrators in the legal 
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process.370 The Tribunal was somewhat successful at facilitating reconciliation for victims and 
survivors who testified and saw their perpetrators being brought to justice, yet failed many others 
when it moved cases through trials without rape charges despite substantial evidence. Inadequate 
retributive justice delivery and an incomplete picture of rape and sexual violence thus prevented 
the ICTR from fulfilling its objectives. In addition, the extent to which a judicial mechanism can 
facilitate reconciliation for victims depends on whether the victims know about its record.  
Located in Arusha, Tanzania, the ICTR was already an institution physically and psychologically 
distant from the majority of the victims of sexual assaults. Its frequent maltreatment of victims 
and witnesses also created major impediments to reconciliation, such as re-traumatization, for 
those who testified in front of the tribunal in pursuit of justice and closure.  
Moreover, the majority of the Rwandan population was generally under-informed of the 
progress that the ICTR made over the years. This lack of knowledge about the ICTR can be 
attributed to the Tribunal’s lack of outreach efforts.371 Those who testified at the Tribunal 
received little or no information about the trial process and its results. This lack of information 
and follow-up gave many victims a sense of having been used; as one witness said, “our tribunal 
gives us nothing, not even a thank you.”372 The one exception was after the Akayesu case, when 
the OTP staffers returned to Taba and held a public town hall meeting to explain the judgment. 
While it is reasonable to argue that the Tribunal did not have the responsibility to follow up with 
survivors who testified, public outreach effort similar to the town hall meeting after Akayesu was 
crucial to facilitate reconciliation, which was included in UNSC Resolution 955 as one of the 
ICTR’s objectives. As a retributive justice institution, the ICTR had the ability to facilitate 
reconciliation for survivors by publicly acknowledging the wrongness of the crimes committed 
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against Rwandans, which could only happen if the victims actually knew about the punishment 
of their perpetrators. As Dina Temple-Raston argues: 
The ruling would have meant more if the thousands of women in Rwanda who 
had been victims of rape during the genocide had known it even occurred. This, 
too, was one of the problems with the ICTR. It meted out justice and Rwandans 
were never informed.373 
 
The fact that the ICTR was located in Tanzania required a more proactive effort in public 
outreach if the Tribunal wanted to contribute to survivors’ reconciliation, from which the ICTR 
unfortunately fell short.   
Moreover, the work of the Tribunal spanned over 20 years. Many cases, such as the 
Butare Trial, lasted for a long time and were difficult for victims to follow. In addition, after 
heavy criticism for its slow progress, the ICTR assigned more cases to each trial chamber, and on 
any given day, it was extremely difficult to know what was happening at which time.374 
Information about the ICTR and its procedures were only available in English and French, with 
little or no information available in Kinyarwanda. This selective and rather discriminatory access 
to information, which aimed at a small, literate middle class while the rest of the population did 
not know what was happening, created major impediments to reconciliation for those who 
wished to know about the judgment of the perpetrators who had raped and ruined their lives. In 
addition, the physical disconnect between the ICTR and the Rwandan population almost 
completely prevented the ICTR from fulfilling other aspects of reconciliation, such as citizenship 
and identity, political culture, and security. In many instances, such as with Witness TA from the 
Butare Trial, testifying at the Tribunal even worsened the victims’ prospect of security and 
reintegrating into their communities as full citizens. As Gahima argues, the various shortcomings 
that the ICTR confronted made it unlikely that the ICTR would contribute to or have any long-
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term impact on “fighting impunity, deterring human rights abuses, promoting reconciliation, and 
advancing sustainable peace.”375 In addition, Nicola Palmer’s empirical research in Rwanda 
showed that reconciliation did not consistently or broadly emerge as an impact of the Tribunal, 
while developing an international jurisprudence was identified as the dominant contribution.376 
CONCLUSION 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the major strengths and successes of international 
transitional mechanisms lay predominantly in the sphere of retributive justice – criminal 
prosecution and setting legal precedents. Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera argues that, “the Tribunal 
has contributed positively to the overall situation in Rwandan by arresting, detaining, and 
convicting many of the key figures responsible for genocide, and so prevented these perpetrators 
pursuing their genocidal goals.” 377  These mechanisms also created a strong international 
jurisprudence for the prosecution of sexual crimes in international law. These legal precedents 
were necessary, as both mechanisms were two of the first international institutions to prosecute 
rape and sexual violence as either genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Prior to the 
establishment of the ICTR, rape and sexual violence were not treated as serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, given the international record of non-prosecution of these 
crimes.378 The international jurisprudence created by the ICTR and those of the ICTY and ICC 
all support the assertion that prosecuting sexual violence, at the very least rape and sexual 
slavery, has risen to the level of jus cogens.379 Setting legal precedents, while necessary, was not 
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sufficient; only future victims of rape and sexual assaults in other international and national 
conflicts can receive the benefits that this international jurisprudence gave to international law. 
In other words, these international mechanisms were not successful at bringing comprehensive 
justice to the victims they intended to serve, but have the potential and power to bring justice to 
future victims of rape and sexual assault.  
In addition, some aspects of restorative justice were achieved. Through the testimonies of 
the victims and witnesses, a partial record of truth about sexual violence during the genocide 
emerged from the ICTR and contributed to a collective memory in Rwanda. In other words, as 
both a judicial and truth-telling mechanism, “the Tribunal wrote the genocide story.”380 The 
findings of the ICTR have confirmed that these crimes of a sexual nature must not be seen as 
opportunistic attacks, but rather as essential parts of the intent to destroy the enemy in armed 
conflicts. Women were also active participants in the genocide, and were also responsible for 
perpetrating rape and sexual violence. Crimes of a sexual nature therefore must be considered 
amongst the most serious international crimes worthy of prosecution under international law, and 
these two international mechanisms have contributed significantly to this acknowledgment. Both 
mechanisms, however, failed to uncover more information about sexual violence against men 
and boys, the Hutus, and crimes committed by the RPF, rendering this record of truth and justice 
incomplete.  
As one of the first international tribunal since the Tokyo and Nuremberg Trials and the 
ICTY, the ICTR faced an unprecedented task of prosecuting perpetrators of genocide, especially 
those who committed sexual violence. Given the lack of judicial framework of prosecuting 
sexual crimes as genocide that it could follow, the fact the ICTR was able to gain these 
achievements is indeed remarkable. However, the ICTR’s overall record reflects several 
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institutional challenges for prosecuting crimes and rape and sexual violence. Different 
Prosecutors demonstrated different levels of willingness to prosecute rape cases, even when the 
OTP possessed strong evidence. While the ICTR did incrementally utilize more tools to 
prosecute rape, such as using the JCE theory, it was unfortunate that sexual crimes were rarely 
included as a central element of investigation, which resulted in many missed opportunities to 
hold perpetrators accountable. Many victims felt that the environment at the Tribunal was too 
hostile and foreign for them to testify about intimate experiences of sexual violence. In addition, 
while the ICTR possessed the ability to contribute to the process of reconciliation for survivors 
of sexual crimes, particularly by developing a partial record of truth and justice, it failed almost 
completely to follow up with victims who testified and oftentimes gave them the feeling of 
having been used. While it is difficult to ask an international, retributive justice mechanism to 
pay specific attention to restorative justice, being aware of the need for information-sharing and 
restorative measures can further contribute to the success of future tribunals.  
In conclusion, both the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials in other states showed both 
strengths and weaknesses in bringing both retributive and restorative justice to victims of rape 
and sexual violence. Their major contribution – leaving legal precedents to prosecute crimes of a 
sexual nature under international law – should not be underestimated. The extent to which that 
this contribution impacted the peacetime status of rape victims in general and of women in 
particularly is rather contested. Changing and improving the status of women in Rwandan 
society, and eliminating the social stigma surrounding the victims of rape and sexual assault, 
requires systemic and internal efforts that international mechanisms did not possess. The next 
chapter analyzes the extent to which domestic mechanisms of transitional justice were successful 
in carrying these internal efforts. 
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4. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, LOCAL JUSTICE 
 
NATIONAL COURTS, GACACA COURTS, AND REPARATIONS PROGRAMS 
 
 
“Why do you foreigners [abazungu] ask such stupid questions?!? How can you 
ask me about reconciling with my neighbors when I see their children wearing my 
[dead] children’s clothing, when they are in their house eating at my table, when 
they cook in my pots? Reconciliation!?! It’s not possible.”381  
 
 
As the genocide ended, Rwanda was left with a seemingly insurmountable task of 
rebuilding its social, economic, and political fabric and restoring the rule of law. The wounds of 
the genocide were too painfully visible to be ignored, and bringing justice to victims of the 
genocide became a central part of rebuilding the country. As the international community 
attempted to prosecute international crimes of genocide and other crimes against humanity at the 
ICTR and trials based on the principle of universal jurisdiction in other states, Rwanda itself also 
tried to reckon with its painful past. The Rwandan government first used its domestic courts to 
try crimes of genocide, yet its post-genocide collapsed justice system soon proved to be utterly 
ineffective. Confronted by both a devastated, overburdened judicial system and an overwhelming 
desire for justice from the population, the Rwandan government resorted to the gacaca court – a 
local and communal justice system deeply rooted within Rwandan culture and popular in 
Rwandan society. In many ways, post-genocide gacaca incrementally evolved both as a 
complement to and as an alternative of the national courts. In addition, the Rwandan government 
acknowledged that justice solely in terms of criminal prosecution was not enough for a 
population overwhelmed by the daily struggles of survival; reparations therefore became of 
crucial importance. Genocide victims could claim reparations as civil parties in both the national 
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courts and gacaca. Furthermore, the government introduced legislation to establish two 
reparation programs: the FARG assistance fund (Fonds National d'Assistance aux victimes les 
plus nécessiteuses du génocide et des massacres) and the FIND indemnification/compensation 
fund (Fond d'indemnisation).  
While challenges confronting post-genocide Rwanda were overwhelming, the Rwandan 
government’s attempts to solve these problems were extensive and aspirational. Rwanda’s 
domestic responses to the crimes of genocide stood out for the unprecedented lengths to which 
the state has gone to hold perpetrators accountable and to bring justice to victims.382 Within the 
scope of this thesis, a question arises: How successful were these transitional justice mechanisms 
in bringing comprehensive justice to Rwandan victims of rape and sexual assaults? A UN report 
estimated that there were between 250,000 and 500,000 people who were raped and sexually 
assaulted during the Rwandan genocide.383 While the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials were 
primarily concerned with prosecuting the mastermind of the genocide, domestic mechanisms 
were more concerned with trying other categories of perpetrators. To victims of sexual violence, 
domestic mechanisms brought the possibilities of bringing those who directly raped and sexually 
assaulted them to justice. The victims’ proximity to the justice mechanisms and their potential to 
claim reparations showcased a promise of justice and reconciliation.  
This chapter analyzes the extent to which domestic mechanisms – national courts, gacaca 
courts, and reparation programs – were able to fulfill their promises. It first provides a brief 
background to these mechanisms and summarizes their records. The chapter continues with an 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice 
– both retributive and restorative justice – to victims of rape and sexual violence. The chapter 
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argues that given the Rwandan government’s commitment to justice, domestic mechanisms were 
somewhat successful at prosecuting at most 9,000 perpetrators of rape and sexual violence, and 
were able to provide reparations in the form of assistance programs to a portion of victims, 
especially widows of the genocide. Despite this commitment, domestic mechanisms faced 
several institutional challenges that came from the genocide and from the social norms deeply 
embedded within Rwandan society. As a result, while domestic mechanisms were able to bring 
justice to some victims, they also unfortunately failed many others. Within these mechanisms, 
gacaca deserves particular attention for its cultural values and its pioneering approach to 
transitional justice. However, modern gacaca was heavily modified to fit the Rwandan 
government’s pursuit of justice, and arguably became a justice mechanism unsuitable for crimes 
of rape and sexual violence.  
NATIONAL COURTS 
Between 1994 and 1996, the Rwandan government discussed with national experts the 
possibility of criminal justice and accountability for genocide-related crimes within the domestic 
legal framework. This two-year discussion culminated in the adoption of Organic Law No. 08/96 
on the Organization of Prosecution of Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity.384 With this 1996 law, Rwandan became the first country to pass domestic 
criminal legislation on genocide.385 This law established the first legal and judicial framework to 
prosecute genocide-related crimes within Rwanda, and created four categories of offenders 
subjected to prosecution. Category one consisted of organizers or leaders of genocide, well-
known killers, and perpetrators of sexual torture. Category two included murders and 
accomplices to murder or serious attacks. Category three included persons who committed 
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serious attacks without the intent to cause death, and category four included those responsible for 
property damage.386 This chapter is primarily concerned with category one offenders who raped 
and committed acts of sexual torture.  
As the 1996 Genocide Law entered into force in December 1996, several institutional 
challenges facing national courts soon came to the fore as the courts attempted to try more than 
120,000 persons accused of genocide-related crimes. At the end of the genocide, Rwanda 
counted only 20 judicial staffers for criminal prosecutions and only 19 lawyers, and by 1997, the 
448 judges serving in national courts by 1997 were poorly trained.387 Given this limited human 
resource and the lack of financial resource, the courts were only able to try 1,292 genocide 
suspects by 1998 and, at that rate, genocide trials would have continued for more than a 
century.388 The justice system was so overwhelmed by the caseload that even serious crimes such 
as sexual torture – category one crimes subjected to the most severe punishments – were not 
investigated and prosecuted.389 This slow pace of justice, overcrowding and inhumane prison 
conditions, and insufficient due process for the accused in trial practices, all led to heavy 
criticism of the government.390 With regards to rape and sexual violence, Human Rights Watch 
states that “between 1998 and 2004, an extraordinary small number of cases of genocidal sexual 
violence were prosecuted at the domestic level.”391 Between December 1996 and December 
2003, the national courts tried 9,728 persons accused of genocide-related crimes, of which only 
32 cases included charges of rape or sexual torture.392 Rwandan women’s organization AVEGA 
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(Association des Veuves du Genocide – The Association of the Widows of Genocide) estimated 
that less than 100 rape cases were heard in the national courts, while Usta Kaitesi in an interview 
estimated that there were much fewer than 1,000.393  
GACACA COURTS 
Responding to the nearly complete destruction of the judicial infrastructure and the high 
level of civilian participation in crimes of the highest degrees, the Rwandan government resorted 
to the traditional justice process called gacaca, which some scholars deemed as the “last hope for 
justice and reconciliation” in Rwanda.394  
2001 Gacaca Law 
Traditional gacaca mainly dealt with civil matters such as land disputes and general 
family relations, and was a private affair rooted within restorative justice elements, especially the 
restoration of relationship between parties.395 Gacaca can be traced back until at least the 17th 
century, and operated throughout the Belgian colonial period. Traditional gacaca operated under 
the Habyarimana regime, and families continued to resolve intrafamilial conflict through gacaca 
when necessary.396 Modern gacaca – the modified version that was implemented following the 
Rwandan genocide – was, however, drastically altered to fit the need for post-genocide justice, 
and its proceedings turned into a public affair with the entire community participating. Gacaca 
trials were judged by inyangamugayo, local elder leaders who were elected by citizens for their 
integrity and standing within the community. While traditional gacaca operated in an ad hoc 
manner, its modern version was based on a complex written law, with systematic administrative 
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divisions and the power to impose prison sentences (but not the death penalty) on the accused.397 
More importantly, while women were often not permitted to speak in traditional gacaca,398 
modern gacaca addressed this shortcoming. Women were elected as inyangamugayo, 
participated both as victims and as perpetrators, and actively contributed as eligible members of 
the general assembly.399   
On March 15, 2001, the Rwandan government adopted Organic Law No. 40/2000 on 
Setting up ‘Gacaca Jurisdiction’ and the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting 
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed between October 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 1994,400 and established the gacaca courts as a concurrent justice mechanism to 
operate alongside the national courts. Gacaca was established with five main objectives: 1) to 
reveal the truth about the genocide, 2) to speed up the cases of genocide and other crimes against 
humanity, 3) to eradicate the culture of impunity, 4) to strengthen unity and reconciliation among 
Rwandans, and 5) to prove the Rwandans’ capacity to solve their own problems.401 Each gacaca 
court was comprised of a General Assembly (100 community members), a Bench (19 
Inyangamugayo judges, who were all elected by the community), and a Coordination Committee 
(one President, two Vice-Presidents, and two secretaries who altogether managed the operation 
of gacaca).402 The 2001 Gacaca Law established approximately 11,000 gacaca courts at 
different administrative levels – the cell, sector, district, and province levels – for the pilot 
phase.403  
                                                
397 Ibid 28 
398 Waldorf 48 
399 Kaitesi 209 
400 Hereinafter as 2001 Gacaca Law 
401 National Services of the Gacaca Courts (SNJG), Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (Kigali, 2012), Part I, Chapter II, 
Section 2 
402 Ibid 
403 Human Rights Watch, Struggling to Survive, 15 
  105 
The 2001 Gacaca Law used the same four categories of crimes established by the 1996 
Genocide Law, but expanded category one to include the crime of rape. Under this law, all 
genocide-related cases had to first go before gacaca. Gacaca took place once a week in public if 
the quorum (at least five members of the bench and 100 members of the general assembly) was 
present. Gacaca operated in three stages: information gathering, categorization of crimes, and 
trials. During the last step of the information-gathering phase at the cell level of gacaca, 
witnesses testified publicly or in writing before the assembly. Information was also collected in 
confessions and guilty pleas of the perpetrator. During phase two, gacaca judges reviewed the 
files and categorized the accused in accordance with the hierarchy of crimes created by the 1996 
Genocide Law. The gacaca court then tried and delivered verdicts on crimes of the latter three 
categories, while category one crimes including rape were transferred to the national courts 
system for prosecution.404 Since traditional gacaca was a form of communal justice, modern 
gacaca also required every citizen to take part in the procedure, for every Rwandan was witness 
to the crimes of genocide.405  
Regarding rape and sexual violence, one important trend emerged. While the initial legal 
procedures within the national courts remained private and rather limited to the related parties, 
every case must go through the public proceedings of gacaca under the 2001 Gacaca Law. The 
pilot phase report revealed that the public nature of the information gathering and guilty pleas 
exposed victims of sexual torture to further victimization and social stigmas surrounding these 
crimes. Between the launch of the pilot phase and June 2002, 581 gacaca courts in ten provinces 
registered approximately 134 cases of rape and sexual torture, as compared to the approximately 
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3,308 cases of non-sexual violence crimes.406 In response, the government adopted a new law in 
2004 to address the weaknesses identified, such as the public nature of the information-gathering 
process during the pilot phase. 
2004 Gacaca Law 
Organic Law No. 16/2004 on the Organization, Jurisdiction, and Functioning of the 
Gacaca Courts407 was adopted on June 19, 2004 and laid out several changes in accordance with 
the lessons learnt in the pilot phase. To speed up the nationwide implementation of gacaca, 
gacaca at the provincial and district levels were abolished, and cases in these levels were 
transferred to various sector gacaca courts. Categories two and three were combined in a new 
category two, and the former category four became the new category three. The number of 
judges in each gacaca court was reduced from 19 to 9 with 5 alternates, and additional training 
programs for gacaca judges were developed and implemented.408 Nationwide implementation of 
gacaca began with the launch of the information-gathering phase in 2005.  
Specific procedural changes were implemented to protect victims of rape and sexual 
violence from the public nature of the information-gathering stage, and the 2004 Gacaca Law 
prohibited publicly gathering information on sexual violence. Victims of sexual crimes were 
supposed to give evidence in closed settings to a single judge of their choosing or, if they did not 
trust any of the judges, could give the evidence directly to the public prosecutor at the national 
courts. Perpetrators could make confessions about rape but must not do so in public, and third 
parties, such as witnesses, were prohibited from publicly reporting sexual violence crimes.409  
2008 Amendment 
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The last significant changes in the operation of gacaca, especially with regards to rape 
and sexual violence, occurred after the adoption of the 2008 amendment to the 2004 Gacaca 
Law on May 19, 2008. In order to speed up first category trials at the national courts, the 2008 
amendment extended the jurisdiction of gacaca to cover some first category crimes, including 
trying perpetrators of rape and sexual torture and their accomplice. Under this law, cases arising 
from the information gathering phase and those already at the prosecution office of the national 
courts were transferred to the competent gacaca courts. Prior to this amendment, everyone could 
either testify or confess about what they saw or experienced during the genocide. Under this 
amendment, for new claims, only victims had the right to lodge new rape cases, and in case the 
victim was dead or incapable, other concerned parties could lodge it; all of these claims had to be 
submitted secretly.410 After 2008, between 6,608 and 8000 cases that included rape and sexual 
violence charges were estimated to have been transferred from the national courts to gacaca.411 
Trials began in January 2009 and ended in July 2010. The exact number of delivered verdicts 
that included rape and sexual torture crimes is not currently available.   
In addition, the law also required that rape trials must be in closed sessions (in camera) 
where the general public was excluded. There were usually six people allowed in the trial room: 
the victim, the accused, the judge, a security officer, a gacaca representative, and a trauma 
counselor chosen by the victim.412 As a safeguard for human rights, all judgments were 
announced publicly. In addition, the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdiction (SNJG), which 
monitored the implementation and progress of gacaca and the post graduate training institute for 
the justice sector in Rwanda, organized a 10-week, expert training program for various 
individuals, who would in turn train the Inyangamugayo on approaching cases of rape and sexual 
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torture. This interdisciplinary training covered both legal and psychological aspects of the law 
and judicial process.413   
REPARATION PROGRAMS 
 Several reparation programs were proposed in the aftermath of the genocide with a focus 
on two different types of reparations: compensation that made up for the loss suffered by the 
victim, and assistance that aimed at helping the neediest among the population. In reality, 
however, only one program was eventually established and maintained financially, while others 
were never adopted or did not have the financial capacity to be effective. Regarding reparations 
for victims of rape and sexual violence in particular, the prospects were even grimmer.  
Reparations Within Genocide Trial 
Under the 1996 Genocide Law, the specialized chambers were given the competence to 
adjudicate the victims’ reparation claims within criminal trials. Perpetrators of first category 
crimes, including rape and sexual torture, incurred civil liability for all damages suffered by the 
victims during the genocide throughout the country.414 Reparation claims were to be paid by the 
perpetrators and their families. By the end of the 1990s, the government, overwhelmed by the 
heavy caseload and the slow progress of justice at the national courts, had given up on the idea of 
individualized compensation awarded by the national courts, and looked at solutions involving 
administrative compensation distributed by a fund that was to be established in the wake of the 
introduction of the gacaca system.415  
The Assistance Fund (Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide – FARG) 
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In 1998, the government decided to create an independent fund named FARG, which 
would distribute assistance in the form of education, healthcare, housing, and income-generating 
programs.416 The two most important criteria to qualify as a FARG beneficiary were being “in 
need” (orphan, widow, and the handicapped) and being a “réscape.” A réscape was defined as “a 
person who escaped the genocide or the massacres committed between October 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 1994. The FARG did not provide legal definitions of genocide and massacre but 
only referred to the element of intent: the intent of the genocide was to target and exterminate 
individuals and to destroy their properties because of their ethnic background or their political 
opposition to the genocide.417 This definition shied away from the notion of victimhood. 
Rombouts argues that while “harm” and “loss” is central to the notion of victimhood, central to 
the notion of réscape is “having escaped persecution,” which was often interpreted in an ad hoc 
manner by local authorities.418 Because of this interpretation, some survivors of rape and sexual 
violence were categorized as réscapes while others were not. Since the fund was perpetually 
underfunded, only a fraction of those entitled to receive assistance was able to receive it.419   
The Compensation Fund (Fond d'indemnisation - FIND) 
While the creation of a compensation fund was announced in the 1996 Genocide Law, 
two different drafts for a FIND law did not take place until 2001 and 2002 respectively. The 
funds would come partly from the Rwandan state, partly from those convicted of genocide, and 
from the international community and individuals on a voluntary basis. The profits from 
community service programs would also be transferred to the fund for distribution. The process 
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of implementation of this fund came to a standstill in the wake of the 2003 elections, and has not 
been taken up again since. While the 2003 Constitution contains a provision on the “welfare of 
victims of genocide,” it also states that such provision is only manageable within the limits of the 
state’s capacity. The two FIND drafts have never been adopted, and most observers no longer 
believe in the implementation of this fund.420   
ANALYSIS: MAJOR STRENGTHS AND SUCCESSES 
As noted in Chapter 2, human rights reports and transitional justice scholars have largely 
employed a pessimistic and negative viewpoint while analyzing the prospects for comprehensive 
justice for victims of rape and sexual violence in political contexts of transition. In Rwanda, the 
number of rape and sexual violence cases heard in both the national courts and the gacaca courts 
in total amounts to fewer than 9,000, a significantly small figure compared to the estimated 
250,000 – 500,000 cases of rape and sexual violence during the genocide. Yet to argue that 
domestic mechanisms did not bring any justice to victims of rape and sexual violence is to 
unfairly undermine the work they have done, and to underestimate the unparalleled challenges 
they faced as the country attempted to reckon with the legacy of the genocide.  
Justice and Jurisprudence 
The inclusion of rape and sexual torture within category one of genocide-related crimes 
deserves particular consideration. This inclusion, after various debates within Parliament, moved 
rape cases from category three (serious assaults against persons without clear genocidal intent) to 
category one, whose perpetrators were subjected to life imprisonment or death penalty. This 
decision unequivocally acknowledged that rape and sexual torture not only constituted an 
essential part of the genocide, but also amounted to the category of most serious crimes 
deserving the heaviest forms of punishment, which altogether had “considerable impact on the 
                                                
420 Bornkamm 135-136, Rombouts 199-200 & 214 
  111 
perception of rape as a spoil of war.”421 Symbolically, this decision showed an appreciation the 
severity of the experience suffered by hundreds of thousands Rwandan during the genocide. 
Practically, some of these victims were able to see their perpetrators being brought to justice by 
either serving their prison terms or being executed.   
To some extent, both national courts and gacaca were able to facilitate the creation of a 
partial historical record of truth about what happened during the genocide. For gacaca, its major 
potential in uncovering truth lay in the information-gathering and investigation stage. While 
formal legal procedures such as the criminal courts often restrained the victims’ testimonies, the 
informal nature of gacaca allowed for more truth to be discovered. Truth emerged not only from 
the confessions of perpetrator and testimonies of victims and witnesses, but also from the 
judgments that were made public by the judicial authority. While rape and sexual violence trials 
were in camera, all judgments had to be made public. These judgments had both potential 
retributive and restorative impacts: they not only put the perpetrators within the confines of the 
justice system and removed them from their communities for punishment, but also affirmed the 
wrongness of the violence committed against the victims. These impacts were arguably more 
powerful within the context of gacaca, since gacaca could be seen as a blend of retributive and 
restorative justice with “confessions and accusations, guilty pleas and trials, forgiveness and 
punishment, community service and incarceration.”422 While cases in national courts often 
happened far away from the communities in which the victims and perpetrators lived, gacaca 
situated such justice process within the community itself. The fact that gacaca sessions could 
only start when 100 members of the general assembly were present means that open judgments 
of rape and sexual violence cases were arguably intended to provide the community with a better 
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understanding of what happened during the genocide, and could help facilitate the emergence of 
truth about what happened during the genocide within such community itself. The National 
Service of Gacaca Courts published a final report in 2012 titled Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 
which included a section about what gacaca uncovered about rape and sexual torture.423   
Modern gacaca was not only a legal institution, but also a social institution as well. This 
combination of both legal and social functions dominates some scholars’ compliments of 
gacaca’s impact. Matthew Braley argues that the gacaca was capable of “empowering a 
disenfranchised citizenry and offering an institutional space in which alienated individuals and 
groups can recognize a degree of interdependence.”424 By allowing victims to testify about their 
experience and publicly denouncing those acts of violence, gacaca offered victims of rape and 
sexual violence a platform to talk and to be listened to, and validated them by acknowledging 
their sufferings. Emily Amick argues that the real value of gacaca came in its provision of a kind 
of truth commission, a community-wide discussion about what took place during the genocide, 
and a beginning of the conceptualization of how individuals would engage with their neighbors 
in the new Rwanda and would altogether form a common society.425 In theory, truth telling in 
gacaca served as “a manner to develop a common language of morality,” and gacaca provided a 
space for a renegotiation of the mores of everyday society and affirmation of social moral 
norms.426 Many women who testified in gacaca felt that it “enabled them to relieve their hearts, 
to have their experiences and their suffering during the genocide recognized, and to urge others 
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to act to prevent these crimes from ever happening again.”427 Bert Ingelaere argues that it was 
this discursive nature of gacaca – in which people were not forced but chose to talk about their 
experiences – that functioned as a catalyst of the transitional justice process.428   
Gacaca, as a unique approach to transitional justice by serving both as a judicial and 
social institution, deserves particular attention for the length it went to seek truth, justice, and 
reconciliation. The extent to which gacaca was successful in doing so, especially in bringing 
justice to victims of rape and sexual violence, requires more field research that I do not have the 
capacity to implement. Writing about the extent to which truth telling can contribute to 
sustainable peace and reconciliation, Tristan Borer points to the phenomenon of equating 
“aspiration with empiricism,” in which claims about truth-telling mechanisms are presented as 
facts while insufficient empirical work has been done to substantiate them in reality.429 As this 
chapter later demonstrates, there existed significant institutional challenges that impeded the 
justice process at gacaca and prevented many victims of rape and sexual violence from 
participating. Truth and justice that emerged from gacaca were at least symbolic and at most 
partial; it is arguable that the compliments and observations made by the authors mentioned 
above may somewhat be too aspirational while there are reasons to believe that gacaca was not 
that successful.  
Saying that gacaca was not successful at all, as this section does not in any way attempt 
to, is an extreme oversimplification that undermines the courage of the victims that came 
forward. A partial historical record about what happened during the genocide and justice served 
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by those who were convicted at gacaca are undoubtedly better than no truth and justice at all, 
especially in a country where insufficient legal personnel could barely make the national courts 
system work. While acknowledging the gaps in the current literature on the lack of empirical 
evidence supporting aspirational claims about the success of gacaca, this thesis does want to 
give credit where credit is due. Through both the national courts and gacaca, the collective 
memory in the form of a partial record of truth and the justice served by those convicted of rape 
and sexual torture could arguably contribute to both national and individual reconciliation. This 
thesis examines reconciliation by dividing it into six different components: 1) understanding the 
past, present and envisioning the future of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and identity, 3) political 
culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social cohesion. The recognition of rape and sexual 
violence as some of the most serious forms of genocide not only contributed to the emerging 
understanding of the past, but also to the justice and security components by isolating and 
punishing the perpetrators in those 9,000 cases that included rape charges. Moreover, Anne-
Marie de Brouwer – a prolific scholar who has conducted field research and written extensively 
on sexual violence and transitional justice in Rwanda – argues that the public was gradually 
beginning to comprehend the significance of hearing stories of rape and sexual violence in 
gacaca in order to effectively respond to rape and sexual violence in the future.430 While this 
contribution was rather limited given the number of cases actually heard and tried within the 
national courts and gacaca, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge such contribution, 
especially to the victims who were able to see their perpetrators brought to justice.  
Procedural Changes to Protect Victims of Rape and Sexual Violence 
 Up until 2008, national courts and gacaca operated as concurrent justice mechanisms to 
prosecute genocide-related crimes. Both institutions thus were never static but ever changing, 
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and gacaca itself went through at least five different amendments. 431  Through these 
amendments, the gacaca courts were able to incorporate more procedural changes to protect and 
encourage victims of rape and sexual violence to participate. After the pilot phase in the early 
2000s, the Rwandan government soon realized that the information-gathering stage exposed 
some victims to heavy social stigmatization once their families and communities found out that 
they were raped. The 2004 Gacaca Law thus prohibited the publishing of information regarding 
to rape, and the lodging of these cases had to be done in private and reported directly to one 
Inyangamugayo. The 2008 Gacaca Law, which transferred cases of rape and sexual torture to the 
gacaca courts, established in camera trials so victims and perpetrators could testify/confess about 
their cases in protected settings. As aforementioned, the victims were also able to choose the 
judge to hear their case, and choose a counselor to assist them within the process. One woman 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch preferred her case to be heard before gacaca, because the 
procedures were less formal and she could speak more freely with emotional support.432 The law 
also included provisions on punishments for individuals who breached this secrecy and exposed 
the victims to trauma and social stigma. The 2008 Gacaca Law also laid out a framework for 
extensive gender-sensitive trainings for judges to deal with rape and sexual violence cases.  
In addition, the 2008 Gacaca Law also allowed the victims in criminal cases to determine 
whether the case should be tried or not.433 Ordinary criminal justice often does not reflect the 
needs of the victims and may do justice at the expense of victims. Usta Kaitesi and Roelof 
Haveman argue that this provision was rooted in a restorative justice purpose, for it allowed all 
stakeholders to participate not only in the court but also in the decision to either enter the case in 
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the criminal process or not.434 This provision was also intended to protect the victims, since some 
accusations were lodged maliciously to expose and further attack the victims.435 As this chapter 
further demonstrates, these provisions were able to help some victims feel more welcomed to 
testify at gacaca while simultaneously not being able to help many others. Some victims were 
either too overwhelmed by the fear of social stigmas surrounding sexual violence; others did not 
want to come forward at all and had already learned to live with their lives. These procedural 
changes, however, demonstrated that the Rwandan government was well aware of these 
challenges confronting victims and survivors of sexual violence, and that it had no control over 
some of these challenges – such as culturally embedded social stigma. The government was 
nevertheless willing to modify the gacaca process throughout the years, especially based on the 
lessons learned in the pilot phase, as demonstrated by the fact that major changes in gacaca law, 
such as those in 2004 and 2008, contained specific provisions on helping victims of rape and 
sexual violence come forward. It is because of this good intention and willingness to address 
challenges facing victims – despite the acknowledgment that it was only able to fix some but not 
fundamentally counter all of these challenges – that the Rwandan government should be 
applauded.  
Assistance and Reparation for (Some) Women 
Traditionally, women were often regarded as dependents of their male relatives, and their 
position in society was limited in public settings and built around their roles as daughters, 
mothers, and wives. Gender relations have changed since the genocide, since the Rwandan 
government seized the post-conflict period as an opportunity to improve gender equality.436 As 
early as 1999, the government changed the discriminatory inheritance rule, under which women 
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could not inherit from their husbands or fathers, and women have since become rightful owners 
of land.437 This development was particularly important, since many women became widows 
during and after the genocide; being able to own and work on their lands was an essential 
component of life sustenance. Understanding that the economy was destroyed after the genocide, 
which inevitably affected women disproportionately, the government also created the Ministry of 
Gender and Women in Development to oversee development programs with a focus on women. 
In addition, the 2003 Constitution explicitly underscored gender equality and stipulated that all-
decision making bodies should be composed of at least 30% women.438   
Structural, top-down changes were thus made to facilitate the incorporation of women 
into post-genocide Rwanda, many of whom were victims of rape and sexual violence. More 
importantly, these women were often widows, and thus fell under the definition of “the neediest 
réscapes” that qualified them as beneficiaries of the FARG fund. In other words, reparations and 
assistance coming from FARG was not organized around victimhood of sexual violence, but 
rather around widowhood. The fact that the FARG fund was somewhat gender-sensitive proved 
to be beneficial to various victims of rape and sexual violence who were widows. Heidi 
Rombouts argues that widowhood was a much safer banner for women because organizing 
themselves around a victimhood of sexual crimes would involve a much too explicit and public 
assertion of their experiences that might result in further re-traumatization or social stigmas. The 
fact that FARG targeted “the neediest” among Rwandans also indirectly made women the 
primary beneficiaries of its assistance, since they were generally poorer than men, and female-
headed households were usually in more dire situations than male-head ones.439  
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FARG’s census in 1998 showed that out of 282,000 réscapes, 80,000 women and 53,000 
men were without shelter, and one of FARG’s first initiative was to provide houses to réscapes 
of the genocide.440 Since new houses were often grouped together, some women were able to 
establish contacts with other victims instead of being forced to live with their old neighbors 
whom they did not trust.441 In addition, FARG also established a health program that provided 
medical health cards with which réscapes could go to several hospitals for free medical care, 
including genocide-related diseases, such as wound infections and medical consequences of 
mutilation.442 These assistance services were of particularly importance for women in general 
and victims of rape and sexual violence in particular, who were in overwhelming needs to 
overcome physical harms and to generate income in order to start their life. In addition, the 
FARG fund was also particularly successful in working with women’s groups, such as IBUKA 
and AVEGA, to help distribute their services packages to widows who lived far away from the 
capital. While the FARG fund did not pay specific attention to trauma and HIV/AIDs, which 
victims of rape and sexual violence generally experienced, AVEGA incrementally became more 
involved with providing services that dealt with these problems while simultaneously focusing 
on helping widows with their daily survival, including distributing clothes and housing and 
looking for funds to support income-generating projects.443 AVEGA has arguably remained the 
only lifeline for genocide survivors by providing guidance and moral support as well as concrete 
assistance.444  
As noted in Chapter 2, transitional justice scholars have generally pointed out the 
significant need to provide reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights, especially 
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for victims of rape and sexual violence. It was generally impossible for some victims to think 
about justice and reconciliation when they still struggled to survive and fulfill basic needs every 
day. The various developments in national law that focused specifically on women and the 
distribution of service packages by FARG could in theory facilitate reconciliation by gradually 
constructing a political culture that is gender-sensitive and reflects the specific needs of victims 
of rape and sexual violence. In addition, the constitutional provision that requires the 
representation of women in executive and legislative branch did in fact contribute to the 
citizenship and identity component of reconciliation. As of 2014, Rwanda managed to reach 64% 
women in its Parliament, a figure that is practically unheard of anywhere else.445 Women’s 
representation in the government reflects a significant power in a society dominated by 
patriarchal norms that often relegate women to the private sphere and fail to give women the full 
benefits of citizenships. The fact that Rwandan women are overwhelmingly represented in 
government shows the potential that the needs of rape victims would be assisted in the future. 
ANALYSIS: MAJOR WEAKNESSES AND FAILURES 
Throughout the years, the national courts, gacaca courts, and various reparation programs 
have received heavy criticism for their failure to bring justice to victims of rape and sexual 
assaults. The total number of rape and sexual assaults cases heard in the national courts and 
gacaca was fewer than 9,000. The number of perpetrators actually convicted of these crimes is 
not available, but is presumably equally small, if not smaller. This figure is disproportionately 
small compared to the estimated number of rape and sexual violence incidents during the 
genocide (between 250,000 and 500,000). Many victims indeed never saw their perpetrators 
brought to justice. Similarly, while some victims of rape and sexual violence received 
reparations from FARG, many did not. The question remains: what factors impacted the 
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adjudication of rape and sexual violence cases and the distribution of reparations? This section 
sheds light on some institutional and systemic challenges confronting domestic justice 
mechanisms, over many of which these mechanisms had no control.  
Social Norms Inhibiting the Justice Process 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, one major theme dominates in transitional justice 
literature on how different mechanisms reckon with the legacy of rape and sexual violence: 
victims are generally afraid to come forward to either testify about their experiences or to receive 
benefits as victims of rape and sexual violence. Societal and cultural norms dictate women’s 
behaviors and discussion of sexuality across the world, if not more so in Rwanda. Female 
victims of rape often talked about feeling of shame, depression, and stigmatization, and the fear 
of isolation and rejection by their family and communities as the main reasons why they did not 
testify in the national courts and gacaca.446 Many found that it was impossible to testify because 
“the words to describe some sexual acts do not even exist in Kinyarwanda,”447 while others 
hesitated to talk about rape for fear that such revelation would lead their husbands to reject them 
or make them unmarriageable.448 In a patriarchal country where women depended heavily on 
marriage for survival and sustenance, this fear was so overwhelming and extensive that in many 
cases it overshadowed the victims’ desire for justice and reconciliation. While both men and 
women were victims of rape and sexual violence, social stigma affected women 
disproportionately. A 2002 survey conducted by the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission of Rwanda found that sixty percent of sexual violence survivors thought that 
women would testify significantly less than men because of the nature of these crimes, and that 
the risks of testifying for female survivors were so much greater than those of men that many 
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families would prevent young girls from testifying about their experiences of wartime sexual 
violence.449  
Karen Brounéus’s field research in Rwanda also shows that gacaca impacted men and 
women differently. From this research, women demonstrated significantly higher levels of war-
related trauma, depression, and PTSD than men.450 Men had more positive attitudes towards 
integrating prisoners than women, and women found it more difficult than men to interact with 
someone who was accused in gacaca.451 Women were significantly more negative than men in 
their perspectives of gacaca: they did not believe that gacaca made living together easier and 
believed to a higher extent than men that gacaca intensified suffering.452 While this study did not 
focus specifically on victims of rape and sexual violence, the fact that many participants 
experienced sexual violence during the genocide demonstrates that these results are applicable to 
the analysis of this thesis. 
In addition, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs in Rwanda such as AVEGA and 
IBUKA argued that the categorization of rape and sexual torture as category one crimes, whose 
perpetrators were subject to either death penalty or life imprisonment, also impeded the justice 
process despite its good intention.453 First, the severity of punishment for category one offenders 
discouraged many from making confession, pleading guilty, and asking for forgiveness, which 
undermined the discovery of truth about what happened during the genocide.454 Second, such 
categorization placed a significant burden on the victims. A report by the Penal Reform 
International stated that since perpetrators of sexual violence could receive harsh punishment, 
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sexual violence victims faced enormous pressure from their communities not to testify for fear of 
reprisals.455  
The national courts were primarily concerned with justice and holding perpetrators 
accountable, and truth was often deemed as a by-product rather than a goal of this mechanism. 
Gacaca was, however, institutionally more concerned with establishing a record of truth about 
what happened during the genocide.456 As a community-based justice system, gacaca was 
created to succeed only if community members were willing to come up and testify. An 
incapacity to speak of their most intimate experiences of sexual violence, accompanied fears of 
social stigmas and reprisals, constituted an institutional challenge to both the victims who needed 
to tell their stories and to the entire justice process that needed to take into account these 
narratives. Because of this challenge, Emily Amick argues that gacaca was an unsuitable to hear 
and prosecute the crimes of rape and sexual violence.457  
Gacaca: Not a Suitable Mechanism to Prosecute Rape and Sexual Violence? 
While the national courts were considered a more private justice system for rape victims 
to testify about their experience since community members were not allowed, this privacy was 
essentially undermined when the gacaca courts were launched to gather information and 
categorize perpetrators for prosecution purpose in 2001. The public nature of gacaca in its pilot 
phase exposed women to significant social stigma if they chose to testify in front of more than 
100 members of their communities. In various cases during the information-gathering stage, 
perpetrators intentionally testified to harm the victims, as guilty pleas or public confessions could 
serve as a means to strike “one last blow against the surviving victims especially before an 
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audience which does not expect any better from these perpetrators.” 458  Moreover, many 
perpetrators also confessed in public as part of the plea bargain process during this phase, and 
these public confessions exposed women who did not want to reveal their past to re-
traumatization. In addition, the public nature of these hearings means that family and friends of 
the accused were often present during the process, and women had a well-founded fear of 
reprisals. There have been many allegations and cases of witness disappearances, beatings, and 
killings after they testified at gacaca.459   
The concurrent justice framework, in which both the national courts and gacaca courts 
operated together to gather information and to prosecute perpetrators, was often criticized for 
imposing heavy burdens on victims of rape and sexual violence. Until 2008, this dual jurisdiction 
framework forced victims who wanted to testify to bring their cases before gacaca and then the 
national courts. Testifying at gacaca was only relevant for gathering information and 
categorizing perpetrators, and the victims had to testify again at the national courts.460 Victims 
were responsible for convincing the gacaca judges and the general assembly that sexual 
offenders had actually assaulted them to categorize these perpetrators as category one offenders, 
so that the case against the accused could include rape charges and move to the national courts 
for trials. In most cases, victims often did not possess the medico-legal evidence of their 
experiences, and physical evidence suggestive of forced sexual relations was often not collected 
immediately following the assault.461 Since the social and medical fabric of the country was 
destroyed after the genocide, Rwanda also did not have the capacity to medically examine the 
victims and preserve evidence. This lack of evidence was a significant challenge for victims in 
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proving their cases.462 Moreover, most gacaca judges were community members who did not 
have a legal background and often had the tendency to not believe the victims or blame the 
offences on the victims themselves.463 These various challenges often resulted in the failure to 
record the charges of sexual violence, and many perpetrators were granted provisional release.464 
This failure was two-fold: the victims were not able to see their perpetrators being held 
accountable despite the excruciating justice process, and they were forced to face these 
perpetrators again within their communities once they were released, which both impeded the 
reconciliation and reintegration process for these victims.  
While the 2004 and 2008 Gacaca Laws included several provisions for protecting victims 
of sexual violence and maintaining confidentiality, these changes oftentimes were not able to 
overcome the communal nature of gacaca. First, many women did not know of the options laid 
out in these laws, and thus viewed the justice process as a public one that would expose them to 
stigma and ridicule, discouraging them from coming forward.465 Despite the closed-door nature 
of the new proceedings, Human Rights Watched reported that everyone in the community would 
still know that the case involved rape because on the day of the gacaca sessions, whether public 
or private, community members would see a woman and a man enter a room and therefore guess 
the nature of the case.466 Furthermore, the communal and informal nature of gacaca also posed 
various risks of miscarriage of justice. Many women reported that they did not believe their cases 
would be heard fairly and impartially given the judges’ ties with the community. Some women 
said that at times rapists or their family members had served as gacaca judges in various rape 
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cases.467 Chitra Nagarajan also reports that while judges in the national courts were believed to 
be better able to understand the delicacy of rape cases, give equitable judgments, and keep 
confidentiality, gacaca judges were often viewed as less likely to maintain information private 
because of their close ties to the community.468  
Because of these various institutional challenges, many of which resulted from the 
cultural norms surrounding women and discussion on sexuality, gacaca was often criticized for 
being an inadequate platform to prosecute rape and sexual violence. The International Rescue 
Committee conducted surveys in 2002, 2005, and 2006, which showed that Rwandans’ belief in 
the appropriateness of gacaca to deal with sexual violence cases had actually diminished over 
time.469 The percentage of people agreeing that revelations of rape at gacaca would hinder the 
reconciliation process also increased over time: 26% in 2002, 22% in 2005, and 34% in 2006.470 
Because of this belief, women’s groups such as IBUKA and AVEGA often criticized the 2008 
amendment that transferred rape cases to gacaca.471 This amendment also came as a shock to 
many rape victims, some of whom had been reluctant to come forward in the first place and did 
so only after receiving assurance that their cases would be heard in the national courts and not 
their local communities.472 Moreover, this adjudication phase started in January 2009 and ended 
in July 2010, presenting a brief time frame for gacaca to address the 6,608 cases of rape and 
sexual torture that were transferred from the national courts. 473  The brief timeframe for 
prosecution, an uninspiring number of cases heard and tried within gacaca, and various 
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institutional challenges inhibiting the justice process altogether undermined gacaca’s legitimacy 
as it aimed to bring justice to victims of rape and sexual violence.  
Lack of Reparations for Many Victims of Rape and Sexual Violence 
The fact that reparations in Rwanda came predominantly from FARG, and that such 
assistance was focused on the neediest réscapes of the society, over time showcased a 
marginalization of various groups of victims. First, since the perpetrators were usually poor, 
victims often found it very difficult to recover compensation from the national courts. Second, 
the two FIND drafts were never adopted due to the lack of political will, thus further 
exacerbating the prospects of victims receiving reparations for the harms done to them.474 Third, 
the distribution of assistance programs within FARG itself also exposed significant tension. 
Since one of FARG’s main target groups was widows of the genocide, this focus did not include 
young girls, married and unmarried women, or widows whose husbands died before or after the 
genocide. 475  Widowhood because of the genocide was thus often interpreted in a strict, 
mechanical way that excluded many female victims who needed help. In addition, for men and 
boys who were raped, the prospects of receiving reparations were even grimmer because of 
cultural norms on masculinity and the fact that they were not the targeted beneficiaries of 
FARG.476 Moreover, since the Rwandan genocide has been predominantly referred to as one 
against the Tutsi both nationally and internationally, Hutu men and women who were raped or 
sexually assaulted were not categorized legally as beneficiaries of FARG.477 
 Even to those who should have been or were considered beneficiaries, the 
implementation of the FARG fund also created major barriers to receiving assistance. First, the 
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status of réscapes was not awarded by an independent body, but instead must be recognized by 
neighbors, victims’ organizations or local authorities.478 This fact often meant that women who 
had a higher social status, a better social network, or lived in Kigali where the funds were 
located, had a higher chance of receiving assistance, thus marginalizing those with direr 
socioeconomic status that desperately needed help. Second, while FARG’s education program 
could have been beneficial to women who needed professional skills to strengthen their 
economic status, this program had often neglected women and rather focused on covering school 
fees for the younger population attending secondary schools and universities.479 Third, since 
FARG was gender-sensitive but not oriented towards victims of rape and sexual violence, 
treatments for traumas and harms specific to sexual crimes such as HIV/AIDs and unwanted 
pregnancy were often neglected in FARG’s health program.480 In addition, women often reported 
that they feared maltreatment while using FARG’s health assistance, since nurses and doctors 
often questioned why they deserved free care while others needed to pay. Taking care of harms 
and psychological traumas caused by rape required a basic trust between the doctor and the 
patient, which was often undermined by social tensions within a post-genocide Rwanda.481  
CONCLUSION 
As this chapter demonstrates, domestic transitional justice mechanisms – the national 
courts, gacaca, and reparation programs – had both strengths and weaknesses in bringing 
comprehensive justice to victims of rape and sexual violence. On the one hand, retributive justice 
mechanisms were able to prosecute at most 9,000 rape and sexual violence cases. This 
prosecution not only held various perpetrators accountable and contributed to the prospects of an 
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emerging culture of justice embedded in the rule of law, but also facilitated the development of a 
partial historical record of truth about what happened during the genocide, especially in terms of 
rape and sexual violence. Both national courts and gacaca were not static institutions but ever-
changing ones, as the Rwandan government did attempt to introduce amendments that could 
make these institutions a more welcoming environment for victims of rape and sexual violence. 
This political will itself and the fact the rape and sexual torture were considered the highest level 
of genocide-related crimes deserve attention and compliments. Reparation programs from FARG 
were also able to help a segment of victims who desperately needed assistance with daily 
survival. To those who were lucky to see their perpetrators brought to justice and to receive 
reparations, domestic mechanisms had the potential to facilitate their process of reconciliation 
and reintegration.  
On the other hand, however, many more victims were not that lucky. Compared to the 
estimation of between 250,000 and 500,000 cases of rape during the genocide, the estimated 
9,000 cases heard in domestic mechanisms, in many of which perpetrators were also acquitted 
and released, were underwhelming. Moreover, thousands of victims of rape and sexual violence 
never received reparations since they were not technically categorized as beneficiaries of 
FARG’s programs. Overall, Hutu victims of the genocide and male victims of sexual violence 
were often neglected in both retributive and restorative justice processes.482 In a country torn by 
colonially imposed ethnic tensions, this appearance of “victors’ justice,” in which crimes 
committed by the RPF were never investigated and prosecuted, significantly undermined the 
overall legacy and legitimacy of transitional justice. The imbalance of justice for some and 
injustice for many others not only hampers the process of national reconciliation in a country 
completely wrecked by the genocide, but also personal reconciliation as well. In all fairness, no 
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judicial system or transitional justice system in the world has been designed to cope with the 
requirements of prosecuting crimes committed during a genocide with such a significantly high 
rate of civilian participation and an even higher rate of victimization.483 Bringing comprehensive 
justice to victims of gross human rights violations is hard in any transitional justice context, but 
even more so in a post-genocide Rwanda and to victims of rape and sexual violence. Cultural 
norms that discourage victims from talking about sexual violence because of social ostracism 
and reprisals constituted significant challenges for victims to testify about their experience.  
As this chapter unfolds, I grapple with an emerging question: To whom, exactly, was 
justice served? This question became excruciatingly hard to answer in the context of gacaca, for 
it was both a restorative and retributive mechanism that possessed both a public, communal 
nature in general and a private setting for victims of rape and sexual violence in particular. First, 
gacaca was a restorative justice and social institution because it allowed the victims in general to 
choose to come forward and tell their stories in front of their neighbors and communities. While 
the law required all citizens to participate in gacaca, the decision to actually tell their story was 
ultimate the choice of survivors. This designated choice gave the victim a sort of agency that is 
often lacking in criminal justice mechanisms. In traditional retributive justice settings, victims 
often testify because they are called in by the justice system whenever necessary but not 
generally out of their own choosing. The basic assumption underlying this choice was that the 
victims should be able to comfortably testify, and that such testimonies were welcomed and 
necessary for a historical record of truth. However, victims often saw this choice differently. 
While many women wanted to “shout it from the rooftops,” others did not want to participate 
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because of the fear, shame, and stigma associated with victims of rape and sexual violence.484 
The conception of justice thus varied significantly amongst the victims, whereas such conception 
was rather monolithic when the government reestablished gacaca. The fact that information 
obtained within in camera trials could be leaked to the public also worsened this tremendous fear 
for these victims. In addition, post-genocide Rwanda was a society in which living together was 
not a personal choice but a simply necessity and reality of life.485 The fact that gacaca was 
implemented nationwide only in 2005 – more than ten years after the genocide – meant that this 
cohabitation had become the norm, and the initial mutual fear amongst neighbors had diminished 
progressively with the passing of time.486 In this context, gacaca could be arguably seen as “too 
little too late,” as many victims had already learned to go on with their lives. Reconciliation and 
reintegration often come together, and in this case, forced reintegration out of sheer necessity 
may have in fact contributed to a sense of forced reconciliation as well, especially to the victims 
who decidedly did not want to remember their experiences.  
Another institutional tension within gacaca lay in the nature of the modern system that 
was implemented following the genocide. While traditional gacaca was a purely restorative 
justice mechanism that operated privately with the concerned parties in order to ease social 
tension, modern gacaca was an institutionalized, state-mandated, and public affair with new 
retributive functions. This modification of gacaca came from the fact that the Rwandan 
government was more concerned with speeding up the criminal justice process within the 
national courts rather than using gacaca in its original and popular form. Modern gacaca can 
thus be seen as an “invented tradition” with a new prosecutorial logic that functioned according 
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to typical Western trial proceedings.487 This modification undermined the restorative justice 
nature of traditional gacaca. Victims were under social burdens to not testify because of 
potential reprisals by the perpetrators’ family, and perpetrators were less likely to confess 
because of the potential punishment as analyzed above. As a result, while the discovery of truth 
was one of gacaca’s main objectives, such discovery was heavily weakened by the prosecutorial 
functions of modern gacaca.488 In addition, since gacaca was mandated and supervised by the 
government, the Tutsi-dominated RPF, the truth emerging from gacaca was thus state-mandated 
and notoriously ignored crimes committed by the RPF itself during the civil war. This partial 
record of truth thus bore the appearance of the “victors’ truth,” which seriously undermined the 
process of reconciliation for Hutu victims of the genocide. Many Rwandans argued that the 
absence of any trials for war crimes committed by RPF soldiers challenged gacaca’s 
contribution to establishing the truth about the conflict.489 Modern gacaca therefore had to 
grapple with the classic transitional justice tension between truth and justice, which it had 
decidedly sided with the latter at the expense of the former in various cases, even though not 
much justice was actually served.   
With regards to cases of rape and sexual violence, another tension lay in the fact that 
while it was a public process, victims of rape and sexual violence had the ability to testify in 
private. This ability came from the 2004 and 2008 Gacaca Laws that aimed to protect victims 
from re-traumatization. To some, these protection measures did make gacaca a more 
accommodating environment for them to come forward. However, these measures also 
simultaneously took away the ability for some women who wanted to tell their community about 
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their experience in the form of a public testimony. If gacaca’s main strength was its existence as 
a type of truth commission, the insistence on in camera trials took the discussion of sexual 
violence during the genocide out of the public narrative and such discussion was not interwoven 
into the community narrative and the emerging common morality.490 In a similar light, Human 
Rights Watch argues that since gacaca derived its legitimacy from popular participation, hearing 
sexual violence cases behind closed door undercut the very rationale of using this local court and 
thus was not compatible with the nature of gacaca.491 To decide whether the insistence on in 
camera trials was good or bad is almost impossible. Some victims preferred the closed, protected 
setting, while others wanted the entire community to know about what was done to them. The 
fact that victims have different conceptions of justice and reconciliation therefore makes it 
extremely difficult to determine whether a community-based justice system like gacaca was 
successful.  
In conclusion, similar to any transitional justice mechanisms, the national courts, gacaca, 
and domestic reparation programs possessed both strengths and weaknesses in bringing 
comprehensive justice for victims of rape and sexual violence. These mechanisms faced various 
institutional challenges, over many of which they had no control, such as cultural and social 
norms that are deeply patriarchal. Within these mechanisms, gacaca deserved particular attention 
for its pioneering method of using a local justice mechanism during transitional justice processes. 
Gacaca was, without a doubt, not a perfect mechanism, as it was forced to grapple with 
significant tensions that resulted from the modification in 2001. Reports from Rwanda 
nevertheless send positive signals about its contribution to reconciliation. The NURC’s 2015 
survey on reconciliation states that on average, 92.5% of Rwandans who participated in the study 
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felt affirmed that they were somewhat able to reconcile with the past.492 In addition, the final 
gacaca report concludes that 87.3% of the participants in a study carried by the Centre for 
Conflict Management of the National University of Rwanda believed that gacaca did contribute 
to the objective of national unity and reconciliation.493 Given the various shortcomings analyzed 
above, it is rather hard to assume that victims of rape and sexual violence were actually that 
successful at achieving reconciliation facilitated by domestic mechanisms.  
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5. LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 
 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RWANDA 
 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, nothing seemed possible. Domestically, 
Rwanda was confronted with the seemingly insurmountable tasks of rebuilding every aspect of 
its social, political, and economic fabric, while simultaneously bringing perpetrators of the 
genocide to justice and moving the country towards reconciliation. By 1999, Rwandan prisons 
were filled with approximately 120,000 genocide suspects, and thousands of criminal 
proceedings were seemingly beyond the political and economic capacities of this post-conflict 
society. Internationally, the international community, despite possessing sufficient and early 
evidence that a genocide took place, bore the responsibility of failing to intervene to stop it. The 
United Nations Security Council – the most powerful international organization to date – was 
tasked with reasserting its legitimacy as an international authority that aims to protect world 
peace and global security. Within the multitude of challenges confronting post-genocide 
Rwanda, this thesis is primarily concerned with the attempts to reckon with the legacy of 
widespread, genocidal rape and sexual violence during the genocide. This thesis starts out with a 
simple question: Could there ever be justice for Rwandan victims of rape and sexual violence, 
and what would such justice look like? 
As this thesis demonstrates, there were no easy answers to such a question. The length to 
which both Rwanda and the international community have gone to seek truth, justice, and 
reconciliation was inspiring and aspirational. Both international and domestic transitional justice 
mechanisms attempted to bring comprehensive justice to survivors of rape and sexual violence in 
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various ways. The extent to which these mechanisms were successful is, however, difficult to 
quantify. The thesis shies away from the notion of “success,” since defining and operating 
success is almost an impossible task. The thesis therefore focuses on analyzing the strengths and 
weaknesses of domestic and international mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice to 
victims of rape and sexual violence, rather than focusing on determining which mechanism was 
more successful. This chapter concludes the thesis, summarizes major research findings, and 
offers some recommendations for future research and transitional justice projects.  
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The first question this thesis asks is, “given the personal nature of rape and gender-based 
violence, and the social stigma surrounding victims of such crimes, what were the strengths and 
weaknesses of local and international transitional justice mechanisms in delivering different 
elements of restorative and retributive justice for victims of rape and gender-based violence?” As 
shown in Chapter 3 and 4, no transitional justice mechanisms were perfect; each possessed 
different strengths and weaknesses. All mechanisms were able to bring some measure of justice 
to some victims while simultaneously failing to bring justice to many others. While a blanket 
statement of how one mechanism was more successful than the other would surely be more 
satisfying, reality was rather much more nuanced.  
Achievements and Shortcomings of Retributive Justice 
The fact that the ICTR was established within a short timeframe of discussions at the 
UNSC immediately after the genocide was already in and of itself an important milestone in the 
realm of international law. The ICTR convicted 14 high-level individuals for sexual violence 
crimes as elements of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Despite the lack of 
data on universal jurisdiction trials in other states, it was evident that a few individuals were also 
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convicted of sexual violence. The Belgian court convicted Ephrem Nkezabera of rape as a war 
crime, and the Canadian court convicted Desiré Munyaneza of rape as both a war crime and a 
crime against humanity. The Nkezabera case stood out as the first instance in Belgian judicial 
history when rape was convicted as a war crime.494  
Within Rwanda, both the national courts and the gacaca courts were able to hear at most 
9,000 cases of rape and sexual violence. While the data on how many perpetrators were actually 
convicted of sexual crimes is not currently available, this number is presumably equally small, if 
not smaller. As the UN estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 individuals were rape and 
sexually assaulted during the Rwandan genocide, the fact that transitional justice mechanisms 
were not able to bring more perpetrators to justice is indeed frustrating. However, in a post-
genocide context where the justice system was devastated, the fact that these mechanisms were 
at least able to bring some perpetrators justice is undoubtedly better than no justice at all. 
Moreover, undergoing the complex practice of investigating the darkest period of Rwanda’s 
history is already an accomplishment unto itself. 
Additionally, the prosecution of rape and sexual violence in all retributive mechanisms 
also served as an unequivocal acknowledgment of the responsibility to try these crimes. While 
sexual crimes in armed conflicts have been historically regarded as opportunistic attacks, spoilers 
of war, and results of “a few bad apples,”495 widespread rape and sexual violence during the 
genocide proved that these crimes were not only systematic but also perpetrated with an intention 
to destroy the enemy. These crimes therefore had to be considered and prosecuted as elements of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and transitional justice mechanisms for 
Rwanda somewhat succeeded in doing so. Within Rwanda, rape and sexual violence were 
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category one crimes at the national courts and gacaca – the most serious category of crimes 
whose perpetrators were subjected to life imprisonment and execution. 496  Additionally, 
international mechanisms were particularly successful in developing new international 
jurisprudential norms. The ICTR affirmed that crimes of a sexual nature were international 
crimes that had to be prosecuted under international law, and offered progressive definitions of 
rape and sexual violence. The Tribunal was also able to attach criminality to the masterminds of 
the genocide, many of whom did not personally rape but oversaw the perpetration of sexual 
crimes, by using the Joint Criminal Enterprise theory. The ICTR also offered lessons on 
prosecuting sexual violence by publishing the Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the 
Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  
In the repertoire of transitional justice mechanisms for Rwanda, the ICTR stood out for 
its contribution to international law. While the ICTR was an ad hoc tribunal, its successor, the 
ICC, is a permanent court; lessons from the ICTR could provide guidance for future cases at the 
ICC. As a result, additional cases of rape and sexual violence have been prosecuted at the ICC, 
and this permanent tribunal has been investigating and prosecuting sexual crimes committed in 
Uganda, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.497 More 
importantly, the international jurisprudential norms created by the ICTR and those by the ICTY 
and ICC all affirm that prosecuting sexual violence, at least rape and sexual torture, has risen to 
the level of jus cogens.498 In other words, the prosecution of rape and sexual violence as 
international crimes is now a judicial norm so fundamental to the peace and security of the 
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international community that it binds states even if they have not given formal consent.499 This 
development confirms the hypothesis that international mechanisms, especially the ICTR, had 
the potential to push for more positive changes in international law concerning victims of rape 
and gender-based violence. In other words, creating international jurisprudence on prosecuting 
sexual crimes under international law is the international mechanisms’ biggest contribution.  
Despite these contributions to retributive justice, domestic and international mechanisms 
also faced several shortcomings. One of this thesis’s hypotheses is that the physical distance of 
the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, the language barrier between the victims and the court, and the 
public nature of an international tribunal would create an inhospitable environment for victims to 
come forward. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, this hypothesis is only partially true. The language 
barrier was undoubtedly a challenge for many victims. However, many victims nevertheless still 
came forward to talk about their experience of sexual violence, even when they were not asked 
to, such as in Akayesu. The public nature was therefore not the problem for many. It was the way 
some judges presided over sexual violence cases and did not pay due attention to the emotional 
position that many survivors were in when they were testifying, and the insensitive, 
overwhelming questioning and cross-examination of the defense counsel that made the 
environment inhospitable.  
In addition, as shown in Chapter 3, various other factors not listed in the hypothesis did 
impact the ICTR’s shortcomings. The Tribunal did not have a clear and comprehensive 
prosecution strategy regarding sexual crimes, although early human rights reports that came out 
after the genocide all showcased that sexual violence was widespread and genocidal during the 
conflict. As a result, sexual crimes were rarely included as a central element of investigation and 
prosecution. Moreover, prosecuting sexual crimes depended heavily on the Prosecutor’s 
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willingness to do so, which was inconsistent amongst the four individuals who had served in this 
role at the ICTR. Many cases were moved through trials without rape charges although the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) possessed strong evidence, often because these charges were 
considered irrelevant while the OTP needed to speed up the justice process. In addition, while 
Trial Chamber I offered progressive definitions of rape and sexual violence that allowed judges 
to infer non-consent from the coercive background of the attack, such as genocide in the case of 
Rwanda, without requiring evidence of the perpetrator’s force, threat of force, or the victim’s 
resistance, other Chambers were not quite successful in consistently using these definitions.  
Similarly, domestic retributive justice mechanisms – the national court and gacaca – also 
faced several shortcomings. Chapter 4 confirms the hypothesis that the devastated judicial 
system in post-genocide Rwanda rendered the national courts ineffective and insufficient in 
prosecuting rape and sexual violence. It was not until gacaca was implemented as a concurrent 
justice mechanism, which first classified perpetrators into different categories and moved 
category one cases, including rape and sexual torture to the national courts, that this domestic 
mechanism was able to hear and prosecute more cases. Chapter 4, however, confirms that the 
hypothesis that the communal nature and cultural legitimacy of gacaca created a less hostile 
environment for victims to come forward was only partially correct. For some victims who 
wanted to tell their stories to their communities and see their perpetrators being brought justice, 
gacaca offered them the opportunity to fulfill this desire. However, to many other survivors, the 
social stigma surrounding victims of sexual violence, fear of reprisals by community members 
and the perpetrators’ families, lack of trust in judges who had close ties with the community, and 
fear of not being able to marry and/or being isolated by their communities prevented them from 
testifying at gacaca. The proximity of gacaca thus proved to be a double-edged sword: it 
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facilitated the process of justice and reconciliation for some while maximizing the fears for 
others.  
Achievements and Shortcomings of Restorative Justice 
This thesis divides restorative justice into two components: economic justice through 
reparations, and reconciliation. Reconciliation is further divided into six subcomponents: 1) 
understanding the past, present, and envisioning the future of Rwanda, 2) citizenship and 
identity, 3) political culture, 4) security, 5) justice, and 6) social cohesion.  
On the one hand, as international retributive justice mechanisms, the ICTR and universal 
jurisdiction trials did not pay due attention to reparations. While there was a short service 
program at the ICTR to distribute monetary and medical support to Rwandan victims through 
five Rwandan organizations in 2000-2001, this program concluded shortly and was largely 
symbolic. Similarly, the Belgian court was able to provide some reparations to a few victims, 
which was also a symbolic effort rather than a comprehensive one. The Rome Statue of the ICC 
did address these shortcomings by allowing victims to request reparation.500 For instance, Article 
79 of the Rome Statute provides that a "Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the 
Assembly of States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and of the families of such victims.”501  
On the other hand, national mechanisms were more successful in providing reparations 
for victims. While there were several proposals for different reparation programs, the assistance 
FARG (Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide – Assistance Fund for Genocide 
Survivor) fund was the only one that was actually implemented and is still currently operating. 
FARG, however, focused on providing reparations for the neediest rescapés after the genocide, 
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and was thus oriented towards helping Rwandan widows rather than victims of rape and sexual 
violence specifically. While there was undoubtedly some overlap between the two categories, 
many rape survivors were not categorized as beneficiaries of FARG. Local authorities often 
interpreted the definition of “rescapés” in an ad hoc manner, which included victims of sexual 
violence as rescapés in some cases while neglecting other victims in other situations.  While 
there was a systemic effort to provide service packages to widows, especially in terms of 
housing, FARG has faced several challenges, such as the perpetual lack of funding, which has 
deprived a large number of sexual violence survivors of reparations.  
With regards to non-economic reconciliation, the ICTR, universal jurisdiction trials, the 
national courts, and gacaca, as retributive justice mechanisms, all contributed partially to the 
security and justice components by removing a handful of perpetrators from their communities, 
putting them within the confines of the justice system, and convicting them for crimes of rape 
and sexual violence. In addition, retributive justice mechanisms also served as truth-uncovering 
platforms. Through the convictions of perpetrators and individual articulations of survivors about 
what they witnessed and experienced, these mechanisms were able to contribute to the creation 
of a partial historical record of truth about what happened during the genocide, and thus helped 
facilitate an understanding of the past. This historical record is part of a collective memory about 
the genocide, and is now presented in trials’ transcripts, in the ICTR’s Best Practices Manual, 
and in the National Service of Gacaca Courts’ Gacaca Courts in Rwanda.  
Truth from these retributive mechanisms was, however, extremely partial and 
incomplete. As Bert Ingelaere argues, truth emerging from criminal tribunal was at best “forensic 
truth,” which entailed answers to basic questions of who, where, when, how, and against whom, 
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and the context, causes, and pattern of violations.502 Other aspects of truth – narrative, social, and 
restorative – were hardly achieved. Another way of thinking about different types of truth is the 
distinction between “knowledge” and “acknowledgment.” While knowledge is akin to forensic 
truth and contributes to an understanding of the past, acknowledgment – such as narrative, social, 
and restorative truth – contributes more directly to the personal healing of victims.503 In addition, 
all mechanisms were insufficient in uncovering truth about crimes against Hutu and male 
victims. This lack of truth and justice thus constituted a major impediment to reconciliation for 
these victims. Moreover, the fact that no mechanisms were successful at prosecuting and 
uncovering truth about crimes committed by the RPF is detrimental to national reconciliation. 
The Rwandan genocide was one against Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus, which was partly 
the result of long-lasting ethnic tensions between the two ethnic groups that could be traced back 
until the colonial period. The fact that all justice mechanisms created jurisprudence that appeared 
to be “victors’ justice,” in which crimes by the RPF remained hidden and unprosecuted, can 
undermine the efforts of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups. While Rwanda banned 
ethnicity as a criterion of social classification in 2004, the extent to which such law could 
overcome the shortcomings of this partial truth and justice requires more empirical research.  
 Beside these contributions, how national and international mechanisms contributed to 
other aspects of reconciliation varied extensively. As international mechanisms located outside 
of Rwanda, both the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials had almost no power and impact over 
components of reconciliation such as citizenship & identity and political culture. This impotence 
is demonstrated in the statement by one of the staffers at the ICTR who was interviewed by 
Nicola Palmer: 
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This is not just for Rwanda… nor is it our way to fix the Rwandan judiciary. The 
ICTR does not exist to please the Rwandan community. If the issue had been 
about strengthening the Rwandan judiciary then the trials should have happened 
in Rwanda, there could have been assistance through foreign staff and there 
would be an application of Rwandan law.504 
 
While creating legal precedents remains as international mechanisms’ most significant 
contribution, the extent to which such contribution has translated into concrete impacts on 
Rwandan society and judiciary was rather limited.  In addition, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
while reconciliation was one of the ICTR’s objectives listed in its mandate, the ICTR showed 
insufficient attention to this component of restorative justice. In order for retributive justice to 
contribute to reconciliation, victims must know about the judgments against their perpetrators 
and the affirmation of the wrongness of the acts committed against them. The ICTR throughout 
its operation, however, was systematically inadequate in its effort to follow up with Rwandan 
society, leaving many victims who testified with the feeling of having been used. This lack of 
attention could be attributed to the fact the ICTR was one of the first international tribunals of its 
kind and had little in the way of a precedential framework to follow. 
In contrast, domestic mechanisms, especially gacaca, had more potential to contribute to 
these components. For instance, while women were often not permitted to speak in traditional 
gacaca, modern gacaca included women in every aspect of its process: as judges, as members of 
the general assembly, and as victims and perpetrators. In addition, as shown in Chapter 4, the 
Rwandan government also implemented several laws that aimed to advance the status of women 
within Rwandan society, which could positively contribute to both the citizenship and identity 
and the political culture components. The fact that the Rwandan parliament currently has the 
highest level of women’s representation in the world shows potential for improvement of 
women’s social status in the future. This acknowledgment does not deny that the aforementioned 
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social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual violence still exist, but rather affirms an 
optimistic believe that Rwandan women’s social status can be improved over time. Based on 
these observations, it is therefore arguable that international mechanisms paid more attention to 
violations of first-generation rights, especially bodily-integrity rights, while national mechanisms 
were more balanced in their approach to both first-generation rights (women’s representation in 
government) and second-generation rights (economic assistance through reparations).  
Finally, the social cohesion component of reconciliation has not been analyzed 
extensively thus far. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda defined 
social cohesion as a combination of trust, tolerance, solidarity, conviviality, and friendship 
among Rwandan citizens.505 Bert Ingelaere’s research shows that many Rwandans did manage to 
cohabitate alongside one another. 506  This cohabitation was common in rural areas, since 
neighbors depended on each other in their daily activities and their fight for survival; tensions 
and conflicts were thus often kept in the dark. Since the Rwandan genocide had a high rate of 
civilian participation, it was often the norm that survivors and perpetrators came from the same 
community. Cohabitation, in many ways, was not a direct result of transitional justice, but rather 
borne out of sheer necessity and the reality of life.507 How cohabitation could amount to social 
cohesion is, however, open to interpretation and further research. “Social cohesion” – the most 
difficult aspect of reconciliation to both achieve and quantify – requires extensive empirical 
research that this thesis does not have the resource to implement. This thesis is the product of one 
year of research, most of which was qualitative and heavily focused on current secondary 
literature. Because of this limitation, this thesis hopes to stay away from the phenomenon of 
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“aspiration without empiricism,” in which scholars present aspirational claims about the impact 
of transitional justice without having empirical evidence to substantiate them.508  
As Chapters 3 and 4 both demonstrate, patriarchal norms embedded within Rwandan 
society constituted an independent factor that inhibited the justice and reconciliation process at 
both international and national mechanisms. These norms include, but are not limited to, social 
ostracism and rejection of victims of rape and sexual violence, the tendency to not believe or 
constantly question rape victims, the fear of being unable to marry once it was revealed that they 
were raped, and the fact that life sustenance depended heavily on marriage. Despite several 
measures of protection developed at the ICTR and gacaca, many victims still refused to come 
forward because of these well-founded fears. As an international mechanism located in a 
different country, the ICTR certainly had no control over, or the power to change, these norms. 
In addition, while gacaca was a local mechanism popular with the Rwandan population, it was 
only implemented nationwide in 2005 and ended in 2012. This relatively short time period gave 
gacaca insufficient power to fundamentally alter patriarchal norms deeply embedded within 
society. Patriarchal norms surrounding women can only be changed incrementally and 
organically through education, government policy, and local initiatives. It is rather unrealistic to 
think that transitional justice mechanisms – which were ad hoc and short-term in their nature – 
actually had the power to change these norms.  
Internally Incompatible Goals 
One of the principal research questions of this thesis is whether the objectives of local 
and international transitional justice mechanisms conflicted with each other, and if so, how such 
discrepancies could affect the outcomes of transitional justice for victims of rape and sexual 
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violence? As this thesis has shown, it was hardly the case that these different mechanisms had 
conflicting goals, but rather that there were incompatible goals within each mechanism itself.  
The ICTR was primarily concerned with punishing high-level perpetrators, contributing 
to reconciliation, and restoring and maintaining peace. Locating the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania 
was primarily based on a good intention of avoiding “victor’s justice,” since the UNSC was 
determined to prosecute crimes committed by the RPF as well. The physical distance of the 
ICTR, however, unfortunately took away from the ICTR the power to directly influence 
deterrence justice, the rule of law, and reconciliation within Rwanda itself. The fact that ICTR 
failed to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by the RPF counteracted the very decision 
to locate the Tribunal in a foreign country. In addition, while the ICTR was able to foster legal 
precedents in prosecuting rape and sexual violence as serious violations of international law, the 
Tribunal hardly implemented any public outreach efforts. The fact that most Rwandans did not 
know about the ICTR’s judgments significantly undermined the impact that the Tribunal could 
have on the victims’ process of reconciliation. Furthermore, Nicola Palmer’s field research 
shows that most legal personnel and staffers within the ICTR identified the development of an 
international case law as the Tribunal’s central contribution.509 This belief was understandable, 
because the ICTR was a judicial institution through which the UNSC attempted to re-establish 
the authority of the international community for its failure to protect civilians during the 
genocide.510 This authority first started with the condemnation of gross human rights violations 
at the ICTR. While it is difficult to argue that the ICTR was more attuned to recreating the 
international rule of law rather than helping Rwandan victims reconcile, the fact that the Tribunal 
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paid insufficient attention to restorative justice, especially by its lack of reparations for and 
communications with those who testified, was indeed frustrating to many victims.  
In Rwanda, the national courts and gacaca were primarily concerned with holding 
perpetrators accountable. It is crucial to acknowledge that no judicial system has the power to 
render justice for a mass atrocity on the scale of the Rwandan genocide, especially given the high 
rate of civilian participation. The RPF-dominated government was nevertheless committed to the 
pursuit of mass justice. While discussing potential transitional justice mechanisms in the 
immediate aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan government never seriously considered a 
truth commission, since both policy makers and genocide survivors considered a truth 
commission to be “a grossly inadequate response to the horror of the genocide.”511 The national 
courts were the Rwandan government’s first choice, and the pursuit of justice and accountability, 
sometimes at the expense of truth, became the dominant objective of transitional justice within 
Rwanda itself. Lars Waldorf argues that RPF’s insistence on mass and often arbitrary arrests and 
extensive criminal prosecutions only worsened the terrible situation immediately after the 
genocide; such insistence “saddled a devastated justice sector with the impossible task of trying 
some 120,000 Hutu suspects and it fostered a culture of denunciation, both of which have 
undermined efforts to establish the rule of law.”512 As Chapter 4 shows, this national courts 
system was unfortunately extremely inadequate. Rwanda never had an independent and impartial 
system of administration of justice prior to the genocide and this already imperfect justice system 
was further destroyed as a direct result of the genocide, making it impossible to fulfill the pursuit 
of mass justice.  
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Since the national courts soon proved to be insufficient, the pursuit of justice 
subsequently became the main goal of gacaca. The modification of gacaca from its private, 
communal, restorative, and ad hoc form into a public, state-mandated, and mandatory affair, 
however, created various tensions within gacaca. While traditional gacaca drew its legitimacy 
and popularity from its private and restorative nature, in which concerned parties could resolve 
familial and intra-familial conflicts among themselves, this nature was completely lost when 
modern gacaca was introduced and implemented as a quasi-judicial mechanism. It is arguable 
that offences such as genocide and crimes against humanity, especially rape and sexual violence, 
were too serious to be tried in gacaca since, “historically, it was not competent to handle serious 
crimes.”513 In addition, while the national courts only considered truth a byproduct of justice, 
among gacaca’s various objectives were both holding perpetrators accountable and uncovering 
truth about what happened during the genocide. Pursuing both truth and justice about sexual 
violence was, however, impossible in gacaca. The classification of rape and sexual torture as 
category one crimes at both the national court and gacaca was intentionally aimed at giving 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes maximum punishment, which included the death penalty 
until 2007. Such classification, while necessary for retributive justice, undermined the pursuit of 
truth. Perpetrators had less incentive to confess their sexual crimes because of fear of life 
imprisonment or execution, and victims were also less willing to come forward and testify for a 
well-founded fear of reprisals from the perpetrators’ families. While truth and justice are often 
inseparable goals in the field of transitional justice, national courts and gacaca decidedly focused 
on the pursuit of justice at the expense of truth, despite the fact that not much justice was 
delivered either.  
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LARGER TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LESSONS 
In this thesis, I investigate transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda because prior to 
1994, the combination of both domestic and international mechanisms was without many 
precedents. As countries emerging from social conflicts attempt to reckon with legacies of gross 
violations of human rights, both achievements and shortcomings of transitional justice in 
Rwanda can provide helpful lessons for future transitional justice projects. As this thesis 
demonstrates, social stigmas surrounding victims of rape and sexual violence constitute an 
independent variable that impedes the justice process, and these stigmas are almost universal 
across the world. Lessons from Rwanda teach us that first, in order for transitional justice to be 
effective for victims of sexual violence, these stigmas must be taken into account at the very 
formation stage. Second, a clear prosecution strategy that includes sexual violence as a central 
element of investigation is of crucial importance. Third, different protection measures must be 
implemented to help maintain victims’ privacy and security if they decide to come forward and 
testify. Finally, different transitional justice mechanisms must be attuned to the needs of these 
victims, including both justice and reparations, as they attempt to reconcile with the past. To 
elaborate on the lessons learned from Rwanda, this section provides some preliminary 
suggestions for future transitional justice projects.  
War is Gendered; So is Peace514 
There is an increasing recognition within academia and the field of law that gender is an 
independent variable that impacts how men and women experience war and peace differently. 
This thesis is yet another affirmation of this acknowledgment. The premise of this thesis lies in 
the belief that since victims of rape and sexual violence had unique and gendered experiences 
during the genocide, the way in which transitional justice impacted these victims was 
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undoubtedly gendered as well. As this thesis has shown, the fact that many transitional justice 
mechanisms in post-genocide Rwanda did not look at peace-building and transitional justice 
through a gendered lens resulted in many missed opportunities to bring justice to survivors of 
sexual violence. Without a gendered lens, the conception of truth, justice, and reconciliation will 
be inevitably incomplete. Future transitional justice projects must therefore take sexual violence 
into account at the formation stage of justice mechanisms. Opportunities should be created and 
supported for women to take up more leadership roles so that they can have more influence on 
the construction of these mechanisms. With regards to retributive justice, having women as 
judges and investigators is very important; victims of rape and sexual violence, especially 
women, are more likely to feel comfortable talking about their experience to women than to men. 
It is hard to imagine the successful outcomes of Akayesu had it not been for the constant push for 
more truth about sexual violence by the only female judge at that time – Judge Navi Pillay.  
Victims’ Conceptions of Justice and Reconciliation Vary 
The core objectives of all transitional justice projects are holding perpetrators 
accountable and helping victims reconcile with the past. Victims, especially survivors of rape 
and sexual violence, often have different conceptions of justice and reconciliation. In the case of 
gacaca, while many victims wanted to tell their communities of their experiences and hear an 
acknowledgment of the wrongness of the acts committed against them, many already learned to 
live with the past and did not want to relive those memories at all. In contrast, Nicola Palmer’s 
coding of interview materials in Rwanda showed a popular understanding that Rwandans wanted 
a full record of truth about the genocide and the civil war, even more than justice and 
accountability. 515 Moreover, while many wanted to see truth and justice, many preferred 
reparations programs that could help alleviate the daily struggles of life sustenance. This lack of 
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uniformity in the perception and desired outcome of transitional justice unfortunately suggests 
that to many victims of rape and sexual violence, a full notion of justice is simply not possible. It 
is crucial for future transitional justice projects to be more attuned to what victims envision as 
justice and reconciliation so that such projects can be best oriented towards the needs of the 
victims.  
While it was unfortunate that the FARG program has not been able to provide sufficient 
reparations to all victims of the genocide, particularly survivors of sexual violence, it is even 
more disheartening to know that the government diverted resources away from these survivors 
towards criminal prosecution. Instead of focusing on funding reparation programs, the 
government and international donors spent millions of dollars incarcerating and occasionally 
trying genocide suspects.516 While criminal prosecution was important, reparations and economic 
justice were equally, if not more, important as well. The fact the Rwandan was too focused on 
mass justice while neglecting the needs of millions of victims who had to build their lives from 
the ground up was yet another missed opportunity to orient justice towards the needs of the 
survivors.  
Social Context Matters 
As this thesis has demonstrated, social stigmas surrounding rape and sexual violence 
were an independent factor that impeded the justice and reconciliation process for victims of 
these crimes. This factor also once again confirms that transitional justice must be multifaceted; 
bringing justice for victims of sexual violence must be equated with improving their 
socioeconomic status within society as well. Moreover, social stigmas are deeply embedded not 
only within Rwandan society, but also across the world. While the Rwandan government noticed 
how social stigmas impacted the justice process at the national courts and gacaca, and 
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subsequently implemented several procedural changes throughout the years to ensure a more 
hospitable environment for victims to come forward, the ICTR did not pay adequate attention to 
these norms. The Tribunal thus faced a common shortcoming of international justice 
mechanisms attempting to solve the legacy of local crimes: they often do not have adequate 
understanding of the local context. Understanding the context of the conflict and the country is 
thus important and must be considered central to any transitional justice projects. Just as 
different conflicts have different characteristics, transitional justice projects must reflect this 
diversity as well. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to transitional justice, and each 
mechanism must be carefully tailored to fit the particular context to address the needs of the 
population.  
Realistic Expectation for Transitional Justice 
As countries attempt to reckon with the legacy of social conflicts and gross violations of 
human rights through transitional justice, they often have high expectation for the outcomes of 
these processes. In Rwanda, however, it is hard to imagine that any justice mechanisms could 
have had the potential to reconcile a country that was almost completely devastated by the fastest 
and most effective genocide the world has witnessed since the Holocaust. As the historical 
context section of Chapter 1 shows, prior to the genocide, Rwanda already had a history of ethnic 
tension, human rights violations, and a culture of impunity. Indeed, while the Rwandan 
government aspired to establish the rule of law and a culture of human rights through its 
transitional justice processes, it is unimaginable that such goals were attainable in the aftermath 
of genocide. Future transitional justice projects therefore should have realistic goals and 
expectations. These goals, more importantly, should be tailored to the need of the population in 
the wake of conflict. It is inevitable that any justice mechanism would have both strengths and 
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weaknesses; to realize these traits and to target these strengths to the specific context are tasks 
that must be done at the formation stage of transitional justice. In addition, it should be 
understood that to many victims, a full conception of justice is somewhat unattainable.  
Moreover, building a culture of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy are long-
term goals that transitional justice mechanisms are often unable to obtain within their relatively 
short operations. Moreover, societies coming out of violence are often not in a good position to 
undertake all transitional justice and peace-building activities. Gacaca, for instance, was only 
implemented nationwide in 2005, more than ten years after the genocide, because of planning 
and experimentation during the pilot phase. Commitments to successful outcomes of transitional 
justice must entail constant self-reflection and incremental changes to best suit the need of the 
population. As the literature review in Chapter 2 also points out, actual and long-term 
reconciliation for victims of rape and sexual violence often require a fundamental change in the 
gender relation between men and women, and an improvement of women’s socioeconomic and 
political status in general. It is quite impossible, if not naïve, to believe that any transitional 
justice process actually has the capacity to fulfill these tasks. If the international community and 
the country in context genuinely want to help victims of rape and sexual violence, they must pay 
attention to developing laws and carrying out social programs that can first address the needs of 
the victims. In Rwanda, legislation like the 1999 law allowing women to become rightful owners 
of land and the 2003 constitutional provision requiring a high level of women’s representation in 
every decision-making body is a good beginning.  
International Support and NGO Advocacy Matter 
If it takes a village to raise a child, it also takes the entire international community to 
make any comprehensive transitional justice project successful. In many aspects, this was the 
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case in Rwanda. First, the ICTR and universal jurisdiction trials were particularly important, as 
this thesis has demonstrated. Second, one of the main tasks confronting post-genocide Rwanda 
was to rebuild its economy while simultaneously funding trials and reparation programs. While 
the international community unfortunately diverted resources away from reparations programs, it 
was nevertheless able to fund the national courts and gacaca. Additionally, as countries 
emerging from conflicts engage in transitional justice in both domestic and international levels, 
there must be extensive communications among different mechanisms, and between these 
mechanisms and the population they intend to serve.  
As this thesis also demonstrates, NGO advocacy is also particularly important to the 
success of transitional justice. International NGOs and human rights groups, such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and AVEGA, constantly advocated for more rape and 
sexual violence indictments at the ICTR, which resulted in the prosecution of some high-level 
perpetrators. Within Rwanda, national and local NGOs and human rights groups such as 
AVEGA and IBUKA also helped distribute reparation packages, while simultaneously providing 
additional services, such as trauma counseling and HIV/AIDs treatments, to survivors of rape 
and sexual violence when reparation programs fell short. NGOs therefore played a crucial role in 
every aspect of transitional justice in Rwanda, and it is imperative that future transitional justice 
projects consult extensively with local and international NGOs for advising, capacity building, 
training, and logistical assistance.  
FURTHER RESEARCH 
While the current literature offers a large amount of information on the successes of each 
transitional justice mechanism in Rwanda, few studies focus on a comparative analysis of these 
mechanisms. Even fewer scholars have looked at this comparison through a gendered lens. This 
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thesis contributes to the growing field of transitional justice by offering a systematic comparative 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both domestic and national transitional justice 
mechanisms in bringing comprehensive justice for victims of rape and sexual violence during the 
Rwandan genocide. As the result of one year of research, this thesis undoubtedly lacks the 
capacity to make claims based on quantitative data. The author has actively tried to look for 
empirical studies to substantiate the claims made in this thesis. Given this limitation, this section 
aims to provide some implications for future research. 
As Chapter 4 shows, while many scholars applauded gacaca as a pioneering local 
approach to transitional justice that left positive impacts on reconciliation, these aspirational 
claims were often not substantiated with extensive empirical evidence. Future research projects 
must therefore pay attention to both quantitative and qualitative research to make a nuanced 
evaluation of transitional justice. Without accurate statistics and empirical data, all that is left is 
theoretical framework, which is often not reflective of the experiences in everyday life. Since all 
transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda recently ended, the ICTR in 2015 and gacaca in 
2012, this is a crucial time to quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate the impact of transitional 
justice in post-genocide Rwanda.  
Moreover, future research should also focus on victims of rape and sexual violence 
specifically. While there was some empirical research about how transitional justice process 
impacted Rwandan survivors, almost none of these projects paid specific attention to victims of 
rape and sexual violence. This thesis does recognize that approaching survivors of these crimes, 
inviting them to open up about the past, and asking them to participate in research projects 
require scholars to have a substantial amount of gender-sensitive training and a high level of 
cultural understanding. These tasks, while overwhelming, are not impossible; they are also 
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necessary. If transitional justice outcomes in Rwanda offer one lesson, it would be that victims of 
rape and sexual violence are sometimes more courageous and willing to talk about their 
experiences for the pursuit of justice more than the current literature depicts. Understanding how 
transitional justice impacts victims of rape and sexual violence means that future project can 
learn from both the achievements and shortcomings of these mechanisms as well. 
CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, nothing seemed possible. Yet, as this thesis 
demonstrates, domestic and international transitional justice mechanisms were somewhat 
successful at making the impossible possible. Some justice was served, some truth was 
uncovered, and some reparations were delivered to victims. It goes without saying that partial 
truth and justice is better than no truth and justice at all. Moreover, a critical analysis of these 
mechanisms’ weaknesses and failures is not, in any way, an attempt to undermine their 
legitimacy. Understanding the shortcomings of the past is a crucial to achieving successes in the 
future.  
Truth, justice, and reconciliation have emerged as the principal objectives of societies 
emerging from violent conflict. At the heart of this thesis is the belief that in order for these 
complex theoretical concepts to be translated into reality, they must be seen through a gendered 
lens. Rape and sexual violence in armed conflicts have never been only opportunistic; they are 
almost always deliberate, systemic crimes committed with specific intent to destroy the enemy as 
well. It is imperative, as more countries engage in transitional justice, that governments and the 
international community broaden the concept of success of transitional justice mechanisms to 
include the victims of rape and sexual violence. More importantly, it is crucial to note that with 
the emergence from the dark chapter in Rwanda came the promise of “Never Again” – a promise 
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that the international community would never sit idly by and let atrocities such as the Rwandan 
genocide ever happen again. This, unfortunately, has not been the case. The Syrian civil war and 
its subsequent refugee crisis, ethnic cleansing and persecution of the Rohingya Muslims in 
Burma, and devastating civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African 
Republic are the just tip of the iceberg of the ongoing mass violations of human rights that are 
happening every day. Transitional justice mechanisms are designed to exemplify what they 
aspire to create – relationships of social equality in which all parties enjoy and accord another 
equal dignity, respect, and concern.517 A commitment to human rights and equality must start 
with a serious commitment to never let atrocities happen in the first place.   
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APPENDIX 
OVERVIEW OF CHARGES AND CONVICTIONS REGARDING RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA  
NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
1 Akayesu, Jean-Paul Bourgmestre of Taba Commune 2 September 1998 1 June 2001 Count 13: Rape as 
a crime against 
humanity 
Count 14: Other 
inhumane acts as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Trial Judgment, 
paras. 696, 697 
Confirmed on 
appeal, Appeal 
Judgment, para. 
214 
2 Serushago, Omar One of the leaders of 
Interahamwe in Gisenyi 
Prefecture 
5 February 1999 
Pleaded guilty 
6 April 2000 
(Sentence Appeal) 
Count 5: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity in the 
amended 
Indictment of 14 
October 1998 
None 
Rape Charge 
dropped in 
guilty plea 
negotiations 
3 Musema, Alfred Director of Gisovu Tea Factory in 
Kibuye 
27 January 2000 16 November 2001 Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
under Articles 
Trial 
Judgment, 
para. 967 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
6(1) and 
6(3) 
On appeal this 
conviction was 
overturned and 
acquittal entered 
on this count (see 
Appeal 
Judgment, 
para.194) 
4 Bagilishema, Ignace Bourgmestre of Mabanza 
Commune 
7 June 2001 3 July 2002 Count 7: “outrages 
on personal 
dignity of women” 
resulting in serious 
violations of 
Article 3 common 
to the Geneva 
Conventions of 
1949 and 
Additional 
Protocol II 
(“Common Article 
3”) 
None 
(Acquitted on all 
counts) 
5 Semanza, Laurent Former Bourgmestre of 15 May 2003 20 May 2005 Counts 7 and 9 Guilty of Count 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
Bicumbi Commune, MRND 
representative to the National 
Assembly 
include Rape as a 
serious violation 
Common Article 3 
Count 8 and 10: 
Rape as a crime 
against humanity 
10: ‘Rape’ as a 
crime against 
humanity, Trial 
Judgment, para. 
479 
Confirmed on 
appeal, Appeal 
Judgment, paras. 
289, 290 
6 Niyitegeka, Eliézer Minister of Information of Interim 
Government 
16 May 2003 9 July 2004 Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Count 8: 
Inhumane acts, 
including rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Count 9: Rape as a 
violation of 
Common Article 3, 
violence to life 
health and physical 
or 
Guilty of Count 8: 
crimes against 
humanity other 
inhumane acts- 
‘sexual violence’, 
Trial Judgment, 
para. 467. 
Niyitegeka’s appeal 
dismissed in its 
entirety. 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     mental well 
being 
 
Count 10: Rape as 
a violation of 
common Article 3, 
outrages upon 
personal dignity 
 
7 Kajelijeli, Juvénal Bourgmestre of Mukingo Commune 
from June to July 1994 
 
One of the leaders of 
Interahamwe in Ruhengeri 
1 December 2003 23 May 2005 Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 11: 
Humiliating and 
degrading 
treatment, rape, 
enforced 
prostitution and 
any form of 
indecent assault as 
a violation of 
Common Article 3 
None 
8 Barayagwiza, Jean-Bosco President of CDR 
 
Founder and Director of RTLM radio 
station 
3 December 2003 28 November 2007 Count 8: Outrages 
upon personal 
dignity as a serious 
violation of 
None 
 
Acquitted at 98 
bis stage 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     common Article 3  
9 Kamuhanda, Jean de Dieu Minister of Higher Education in 
Interim Government 
22 January 2004 19 September 2005 Count 6: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 8: Rape, 
outrage upon 
personal dignity as 
a serious violation 
of common Article 
3 
None 
10 Gacumbitsi, Sylvestre Bourgmestre of Rusumo 
Commune in Kibungo 
Prefecture 
17 June 2004 7 July 2006 Count 5: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Trial Judgment, 
paras. 321-333 
 
Conviction 
confirmed on 
appeal, Appeal 
Judgment, paras. 
99-108 
11 Ndindabahizi, Emmanuel Minister of Finance in Interim 
Government 
15 July 2004 16 January 2007 Count 5 of the 
Amended 
Indictment of 5 
October 
2001(Rape as a 
None 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     crime against 
humanity) but 
Rape count 
dropped in the 
amended 
indictment of 1 
September 2003 
(Trial Judgment, 
paras. 9, 13). 
 
12 Muhimana, Mikaeli Conseiller of Gishyita Secteur, 
Gishyita Commune, Kibuye 
Prefecture 
28 April 2005 21 May 2007 Count 3: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Trial Judgment, 
paras. 552-563 
 
Conviction 
confirmed on 
appeal (except 
for the rapes of 
Goretti 
Mukashyaka and 
Languida 
Kamukina, 
Appeal 
Judgment, 
Disposition) 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
13 Bisengimana, Paul  Bourgmestre of Gikoro 
Commune, Kigali-Rural 
Prefecture 
13 April 2006 
Pleaded guilty 
Not Appealed Count 8: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 9: Serious 
sexual abuse as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 11: Rape as 
a serious violation 
of Common Article 
3 
 
Count 12: 
Causing serious 
violence to life as 
a serious violation 
of common 
Article 3 
None 
 
Rape counts 
dropped in 
guilty plea 
negotiations 
14 Mpambara, Jean  Bourgmestre of Rukara 
Commune in Eastern Rwanda 
11 September 2006 Not Appealed Counts 1 and 2: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
None 
 
(Acquitted on all 
counts) 
15 Muvunyi, Tharcisse Colonel in Rwandan Army and 
Commander of ESO camp in 
12 September 2006 
(Muvunyi 1) 
29 August 2008 
(Muvunyi 1) 
Count 4: Rape as a 
crime against 
None 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
  Butare   humanity (All convictions 
and the sentence 
were set aside and 
a retrial of one 
allegation of direct 
and public 
incitement to 
commit genocide 
was ordered) 
16 Rwamakuba, André Minister of Primary and 
Secondary Education in 
Interim Government 
20 September 2006 Not Appealed (Joint amended 
indictment of 
…November 
2001) 
 
Count 3: Rape as a 
natural and 
foreseeable 
consequence of a 
joint criminal 
enterprise to commit 
genocide (JCE 3) 
 
Count 5: Rape as 
a crime against 
humanity 
None 
 
Rape charges 
dropped in the 
separate amended 
indictment of 23 
February 2005 
 
(Acquitted on all 
counts) 
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NO. CA
SE 
POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE CRIMES 
CONVICTION FOR 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
17 Nzabirinda, Joseph Employee of Ngoma Commune 
as Encadreur of Youth 
23 February 2007 
Pleaded guilty 
Not appealed Counts 1 and 2: Rape as 
part of genocide 
 
Count 4: Rape as a crime 
against humanity 
None 
 
Rape charges 
dropped in 
guilty plea 
negotiations 
18 Rugambarara, Juvénal Bourgmestre of Bicumbi 
Commune, Kigali-Rural 
Prefecture 
16 November 2007 
Pleaded guilty 
Not appealed Count 7: Rape as a crime 
against humanity 
 
Count 9: Rape, violence to 
life health and physical or 
mental well being, outrage 
upon personal dignity, as a 
serious violation of 
common Article 3 
None 
 
Rape charges 
dropped in 
guilty plea 
negotiations 
19 Nchamihigo, Siméon Substitut du Procureur in 
Cyangugu and Interahamwe 
leader 
12 November 2008 18 March 2010 Count 4: “genital 
mutilation” as part of other 
inhumane acts 
None 
 
No evidence led on 
genital 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     as a crime 
against 
humanity. 
mutilation, Trial 
Judgment, paras. 
221, 361 
20 Bikindi, Simon  Musician 2 December 2008 18 March 2010 Counts 2 and 3: 
Rape and sexual 
violence as part of 
genocide 
None 
21 Bagosora, Théoneste Directeur de Cabinet in the 
Ministry of Defence 
18 December 2008 14 December 2011 Count 1: Rape and 
other crimes of a 
sexual nature as 
part of conspiracy 
to commit 
genocide 
 
Counts 2 and 3: 
Rape and other 
crimes of a sexual 
nature as part of 
genocide Count 4: 
Rape and other 
crimes of a sexual 
nature as part of 
murder as a crime 
against humanity 
 
Count 6: Rape 
Count 2: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
2158, under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Count 4: Trial 
Chamber, para. 
2186 
 
Count 6: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
2194 
 
Count 7: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
2203, under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Count 8: Trial 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     and other crimes of 
a sexual nature as 
part of 
extermination as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 8: Rape and 
other crimes of a 
sexual nature as 
part of persecution 
as a crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 9: Rape and 
other crimes of a 
sexual nature as 
part of other 
inhumane acts as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Judgment, 
para. 2213 
 
Count 9: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
2224, 
under Article 6 
(3) 
 
Count 10: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
2245 
 
Count 12: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
2254, under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Convictions for 
counts 2, 6, 7, 8, 
10, 12 confirmed 
on appeal, Appeal 
Judgment, para. 
721 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     Count 10: Killing 
and causing 
violence to health 
and to the physical 
and mental well- 
being as a serious 
violation of 
common Article 3 
 
Count 12: 
Outrages upon 
personal dignity as 
a serious violation 
of common Article 
3 
 
22 Kabiligi, Gratien Brigadier General (G3, Chief of 
Operations at HQ) 
18 December 2008 Not appealed Count 6: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 8: Other 
inhumane acts as 
a crime against 
humanity in 
connection with 
None 
 
Acquitted on all 
counts, Trial 
Judgment, para. 
2204 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     the sexual assault 
of the prime 
minister 
 
Count 10: 
Outrages upon 
personal dignity as 
a serious violation 
of common Article 
3 
 
23 Nsengiyumva, Anatole  Colonel, Chief of Operations in 
Gisenyi 
18 December 2008 14 December 2011 Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 9: Other 
inhumane acts as 
a crime against 
humanity in 
connection with 
the sexual assault 
of the prime 
minister 
 
Count 11: Outrages 
upon personal 
dignity 
None 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     as a serious 
violation of 
common Article 3 
 
24 Ntabakuze, Aloys Major, Commander of Para- 
Commando Battalion 
18 December 2008 8 May 2012 Counts 2 and 3: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
 
Count 6: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 8: Other 
inhumane acts as 
a crime against 
humanity in 
connection with 
the sexual assault 
of the prime 
minister 
 
Count 10: Outrages 
upon personal 
dignity as a serious 
violation of 
common Article 
None 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     3  
25 Rukundo, Emmanuel Military Chaplain 27 February 2009 20 October 2010 Count 1: Sexual 
assault as part of 
genocide 
Trial Judgment, 
paras 574-576 
 
Conviction 
quashed on 
appeal, Appeal 
Judgment, paras. 
237, 238 
26 Renzaho, Tharcisse Prefet of Kigali-Ville 14 July 2009 1 April 2011 Count 1: Acts of 
sexual violence as 
part of genocide 
 
Count 4: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 6: Rape as a 
serious violation of 
common Article 3 
Count 1: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
779, under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Count 4: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
794, under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Count 6: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
811, under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Convictions 
reversed on 
appeal for 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
      pleading issues, 
Appeal Judgment, 
para. 129 
27 Hategekimana, Ildephonse Commander of Ngoma Camp in 
Butare 
6 December 2010 8 May 2012 Counts 1 and 2: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
 
Count 4: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity. 
Count 4: Trial 
Judgment para. 
729, under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Confirmed on 
appeal, Appeal 
Judgment paras. 
203, 204 
28 Gatete, Jean Baptiste President of MRND in Murambi 
Commune and leader of 
Interahamwe 
31 March 2011 9 October 2012 Count 6: Rape as 
crime against 
humanity 
None 
29 Bizimungu, Augustin Chief of Staff of Army 17 May 2011 30 June 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Count 6: 
Rape as a crime 
against humanity 
 
Count 8: Rape and 
other humiliating 
and degrading 
treatment as a 
violation of 
common Article 
Convicted under 
Article 6(3), Trial 
Judgment, paras. 
2127 and 
2161 
 
Conviction affirmed. 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     3  
30 Nzuwonemeye, François-Xavier Commander of RECCE 
Battalion 
17 May 2011 11 February 2014 Count 6: 
Rape as a crime 
against humanity 
 
Count 8: violation 
of common 
Article 3 
None 
31 Sagahutu, Innocent Second in Command of RECCE 
Battalion. 
17 May 2011 11 February 2014 Count 6: 
Rape as a crime 
against humanity 
and 
 
Count 8: violation 
of common 
Article 3 
None 
32 Ntahobali, Arsène Shalom Led a group of MRND militia men 24 June 2011 14 December 2015 Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 11: Outrages 
upon personal 
dignity, rape and 
indecent assault 
Count 7: Under 
Article 6(1), 
Trial 
Judgment, 
para. 6094 
 
Count 11: Under 
Article 6(3), 
Trial 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     as serious 
violations of 
common Article 3 
Judgment, para. 
6185 
 
 
33 Nyiramasuhuko, Pauline  Minister of Family and 
Women’s Development and 
member of MRND 
24 June 2011 14 December 2015 Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 11: 
Outrages upon 
personal dignity, 
rape and indecent 
assault as serious 
violations of 
common Article 3 
Under Article 
6(3), Trial 
Judgment, para. 
6093 
 
Count 11: Under 
Article 6(3), Trial 
Judgment, para. 
6183 
 
Conviction affirmed. 
34 Bicamumpaka, Jérôme Minister of Foreign Affairs 30 September 2011 Not appealed Count 8: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 10: Outrages 
upon personal 
dignity, rape and 
indecent assault as 
serious violations 
of 
None 
 
Acquitted at 98 bis 
stage 
 
(Acquitted on all 
counts) 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     common Article 3  
35 Mugiraneza, Prosper Minister of Civil Service 30 September 2011 4 February 2013 Count 8: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 10: 
Outrages upon 
personal dignity, 
rape and indecent 
assault as serious 
violations of 
common Article 3 
None 
 
Acquitted at 98 
bis stage 
36 Bizimungu, Casimir Minister of Health 30 September 2011 Not appealed Count 8: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 10: 
Outrages upon 
personal dignity, 
rape and indecent 
assault as serious 
violations of 
common Article 3 
None 
 
Acquitted at 98 bis 
stage 
 
(Acquitted on all 
counts) 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
37 Mugenzi, Justin Minister of Trade and 
Commerce 
30 September 2011 4 February 2013 Count 8: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 10: 
Outrages upon 
personal dignity, 
rape and indecent 
assault as serious 
violations of 
common Article 3 
None 
 
Acquitted at 98 
bis stage 
38 Karemera, Édouard Minister of Interior Affairs as of 
25 May 1994 
 
First Vice President of MRND 
2 February 2012 29 September 2014 Count 3: Rape as a 
natural and 
foreseeable 
consequence of a 
joint criminal 
enterprise to 
commit genocide 
(JCE 3) 
 
Count 5: Rape as 
a crime against 
humanity 
Count 3: Trial 
Judgment, paras. 
1670 under Article 
6(1), 1671 under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Count 5: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
1684 under both 
Articles 6(1) and 
6(3) 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
39 Ngirumpatse, Matthieu President of MRND 2 February 2012 29 September 2014 Count 3: Rape as a 
natural and 
foreseeable 
consequence of a 
joint criminal 
enterprise to commit 
genocide (JCE 3) 
 
Count 5: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Count 1: Trial 
Judgment, paras. 
1670 under Article 
6(1)), 1671 under 
Article 6(3) 
 
Count 5: Trial 
Judgment, para. 
1684 under both 
Articles 6(1) and 
6(3) 
 
 
40 Nzirorera, Joseph National Secretary of MRND Accused deceased 
during trial 
 Count 3: Rape as a 
natural and 
foreseeable 
consequence of a 
joint criminal 
enterprise to commit 
genocide (JCE 3) 
 
Count 5: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
None 
178
  
 
 
 
 
NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
41 Nzabonimana, Callixte Minister of Youth and Associative 
Movements in the Interim 
Government 
31 May 2012 29 September 2014 Count 7 of the 
initial Indictment 
of 21 
November 2001: 
Rape as a crime 
against humanity, 
but charge 
dropped in the 
amended 
indictments of 12 
November 
2008 and 24 
July 2009, Trial 
Judgment, paras. 
1828, 
1829; and para. 
1841 
None 
 
Rape count 
dropped 
42 Nizeyimana, Ildéphonse Captain in the Forces Armées 
Rwandaises (" FAR"); 
S2/S3, in charge of intelligence and 
military 
operations at the Ecole des Sous-
Officiers (ESO) in Butare 
Prefecture 
19 June 2012 29 September 2014 Counts 1 and 2: 
Acts of sexual 
violence as part of 
genocide 
 
Counts 4: Rape as 
a crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 6: Rape as 
Acquitted on rape 
counts.  
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     a serious violation 
of common 
Article 3 
 
43 Ngirabatware, Augustin Minister of Planning in the 
Interim Government 
20 December 2012 18 December 2014 Count 6: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity (through 
JCE 3) 
Trial Judgment 
paras. 1390- 
1393. 
Rape count was 
reversed. 
 44 Bizimana, Augustin Minister of Defence At Large  Counts 1 and 2: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
 
Count 5: Rape as a 
Crime against 
Humanity 
 
Count 6: Torture as 
a crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 7: Other 
inhumane acts as a 
crime against 
humanity 
If arrested, 
Accused will be 
tried before MICT 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     Count 8: 
Persecution as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 10: Torture 
as a violation of 
common Article 3 
 
Count 11: Rape 
as a violation of 
common Article 3 
 
Count 12: Cruel 
treatment as a 
violation of 
common Article 3 
 
Count 13: 
Outrages upon 
personal dignity as 
a violation of 
common Article 3 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
45 Munyagishari, Bernard Secretary General of the MRND for 
the Gisenyi City, President for the 
Interahamwe of Gisenyi 
  Counts 2 and 3: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
 
Count 5: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Case transferred to 
Rwanda 
46 Ndimbati, Aloys Bourgmestre of Gisovu 
commune 
At Large  Counts 1 and 2: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
 
Count 6: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity) 
 
Count 7: Rape as 
part of persecution 
as a crime against 
humanity 
 
(Rape charges 
added in the second 
amended 
Indictment filled on 
8 May 2012) 
Case transferred to 
Rwanda 
47 Ntaganzwa, Ladislas Bourgmestre of Nyakizu Commune At Large  Counts 1 and 2: 
Rape as part of 
Case transferred to 
Rwanda 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     genocide 
 
Count 5: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
(Rape charges 
added in the second 
amended 
Indictment filled on 
30 March 
2012) 
 
48 Ryandikayo,  Businessman in Mubuga secteur At Large  Counts 1 and 2: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
 
Count 6: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
 
Count 7: Rape as 
part of persecution 
as a crime against 
humanity 
 
(Rape charges 
added in the 
Case transferred to 
Rwanda 
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NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     second amended 
Indictment filled 
on 8 May 2012) 
 
49 Mpiranya, Protais Commander of the Presidential 
Guard Battalion of the Rwandan 
Armed Forces (FAR) and 
Commander of the Presidential 
Guard "Camp Kimihurura” 
At Large  Count 5: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity, or 
alternatively Rape 
as a natural and 
foreseeable 
consequence of a 
joint criminal 
enterprise to 
commit genocide 
(JCE 3) 
 
Count 7: Other 
inhumane acts as a 
crime against 
humanity- 
including acts 
committed on the 
body of the Prime 
Minister , or 
alternatively Rape 
as a 
If arrested, 
Accused will be 
tried before MICT 
184
  
 
 
 
 
NO. CASE POSITION DATE OF TRIAL 
JUDGMENT 
DATE OF APPEAL 
JUDGMENT 
CHARGE OF 
RAPE AND/OR 
OTHER SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
CONVICTION 
FOR RAPE 
AND/OR OTHER 
SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
CRIMES 
     natural and 
foreseeable 
consequence of a 
joint criminal 
enterprise to 
commit genocide 
(JCE 3) 
 
50 Munyarugarama, Pheneas Lieutenant Colonel in the FAR, 
Commander of Gako Camp 
At Large  Counts 1 and 2: 
Rape as part of 
genocide 
 
Count 7: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Case transferred to 
Rwanda 
51 Munyeshyaka, Wenceslas Priest, Vicar of St. Famille 
Parish, Kigali City 
Case transferred to France 
(Accused residing in 
France) 
 Count 2: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Case transferred to 
France 
52 Bucyibaruta, Laurent Prefet, Gikongoro Prefecture Case transferred to France 
(Accused residing in 
France) 
 Count 6: Rape as a 
crime against 
humanity 
Case transferred to 
France 
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